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The primary aim of this research is to examine the extent which prison management 
has been influenced by New Public Management (NPM).  Much has been written 
about the growing influence of NPM on public services like health, transport and 
education.  In the prison field, however, the literature is relatively limited.  
Accordingly, with particular reference to the Scottish Prison Service (SPS), this 
research attempts to fill this gap in knowledge by exploring the influence of NPM on 
the SPS and its relation to the use of contractual management of prisons. 
 
Key concerns of this research are the development of prison policy during the last 
two decades, the use of “business-like” mechanisms to manage prisons and the 
accountability measures which the SPS has undergone as a result of NPM.  The main 
sources of data are interviews with key actors in the recent development of the SPS 
and documentary analysis.  Interviewees were asked during the semi-structured 
interviews to reflect on the key concerns referred to above.  Material from the 
interviews was then integrated with academic literature, policy papers, annual 
reports, contracts and other published documents. 
 
This research concludes that NPM has affected the SPS on the dimensions of both 
prison policy discourse and of operations.  For the former, the analysis of 
contemporary prison discourse demonstrates that the focus of prison policy in 
Scotland has extended over time from traditional concepts, for instance control, 
deterrence and rehabilitation, to embrace managerial ones such as effectiveness, 
efficiency and value for money.  On the operational dimension, this research reveals 
that the extensive use of a “business-like” approach in the management of prisons, in 
particular the delegation of decision-making power from the Headquarters to prison 
governors; the use of contractual management to manage both private and public 
prisons; the use of contracting out for prisoner transportation and prisoner 
programme and the SPS’s focus on ‘customer service’.  In summary, the influence of 
NPM is more far-reaching than the privatisation of public prisons as such.  This is 
because NPM changed the way public prisons are managed by bringing in 
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This research is inspired by my experience in the prison system in Thailand.  Having 
worked at the Department of Corrections (DOC) of Thailand for four years, I 
witnessed a lot of changes in the DOC as a result of developments in the civil 
service, in particular the introduction of New Public Management (NPM).  In 
Thailand, NPM emerged in the late 1990s with the aim of improving quality of 
service without increasing the number of civil servants or the size of the national 
budget.  The DOC as a public organisation promptly responded to this development.  
The Headquarters decreased the number of administrative staff by implementing the 
government’s ‘Early Retirement Programme’, which used the savings as an 
incentive for those who had a few years left before their official retirement.  A 
number of staff who remained at the Headquarters were rotated to prison 
establishments.  Prison Governors were given more power to negotiate their prison’s 
budget and personnel.  They also have more control of the daily management of their 
prisons without the intervention of Headquarters.  These changes have taken place at 
the macro level in recent years as a result of NPM. 
 
When I arrived in the UK to pursue a PhD degree, I was still interested in examining 
whether recent trends in the prison service in Thailand resembled those in the UK
1
.  
However, before finalising my research, I undertook a pilot project to explore what I 
was really interested in (see Chapter 3).  Field visits were made to private prisons in 
both England and Scotland and to Scottish Prison Service Headquarters, and 
exploratory interviews were conducted with prison managers and staff in the two 
jurisdictions.  After the field trips, the interview materials were reviewed and reports 
on the visits were produced.  At the end of the pilot project, I was able to narrow 
                                                 
1
 Thailand has been influenced by the UK in many ways, in particular by its political system 
(Constitutional Monarchy) and its civil service administration.  Administrative reform in Thailand 
started in the reign of King Rama IV and continued with significant changes in King Rama V’s era 
when the king appointed his sons, most of whom graduated from UK universities, to take charge of 
major ministries and public organisations.  That was when the UK’s administrative principles and 
philosophy were ‘imported’ to Thailand and applied to both central and local administrations.  Though 
this was not a direct impact of the UK on Thailand, the existence of what had been brought into the 





down my research topic to the relationship between NPM and the management of the 
prison service in recent years and the Scottish Prison Service (SPS) was selected, 
mainly for reasons of convenience, as a case study. 
 
1.1 Overview: The Scottish Prison Service (SPS) 
At the time of writing this thesis (2008-2009), the SPS had 15 prison establishments 
under its supervision, two of which (HMP Kilmarnock and HMP Addiewell) were 
privately managed.  In terms of human resource management, the SPS Annual 
Report 2007-08 reveals that there were 4,048 staff working across Scotland (SPS 
2008a).  As suggested by others (Bryans 2007; Liebling and Price 2001), the work of 
prison staff is quite different from that of civil servants in other areas especially in 
terms of their responsibility and accountability.  An address of Lord James Douglas 
Hamilton, who was then the minister with responsibility for prisons in the Scottish 
Office, to the senior governors at the SPS Senior Management Conference on 5
th
 
September 1990, made clear how significant prison staff are in the prison service:   
 
The most important resource of the prison service is the people who 
work in it.  I know that you, as senior managers of the Service have 
identified, as a key priority, the need to maintain a well-motivated and 
professional workforce.  In the process, you have set yourselves the 
objective of recruiting the best available talent and of developing new 
and existing talent in the full.  No one can deny that the Prison 
Service faces a tremendous challenge in the 1990s and if we fail in 
our responsibility to support and carry forward the staff of the Service 
to meet that challenge, then it can only be to the detriment of the 
Service as a whole. 
 
In 1993, in the SPS Framework Document, Ian Lang, the Secretary of State for 
Scotland at the time, reaffirmed that ‘I know that there is a high level of skill and 
dedication among staff.  The staff are key assets for the Agency.  I recognise that the 
staff of the SPS have a difficult and demanding task to perform and I am grateful to 
them for their sustained effort and commitment’ (SPS 1993:4). 
  
The management of prison staff, therefore, requires a great deal of leadership 






‘In the late 1980s, at the peak of the disturbances, you had new staff 
coming in.  So there was real challenge with them to get them to 
understand that that was not a norm and that we try to change to the 
norm.’  (Interview, Former Chief Executive of SPS, 4 June 2007) 
 
 
1.1.1 Current Prisoner Statistics 
The SPS Annual Report 2007-08 reveals that the SPS was responsible for as many as 
8,083 prisoners, including those on the Home Detention Curfews (SPS 2008a).   This 
number is much higher than the SPS had forecasted in previous decade.  The trend of 
prison population has increased over the last two centuries (Figure 1.1) as the 
general population increased.    It also reflects changes in sentencing practice (which 
has become more punitive) and penal policy (which has become more expansionist).  
Currently, the majority of prisoners are serving serious assault and attempted 
murder, drugs and homicide respectively (Figure 1.2).   
 
 

















Figure 1.2: Sentenced prison population by selected main crime (30 June 2007) 






I. Prison Board 
The Prison Board is headed by the Chief Executive.  In 2009, the Prison Board 
comprised a Director of Human Resource, Director of Prisons, Director of Health 
and Care, Director of Corporate Service, Director of Partnerships and 
Commissioning, Director of Finance and Business Services, and three Non-
Executive Directors.  This research focuses on the roles of Director of Prisons and 
Director of Partnerships and Commissioning as they link senior management at 
Headquarters with prison establishments through prison service agreements (see 
Chapter 5).      
 
II. Headquarters 
The SPS Headquarters is based in Edinburgh.  The SPS website indicates that the 
Headquarters is home to the following directorates (SPS 2009a):  
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 See Coyle (1986, 1991 and 1994) for more details of the organisational development and a brief 





• Corporate Services Directorate is responsible for legal affairs and 
information system services.  
•  Human Resources Directorate deals with ‘employee resourcing, 
employee relations, welfare, pay and associated matters, and advice on health and 
safety’ as well as training.    
• Prisons Directorate is responsible for ‘the line management of public 
sector prisons, ensuring delivery against key performance indicators and prison 
performance contracts’. 
• Health and Care Directorate takes responsibility ‘to guide and ensure 
good quality care and highly professional caring staff meets the needs of prisoners 
and prisons’.  
• Finance and Business Services Directorate ‘consists of three key 
areas including Estate Development, Financial Services Policy, and Procurement’. 
• Partnership and Commissioning Directorate is responsible for two 
agendas: Research and Development and Commissioning and Contract Management. 
Its function also involves working with partners in different areas.  It ‘co-ordinates 
the SPS contributions to the Management of Offenders Act 2005 in line with the 
National Strategy for the Management of Offenders, supports partnership 
arrangements for the Community Justice Authority (CJA) plans, and agrees national 
and local priorities. The core role of the Directorate is as Commissioning Client for 
custodial, correctional and inclusion services for all prisoners. This role involves 
moving the focus from “public sector prison policy making” to “all sector 
requirement setting” and these new arrangements have resulted in changes in 
activity, relationships with partners, behaviour and structures’. 
 
III. Prison Establishments 
Prison establishments are headed by prison governors.  They are tied to the 
Headquarters through service agreements.  The 15 prisons are located across 
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Figure 1.3: Map of Scottish prisons 
Source: Scottish Prison Service (2009b) 
 
1.2 Objectives 
The main objectives of this research are to explore the influence of managerialism on 
prison management with reference to the experience of the SPS and to reveal the 
SPS’s response to the reform of prison management in this context.  The timeframe 
of this research was set to cover the SPS’s development from the late 1980s to 2007.  
The late 1980s was chosen as the departure point of this study simply because of the 
fact that during this period the SPS had encountered series of crises including a 
number of serious hostage-taking incidents and chronic overcrowding in the main 
Scottish prisons
4
 which required determined actions from management and the 
government (see SPS 1988, 1989, 1990a, 1990b).  In this research, key policy papers 
launched immediately after the aforementioned problems were examined to explore 
the development of prison policy and management away from the traditional 
approach that focused on authority, security and order to one that emphasised 
effectiveness and efficiency.   
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In addition, at the macro level, the 1980s witnessed the shift in the management of 
the public sector towards the use of market mechanisms as an integral part of the 
policy of the Thatcher Government (Mackie 2005:5).  The SPS, as a public service 
provider, was no exception.  The extent which these key market mechanisms were 
employed by the SPS for the management of its prisons during these 20 years is 
examined and revealed in this research.   
 
On another dimension, from the 1980s, Scotland experienced a profound 
transformation in terms of population demography, labour market, education and 
politics (Paterson, Bechhofer and McCrone 2004:149-153).  These are all factors 
that, as demonstrated by previous studies, have had an impact on penal policy 
(Garland 1985, 1990; McAra 1999; Newburn 1995, 2003).  The present research, 
therefore, took these factors into account when analysing the effect of managerialism 
on the reform of the prison system in Scotland.  
  
In summary, the primary objectives of this research are: 
 1. To explore and understand the influence of managerialism on prison 
management in Scotland; and 
 2. To examine and reveal the use of a ‘business-like’ approach in the 
management of the Scottish prisons.  
 
1.3 Research Questions 
According to the objectives of this research, the focus is on the development of the 
so-called New Public Management or ‘NPM’ in prison management with reference 
to the SPS’s experience.  NPM’s growing influence in the prison service was 
examined through the shift in prison policies and operational practices towards the 
use of a ‘business-like’ approach, e.g. through contractual management and customer 
orientation, in the management of public prisons.  This research applies insights 
revealed in the academic literature (e.g. Adler and Longhurst 1994; Flynn 1986, 





2002; Hughes 1998; Mackie 2005; Peters, 1996; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000; Walsh 
1995) over a 20-year period.   
 
This research, therefore, attempts to find out the extent to which NPM and 
managerialist ideology have influenced prison management in Scotland during the 
last two decades.  My original hypothesis was that the prison service, as a public 
organisation, has inevitably and significantly been affected by managerialism 
employed by the UK government to ‘modernise’ and improve the efficiency of the 
public sector.  In order to examine this, three research questions were formulated and 
then refined in the later stage of this research (for more details, see Chapter 3).   
 
In summary, research questions in this research are: 
1. To what extent has managerialism had an influence on prison 
management? 
2. What does the development of managerialism in the SPS look like? 
3. How has the SPS approached NPM? 
 
1.4 Outline of the thesis  
 
This thesis comprises eight chapters.  Chapter 1 Introduction provides some 
background to the research and a brief account of the organization of the SPS.  The 
objectives of the research and the research questions that it addresses are also set out 
in this chapter.   
 
Chapter 2 Prisons and the ‘New Public Management’ reviews the academic 
literature on the management of the public sector, the development of NPM and 
prison management in NPM era.  Primary references are made to Hood (1991) on the 
NPM doctrine, Adler and Longhurst (1994) on prison discourse, and Walsh (1995) 
on market mechanisms. 
 
Chapter 3 Research Design deals with research strategy and methodology used in 







Chapter 4 Changing Policy Discourses discusses the changes and development in 
prison discourses during the last two decades.  This thesis has adapted Adler and 
Longhurst’s (1994) ‘discourse matrix’ as an analytical framework to analyse 
contemporary policy documents.  The objective of this chapter is to demonstrate that 
there has been a shift in prison discourse to managerialism.   
 
Chapter 5 Managing Prison with Market Mechanisms examines the use of ‘business-
like’ approach in the management of Scottish prisons.  Three key features are 
discussed: decentralisation, contract management and customer orientation.  While 
Chapter 4 examines changes in the policy dimension, this chapter focuses on the 
operational dimension.  This sets out to demonstrate that, at the operational level, 
there has also been a movement towards managerialism. 
 
Chapter 6 Private Prisons in Scotland examines the management of private prisons 
in Scotland.  Currently, Kilmarnock and Addiewell are the only private prisons in the 
Scottish prison system.  Private prisons are a product of NPM and reflect the 
influence of managerialism at the operational level. 
 
Chapter 7 Ethics and Accountability outlines the accountability mechanisms that are 
encountered in the SPS.  The focus of this chapter is on three principal accountability 
mechanisms, namely HM Inspectorate of Prisons for Scotland, the Scottish Prisons 
Complaints Commission and the Scottish Public Services Ombudsman. 
 
Chapter 8 Conclusion summarises three key themes of this thesis: the background to 
the research and the research design (Chapter 2-3), the main findings from the 
research (Chapter 4-7) and the contribution of the research to the field of prison 




PRISONS AND THE ‘NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT’ 
 
This chapter examines the concept of New Public Management (NPM) and its 
relationship with the management of prisons.  The main aims of the chapter are to 
clarify the meaning of NPM and to illustrate its impact on prison policies and 
management during the past two decades with reference to previous studies.  The 
academic literature examined in this chapter can be divided into two thematic 
clusters: the first deals with the background of NPM covering the brief history of 
NPM, key characteristics and criticisms of NPM; and the second deals with the 
management of prisons in the NPM era.  To serve the purpose of this research, 
special attention is given to the emergence and the characteristics of NPM in the 
public sector.  In particular, the classic work of Hood (1991) namely A Public 
Management for All Seasons?, which gave rise to debates about NPM and became 
the most cited reference on NPM, is discussed and used as a framework for 
examining the influence of NPM on the management of prisons in Scotland.   
 
This chapter lays the foundation for my arguments in Chapter 4-6 where I 
demonstrate that the management of prisons has been influenced by a ‘business-like 
approach’.  In particular, Adler and Longhurst’s (1994) analysis of changes in prison 
discourse in Scotland is discussed in this chapter and adapted as an analytic 
framework in Chapter 4 for examining the influence of managerialism on prison 
policy and discourse in Scotland.  Hood’s (1991) account of the characteristics of 
NPM is then used as a framework in Chapter 5 and 6 for demonstrating the adoption 
of a ‘business-like’ approach for managing Scottish prisons. 
 
2.1 What is New Public Management?  
Since the 1980s, there have been significant changes in public management in the 
UK.  We have become familiar with such terms as decentralisation, competition, 
privatisation, deregulation, and value for money.  If one switches on a television or 
reads a daily newspaper, one will surely find at least one of these terms in 
politicians’ and high-ranking civil servants’ discourse.  Individuals employed by 
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public organisations have been reclassified into marketing-like categories i.e. 
managers, producers, providers, bidders, tenderers, operators, users and customers.  
In terms of management techniques, managers in public service have borrowed 
management tools like contract management, performance-based management, 
‘Total Quality Management’ (TQM) and key performance indicators (KPIs) from the 
private sector.  If all these changes can be summed up in one term, it would be New 
Public Management (Hood 1991).   
 
This new approach to public management has been examined by academics in 
various fields including political science, public administration, management, and 
economics.  Different commentators provide different definitions for NPM (i.e. 
Aucoin 1990; Hood 1991; Lane 2000b; Toonen 2001).  However, the work of Hood 
(1991) seems to be the most cited reference on NPM.  According to Hood (1991), 
NPM is a loose administrative term used as “a shorthand name for the set of broadly 
similar administrative doctrines which dominated the bureaucratic reform agenda in 
many of the OECD
5
 group of countries from the late 1970s” (ibid. 3).  The seven 
doctrines that Hood summarises are the overlapping precepts that appear in most of 
the NPM literature.  They are: 
• ‘Hands-on professional management’ in the public sector; 
•  Explicit standards and measures of performance; 
•  Greater emphasis on output controls; 
•  Shift to disaggregation of units in the public sector; 
•  Shift to greater competition in the public sector; 
•  Stress on private-sector styles of management practice; and 
•  Stress on greater discipline and parsimony in resource use 
 
                                                 
5
 OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) is an international organisation 
established in 1961 and currently comprises 30 member countries around the world (Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,  Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg,  Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand,  Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United 
States).  Its two main principles are democracy and the market economy.  The organisation was 
originally established as Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) in 1948 to 
administer the Marshall plan which was aimed at reforming Europe after World War II.  In 1961, it 
was extended to include countries outside Europe.   See OECD (2008) for more details. 
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‘Hands-on professional management’ (Hood also refers to it as a free to manage 
doctrine) is management in which the individual who is at the top of the organisation 
has active, visible, and discretionary control of the organisation.     
 
Explicit standards and measures of performance refer to clear definitions of goals; 
targets; indicators of success and performance, preferably in quantitative terms. 
 
Greater emphasis on output controls refers to a focus on resource allocation, 
performance-based rewards and decentralised personnel management. 
 
Shift to disaggregation of units in the public sector means the ‘break up of formerly 
‘monolithic’ units, the unbundling of “U-form”
6
 management systems into 
corporatised units around products, operating on decentralised ‘one-line’ budgets and 
dealing with one another on an “arms-length” basis (Hood 1991:5).  
 
Shift to greater competition in public sector refers to a move towards contractual 
management and public tendering procedures.   
 
Stress on private-sector styles of management practice means a move from a 
bureaucratic ‘public service ethic’ towards the use of private sector management 
techniques like flexible hiring and rewards, and public relations techniques.   
 
Stress on greater discipline and parsimony in resource use implies a focus on 
‘cutting direct costs, raising labour discipline, resisting union demands and limiting 
“compliance costs” to business’. 
 
The popularity of the NPM concept since its birth has been analysed by Hood as 
follows.  First, NPM can be viewed as a ‘whim of fashion’ (ibid. 6).  Second, NPM is 
accepted as a ‘cargo-cult phenomenon’ (ibid. 7).  Third, NPM is ‘the synthesis of 
opposites’ (ibid. 7) which are a state-led economy and a liberal economy.  Fourth, the 
                                                 
6
 Alfred Chandler, a business historian, argues that after the First World War, the management 
structure of business organisation shifted from a centralised (U-form) management to a multi-
divisional (M-form), product-base management (see Chandler 1962). 
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rise of NPM is seen as ‘a response to a set of special social conditions’ (ibid. 7).  
This fourth observation according to Hood (1991) provides the most appropriate 
rationale for the popularity of NPM in the sense that it can explain why NPM 
emerged at a certain time and place (Hood’s observation of the popularity of NPM is 
expanded in Section 2.2). 
 
The arguments set out by Hood (1991) gave rise to a wide-ranging discussion over 
the real meaning of NPM.  Ferlie, Ashburner, Fitzgerald and Pettigrew (1996) 
describe NPM using terms that represent NPM’s principal goals and characteristics, 
which are the efficiency drive, downsizing and decentralization, the search for 
excellence and a public service orientation.  Peters (1996) goes further by proposing 
four models of ‘the future of governing’ using the matrix as shown in Table 2.1.  
These four models comprise ‘market government’, ‘participative government’, 
‘flexible government’ and ‘deregulated government’.  He suggests that, compared to 
traditional administration, each model presents a ‘clear separation of roles between 
administration and politics, a hierarchal management style and pyramidal structures, 
(largely) permanent organisations and career civil servants, and accountability 
through political means’ (p.111).  However, from my initial exploration during the 
pilot project, it proved rather difficult to locate the management of prisons in terms 
of one particular governing model proposed by Peters (ibid).  Despite the fact that 
prisons are public organisations, their unique characteristics, especially in terms of 
functions, ‘customers’ or ‘clients’, accountability and the relatively closed 
organisation require a mixed managerial approach which is not fully captured by one 
single model.  At face value, for instance, the change in prison administration since 
the late 1980s seems to be described most accurately by the ‘market government’ 
model as a result of New Labour’s ‘privatisation’ and ‘decentralisation’ policy.  
However, when considering the management of prisons at an operational level and 
daily regimes within prisons, variety of prison activities are still carried out in a 
‘hierarchical’ fashion while internal communication is geared toward ‘virtual 
organisation’.  As for the policy-making process, Liebling (2004:41) suggests that 
special advisors have been brought in and advisory units or consultative bodies have 
been established replacing the monopoly of civil servants.  The points that this thesis 
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attempts to address here are the extent which the SPS has been influenced by NPM 
and whether or not it can be explained by any of the models proposed by Peters (see 























































Table 2.1: Four models of future governing proposed by Peters (1996) 
 
In a broader sense, Walsh (1995) argues that NPM comprises two important strands: 
managerialism and indirect control (p.xiii-xiv).   These two strands are quite distinct, 
as Walsh points out.  He explains (p.xiv): 
 
The first, Taylorist, strand is based on the adoption of industrial 
production engineering techniques within the public sector.  It is not a 
rejection of bureaucracy but its fulfilment.  The second is based on the 
primacy of market-based coordination.  This approach to management 
involves the creation of a core-periphery model of organisation, 
intended to enhance flexibility.  At the core are the central strategists, 
while at the periphery are those who deliver services, frequently with 
a less permanently established position than they had in the traditional 
bureaucracy.  This model is being pursued by a range of mechanisms 
from outsourcing to the creation of internal markets. 
 
Walsh’s (1995) argument on the use of market mechanisms in running the public 
services is expanded in Chapter 5, where his argument is compared with Hood’s 
account of the characteristics of NPM and Peters’ (1996) models to explore the 




Lane (2000b) defines NPM as “a theory of the most recent paradigm change in how 
the public sector is to be governed” (p.3).  Like Hood (1991), he argues that NPM 
represents an international trend in the sense that it is part of ‘the managerial 
revolution that has gone around the world, affecting all countries, although to 
considerably different degrees’ (p.3).  To give a vivid distinction of the difference 
between traditional public administration and new public management, Lane (2000b) 
focuses on the basic tasks of the public sector which are (1) the allocation, or 
provision of goods and services (2) income maintenance, or the handling of transfers 
(3) regulation or the creation and monitoring of economic rules primarily for the 
private sector but increasingly commonly for the public sector.  There are 
distinctions, he argues, between traditional public governance and modern public 
governance.  For example, traditional governance takes on several roles in allocating 
goods and services, whereas modern governance separates these roles from each 
other (Table 2.2).   
 
Traditional public governance Modern public governance 
Emphasis upon politics Emphasis upon getting the job done 
Use of public law mechanisms: 
(a) bureau; (b) public enterprise 
Use of private law instruments: 
(a) contract; (b) tendering/bidding 
Separation between public and private 
players 
Leveling the playing field 
Separation between allocation and 
regulation 
Integration of allocation and regulation 
 
Table 2.2: The differences between traditional public governance and modern 
public governance  
 
Dawson and Dargie (2002), attempt to define NPM in three dimensions: as a 
movement; a subject for study and commentary by academics; and a set of practices.  
They argue that the emergence of NPM in the 1980s reflected the movement towards 
public service reform.  The ideology for the reform of the public sector in the 1980s 
and 1990s was that public sector provision was inefficient and ineffective; that it led 
to cost and quality issues; that it affected the fair treatment of employees; and that it 
led to declining standards of public service (pp.34-35).  Considering these issues 
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from the perspective that the public and the private sectors did not have to be 
different in terms of management, politicians and their advisors then sought advice 
from the private sector.  This resulted in the public sector reform which aimed at 
‘cost containment’, ‘public support’ and ‘performance improvement’.  They pointed 
out that this movement did not only occur in the UK but also occurred in New 
Zealand, Australia, Sweden and the US, where the public sector faced similar 
changes during the1980s and 1990s.    
 
In order to gain a better understanding of NPM, the following subsections present a 
brief history of NPM with the chronology of the NPM movement in the UK, those 
characteristics that are relevant to this thesis and some of the major criticisms of 
NPM. 
 
2.1.1 A brief history of NPM 
Observers examine the origins of NPM in a number of ways from the adoption of the 
new management ‘ideology’ (managerialism) to the search for means to solve the 
problem of inefficiency in the public sector.  As discussed earlier, those who have 
written about NPM regard managerialism as the key element and have tried to make 
sense of it.  To understand the origins of NPM, it is important to look at how 
managerialism emerged in the public sector.  Drawing on the academic literature, the 
discussions on managerialism in British public service began in 1970s when the book 
called Management in Government by Keeling (1972) was launched before many 
more works on managerialism and public sector reform came out in the 1980s 
including such key publications as Managing Public Organisations: Lessons from 
Contemporary European Experience by Kooiman and Elianssen (1987) and 
Improving Public Management by Les Metcalfe and Sue Richard (1987).  In 1990s, 
Christopher Pollitt published Managerialism and the Public Services: the Anglo 
American Experience (1993a) and Managerialism and the Public Services: Cuts or 
Cultural Change in the 1990s? (1993b), which had a great impact on the study of 
public administration at the time.  Pollitt (1993b:vi) argues that, since the 1970s, 
managerialism ‘has grown enormously in salience’ in the public service, not only in 
Great Britain but also in America.  Pollitt (in Lynn 2006:115) sees managerialism as 
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‘an ideology, a set of beliefs and values centered on the role management can play in 
promoting social progress’.  He also points out that the emergence of managerialism 
in the public sector involved ‘the transfer, during the last decade or two, of 
managerialism from private-sector corporations to welfare-state services, and 
represents the injection of an ideological “foreign body” into a sector previously 
characterised by quite different traditions of thought’ (ibid. 11).  The driving force 
behind this ‘transfer’, he argues, is to minimize the differences between the 
management of private business and public services (ibid. 27).   
 
A year later came A Public Management for All Seasons? by Christopher Hood.  
Hood (1991:3) argues that the rise of NPM can be linked with four other 
administrative “megatrends” which are (1) ‘attempts to slow down or reverse 
government growth in terms of overt public spending and staffing’; (2) ‘the shift 
toward privatisation and quasi-privatisation’; (3) ‘the  development of automation, 
particularly in information technology, in the production and distribution of pubic 
services’; and (4) ‘the development of a more international agenda, increasingly 
focused on general issues of public management, policy design, decision styles and 
intergovernmental cooperation, on top of the older tradition of individual country 
specialisms in public administration’.   
 
Hood (1991) argues that NPM’s origin can be viewed as a marriage between two 
different streams of ideas namely new institutional economics (freedom to choose) 
and managerialism (freedom to manage).  He explains that the first, which was built 
on the post World War II development of public choice theory, transaction cost 
theory, principal-agent theory and theory of bureaucracy ‘helped to generate a set of 
administrative reform doctrines built on ideas of contestability, user choice, 
transparency, and close concentration on incentive structures.  Such doctrines were 
very different from traditional military-bureaucratic ideas of “good administration”, 
with their emphasis on orderly hierarchies and elimination of duplication or overlap’ 
(ibid. 5).  Meanwhile, the latter idea, which was imported into the public sector, 
‘helped to generate a set of administrative reform doctrines based on the ideas of 
professional management expertise as portable, paramount over technical expertise, 
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requiring high discretionary power to achieve results (‘freedom to manage’) and 
central and indispensable to better organisational performance, through the 
development of appropriate cultures and the active measurement and adjustment of 
organisational outputs’ (ibid. 6). 
 
According to Hood (ibid. 7), the conditions that may have precipitated NPM include 
(1) ‘changes in income level and distribution’ which underlay ‘the conditions for a 
new tax-conscious winning electoral coalition’; (2) ‘changes in the socio-technical 
system associated with the development of the lead technologies of the late 
twentieth-century’ which remove ‘the traditional barriers between the ‘public service 
sector’ and “private sector work”’; (3) ‘[a] shift towards “new machine politics”, the 
advent of a new  campaign technology geared towards making public policy by 
intensive opinion polling of key groups in the electorate, such that professional party 
strategists have greater clout in policy-making relative to the voice of experience 
from the bureaucracy’; (4) ‘a shift to a more white collar, socially heterogeneous 
population that is less tolerant of “statist” and uniform approaches in public policy’.  
A relatively similar claim is made by Hughes (1998), who argues that the NPM 
model is based on economic and private management theories whereas the traditional 
public administration model is based on the theory of bureaucracy and the theory of 
the separation between politicians and administration (p.66).   
  
In Managerialism and the Public Services, Pollitt (1993b) demonstrates that the 
emergence of managerialism in the UK, which is the main feature of NPM, began 
when the Conservatives were in power in the late 1970s.  For the UK civil service, 
Pollitt presents the chronology of the main management changes from 1976-1989 (as 
summarised in Table 2.3).  He argues that these historical events represent a strong 
emphasis on the control of civil service expenditure, decentralisation and ‘neo-
Taylorian’ management philosophy which favours clear targets, performance 
indicators and the use of merit awards, promotion or other rewards for individual 
who get ‘results’ (Pollitt 1993b:55-56).  This chronology is relevant to the present 
study because it demonstrates that the management of the public sector moved 
towards managerialism in the late 1970s and shifted dramatically in the middle and 
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late 1980s.  This confirms that it is appropriate for this research to look at the 
influence of managerialism on the management of prisons from the 1980s onwards.  
Details are discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
Year Major management changes 
1976 Introduction of Cash limits over most public expenditure 
1979 Conservative government announced a 14 per cent cut in civil service 
numbers in the five years up to April 1984. 
1979 An Efficiency Unit was set up to promote efficiency and eliminating 
waste. 
1979 Management Information System for Ministers (MINIS) was introduced, 
comprising a systematic annual review of the objectives, achievements and 
resources used by every main division within the Department of the 
Environment. 
1980 A 21-week strike occurred when government declined to implement the 
findings of Civil Service Pay Research Unit. 
1981 Megaw Committee was set up to inquire into civil service pay.  It 
recommended a new system which brought civil service pay more closely 
under ministerial control. 
1981 Civil Service Department was abolished.  Its pay and manpower functions 
were transferred to the Treasury.  The efficiency recruitment and selection 
functions went to a new Management and Personnel Office (MPO) within 
the Cabinet Office. 
1982 Financial Management Initiative (FMI) was announced to cover all 
departments. 
1983 Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS or ‘think tank’) abolished. 
1983 Further 6 per cent cuts in civil service numbers were announced.  




The annual staff appraisal system was modified so that personal objectives 
were set for each individual. 
1985 Experiments with performance-bonuses for grades 2-7 were commenced. 
1985 The Civil Service College introduced two new courses, Top Management 
Programme and Senior Management Development Programme. 
1986 FMI was reviewed and extended. 
1986 Government published review of opportunities for competitive tendering 
and contracting out within (formerly) civil service activities: Using Private 
Enterprise in Government. 
1987 The Treasury concluded negotiations with the Institution of Professional 
Civil Servants (engineers, scientists and other ‘specialists’) providing for 
‘a radical change in civil service pay’. 
1987 Management of Personnel Office (MPO) abolished, most of its functions 
transferred to the Treasury. 
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1987 The 1987 annual white paper on public expenditure contained 1,800 
‘performance indicators’ of departments’ work, representing a major 
growth in such indicators since the introduction of FMI in 1982. 
1988 Improving management in government: ‘the next steps’ was published by 
the Efficiency Unit. 
1989 Some departments begin to publish their own annual volumes of resource 
and planning information. 
 
Table 2.3: Summary of Pollitt’s chronology of major management changes  
 
Pilkington (1999) has called these changes in public administration a ‘managerial 
revolution’ which was driven by ‘the three Es’: economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness.  He suggests that the establishment of the Efficiency Unit, the Scrutiny 
Programme, and the Financial Management Initiative (FMI) constituted explicit 
evidence of the efforts of the Thatcher Government in the early 1980s to create a 
radical change in the quality of civil service management.  Pilkington concludes that: 
 
The process by which the Efficiency Unit achieved these changes 
[creating real economies and improved efficiency and increasing the 
managerial skills of senior civil servants] progressed in three stages: 
1. There was a hunt for ‘value for money’ (VFM) in terms of the 
three Es of economy, efficiency and effectiveness: mainly through 
a series of departmental scrutinies-a form of efficiency audit. 
2. In 1982 the scrutiny programme was superseded by the Financial 
Management Initiative (FMI) which was intended to ‘improve 
allocation, management and control of resources throughout 
central government’. 
3. It was Rayner7’s successor, Sir Robin Ibbs, who instituted the 
third stage of the reform programme to coincide with Mrs. 
Thatcher’s third term in government.  The Next Steps programme 
introduced by Ibbs was designed to change the Civil Service for 
ever through separating the service’s policy making functions 
from its executive role as a deliverer of services and it has to be 
said, now that the Next Steps programme has completed it initial 
stages, the intended change has indeed taken place (Pilkington 
1999:69).  
  
                                                 
7
 Besides Mrs. Thatcher as the head of the government, Sir Derek (later Lord) Rayner of Marks and 
Spencer and Sir Robin Ibbs were the two other figures who moved the management of the UK civil 
service into a new era.  With a background as a successful businessman, Sir Derek Rayner, who was 




The victory of John Major in the 1992 election, according to Pilkington (ibid.), 
underpinned the efforts to reform the civil service.  The Office of Public Service and 
Science was established soon after the formation of the Major Government to take 
charge the Next Steps programme, the Citizen’s Charter, and Market-Testing.  While 
the Citizen’s Charter aimed to increase public satisfaction with public services, 
market-testing was geared towards efficiency and economy.  Pilkington (ibid. 79) 
points out that market-testing requires public departments and agencies to ‘market-
test their activities to see whether those activities could be efficiently provided by 
outside organisations instead of continuing rather expensively in-house’.   If these 
outside organisations could do it, it was ‘a gain’.   In addition, he added, ‘even if it 
were decided to keep the activity in house, the act of considering it for tender would 
have involved the staff in a re-evaluation of the activity which in itself might lead to 
more effective execution of that activity’ (ibid. 79). 
 
The argument that NPM was intended to reform public management was 
strengthened by Pollitt and Bouckaert’s (2000) study, Public Management Reform: A 
comparative analysis, which examines recent changes in public management in 
twelve countries
8
 plus the European Union.  Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000) comment 
that public management reforms are potentially a means to multiple ends, including 
savings, quality improvement, efficiency, effectiveness, politicians’ control over the 
bureaucracy, freedom of public officials from bureaucratic constraints, and symbolic 
and legitimacy benefits (ibid. 6).  In addition, they argue, ‘public management 
reform consists of deliberate changes to the structures and processes of public sector 
organisations with the objective of getting them (in some sense) to perform better 
(ibid. 8)’.  This comparative study demonstrates that the reform of public 
management primarily occurs in four main conventional areas: finance (budget, 
accounts, audits), personnel (recruitment, posting, remuneration, security of 
employment, etc.), organisation (specialisation, coordination, scale, 
[de]centralisation), and performance measurement system (content, organisation, 
use).  However, the process of implementation varies from one country to another: 
                                                 
8
 The twelve countries in Pollitt and Bouckaert’s (2000) study are Australia, Belgium, Canada, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, United Kingdom and United 
States of America. 
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from top-down/bottom-up, legal dimensions to task allocation (ibid. 67).  When 
considering trajectories for public management reform, Pollitt and Bouckaert’s (ibid. 
24-38) model
9
 of public management reform demonstrates the important roles of and 
the relationship between socio-economic forces (global economic forces, socio-
demographic change and socio-economic policies), the political system (new 
management ideas, pressure from citizens and party political ideas), elite decision 
making and the administrative system (content of reform package, implementation 
process and results achieved).   
 
Contributors to the contemporary literature on the management of the public sector 
agree that the political factor is one the most significant factors that gave rise to 
NPM.  In addition to Pollitt and Bouckaert, Ferlie, Ashburner, Fitzgerald and 
Pettigrew (1996:1) also argue that top-down pressure was a ‘sustained’ influence on 
changes in the organisation and management in the UK public services in the 1980s.  
Meanwhile, Lane (2000b:178) explores the different NPM theories that were 
influential in public sector management in the twentieth century and concluded that 
‘new public management places a huge responsibility for public sector operations 
with politicians and managers, contracting between each other about the provision of 
goods and services’.  In addition, Hughes (1998) points out that one of the common 
features of NPM from different theories is that senior staff in public organisations are 
‘politically committed to the government of the day rather than being non-partisan or 
neutral’ (Hughes 1998:52).  He also adds that ‘political leaders are now more likely 
to select their heads of departments and require some sympathy with political goals’ 
(ibid. 76).     
 
In addition to political pressures, another significant pressure for NPM was socio-
economic change.  As mentioned above, an attempt to reduce public expenditure was 
among the main pressures for change (Flynn 1993:24).  NPM, however, did not 
completely replace older frameworks but added a new approach to public sector 
governance, in particular contractualism (Lane 2000b:3).  Market mechanisms are 
now widely used in the management of public services (Walsh, 1995).  Lynn (2006) 
                                                 
9
 Pollitt and Bouckaert’s (2000) model was developed from the reform of politico-administrative 
regimes in those twelve countries.  Chapter 2 of their book discusses the details of the model. 
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explains how the UK government has been an enthusiastic promoter of ‘business-
style managerialism’ since Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister in 1979.  The 
drivers for her reform programme include her ‘disdain’ for the civil service, her 
enthusiasm for marketing ideology, and her determination to cut public expenditure.  
Lynn (in Heinrich and Lynn 2000) demonstrates that the reform programmes of the 
UK Government were carried out using a variety of means, including those promoted 
by the Efficiency Unit, Management Information System for Ministers, the Financial 
Management Initiative, Programme Analysis and Review and the Next Steps 
Programme.  The Citizens’ Charter in 1991 aimed to encourage ‘a customer-and-
quality orientation’ in public service delivery and the Competing for Quality White 
Paper of 1991 promoted ‘contracting out, followed by exercises on comparative costs 
known as market testing’ (Heinrich and Lynn 2000:117-8).  Lynn suggests that 
public management reform in Great Britain started at the managerial level ‘with 
significant consequences for the constitutional and policy levels of governance’ (ibid. 
118).  This observation is consistent with Hood (1991:6), who notes that the NPM 
revolution of the UK has been led from above rather than from below.  In this 
research, as presented in Chapter 5, I have applied an analytical framework derived 
from Hood (1991) and Walsh (1995) to explore the use of a ‘business-like’ approach 
to the management of prisons in Scotland.  The privatisation boom and the idea of 
competitiveness are also discussed in Chapter 6 with reference to the study by Mick 
Ryan and Tony Ward (1989) that provides a chronological account of prison 
privatisation in the UK, and the study by Tim Newburn (2002) that focuses on policy 
transfer between the UK and USA and suggests that private prisons were one of the 
products that were transferred across the Atlantic. 
 
In summary, despite the fact that the development of public management in the UK 
seems to have moved in one direction towards the use of a ‘business-like’ approach 
to administration, the reform process can be divided into a number of stages.  The 
work by Osborne and McLaughlin (2002) examines significant changes in the 
management of the public sector and suggests that there have been four stages of the 
reform, with the birth of NPM falling into the final phase which began in the late 
1970s (Osborne and McLaughlin 2002:7).  According to Osborne and McLaughlin 
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(ibid.), the first stage of the development was in the late nineteenth century when 
public services were carried out by the charitable sector or through private provision.  
This period is known as the period of the minimal state.  The second stage was a 
period of unequal partnership between government and the charitable and private 
sectors, starting in the early twentieth century.  During this period, basic minimum 
services were provided by the state while the extras were extended by the other two 
sectors.  The third stage was the welfare state stage commencing from 1945 and 
lasting until the 1980s.  This was ‘the high point of the hegemony of public 
administration upon the provision of public services’ (ibid. 8).  Because of the belief 
that the other two sectors had failed to deliver public services, due to fragmentation 
and duplication, the government took responsibility for delivering all the public 
services.  The fourth stage began in the late 1980s when the public sector 
management was reformed by the use business-like approach.  This was when NPM 
emerged and impacted governmental agencies including the prison service.  The 
present research adapted Osborne and McLaughlin’s approach in analysing the 
development of prison management in Scotland by examining whether or not the 
management of Scottish prisons can be divided into a number of stages (Chapter 4).   
 
2.1.2 NPM characteristics relevant to this research 
Academics in public administration (i.e. Ferlie, Ashburner, Fitzgerald and Pettigrew 
1996; Flynn 1993; Hood 2000; Hughes 1998; Lane 2000b); Pollitt and Bouckaert 
2000; Toonen 2001) seem to agree on the key features of NPM which include market 
and competition, contracting organisations, performance measurement, customer-
oriented service, politicisation, and professionalism.  As mentioned earlier, this 
research focuses on Hood’s doctrinal components of NPM with special emphasis on 
three characteristics that are relevant to the prison service, namely a ‘customer’ or 
‘client’ oriented approach; contract management; and decentralisation.   
 
I. A user-oriented service 
One of the most significant characteristics of NPM is the focus on public service 
clients or customers, i.e. on ‘users’.  Prior to the 1980s, public administration 
discourse had been mostly about ‘staff’ or ‘the union’.  Hughes (1998) suggests that 
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management of the public sector in the NPM era becomes more participative and 
flexible than was formerly the case (Hughes 1998:244-5).  This implies that public 
sector managers recognise the importance of public participation for the delivery of 
public services.  The public are now encouraged to become active users.  Their 
feedback on the service delivered, for instance, is used as one of the key performance 
indicators for the service provider.  A user-oriented service, therefore, is a service 
that has to be responsive to the people who use it (Flynn 1993).   In designing a 
service, Flynn (1993) suggests, a service designer has to be clear about identifying 
who its users are or who the service is designed for.  The public sector cannot just 
borrow this approach directly from the private sector because there is a ‘fundamental 
difference’ between a customer orientation in the private sector and a user 
orientation in public service.   
 
Companies’ marketing efforts are directed at reaching the right 
number of right customers to buy their products or services, usually in 
competition with others.  Often, in the public sector, this is not the 
case: the problem for the organisation may not be to attract people to 
the services, but rather to deter too many people from applying for 
them and to ensure that only those people whose needs are defined by 
the policy receive them. (ibid. 145)     
 
Flynn (ibid. 145) identifies the elements of user-oriented service in the public sector 
since 1979 as follows:  
• a survey of users e.g. users of GP surgeries in the health service to 
find out what users think;  
• the identification of core and peripheral services to ensure that the 
core service meets users expectations without leaving the peripheral 
service behind; 
• customer co-production to create ‘pro-users’ i.e. in education service 
(schools and parents) and in housing service (authorities and tenants); 
•  the match between ‘the timing of demand and the availability of 
supply’.  e.g. the extended opening hours of a housing authority to suit 
the tenants and the discounted tickets for a public bus to encourage 




•  a mutually beneficial exchange between providers (staff) and the 
users; 
• the right sort of staff, which means putting the right person on the 
right job; 
• physical aspects from buildings, vehicles to forms and letters which 
are users-friendly; and 
• Packaging which can reflect what the service does, “as seen from the 
users’ point of view” i.e. a museum should be viewed as “an 
educational establishment” not just a “a convenient place to shelter 
from the rain”. 
 
These principal characteristics of NPM are expanded and discussed in Chapter 4 
where I argue that SPS policy has gradually moved towards a user-oriented 
orientation.  Also, at operational level, I demonstrate in Chapter 5 how the SPS treats 
prisoners as active users.   
 
II. Market, competition and contractual relationships  
A business-oriented approach to government is undoubtedly one of the key features 
of NPM.  Dawson and Dargie (2002) point out that the construction of the ‘quasi-
market’ is part of the NPM approach that has focused on creating institutional and 
organisational contexts that are similar to those in the private sector.  Contracts, 
rather than hierarchies, became the dominant means of control. 
 
The word quasi-market is important, because although market 
mechanisms were introduced in order to control the provision of 
services, in most cases the created market could only operate within 
two major constraints which are rarely, if at all, found in the private 
sector.  The first constraint on the market was that the available funds 
in the market were determined on an annual basis by government 
decree.  Thus even the most successful supplier could not increase the 
size of the total market…The second constraint on the market was that 
the activities in which created organisations could engage were 
carefully circumscribed by statute.   For example, although NHS 
trusts were created as providers of health care, they could not sell their 




Their observation is quite similar to that of Hood (1991) who comments that contract 
is crucial to management under the NPM umbrella as it clarifies explicit standards 
and measures of performance. Among those who have examined the contractual 
relationships in the public sector, Lane (2000b) has produced one of the most 
thorough investigations of contractualism.  He argues that NPM adds a long chain of 
contracts, transactional contracts as well as relational contracts to the old framework 
of traditional administration and that: 
 
using contracts as a coordination mechanism in the public sector is in 
principle nothing new.  But what is extraordinary in NPM is the 
comprehensiveness of its employment.  It is as if contracting in NPM 
has become more important than the traditional tools of government 
when coordinating the public sector, i.e. law, regulation and budgets.   
This raises a few interesting and perplexing questions about the 
distinction between private and public law, as public policy directing 
service delivery will be contained in contracts, enforceable in ordinary 
courts.  The critical problem in NPM is whether contracting generally 
is such a powerful tool for government to reach its objectives (Lane 
2000b: 147).   
 
In contracting regimes, Lane points out that government plays a variety of roles, 
mainly as a contractual partner and an umpire, and that it ‘cannot only be regarded as 
just another contractual partner, simply for the reason that the state is also the 
guarantor of all contracts, private or public, at the end of the day’ (ibid. 161).   
 
To examine the contractual management of the SPS, my analysis is based mainly on 
Lane’s (ibid.) and Walsh’s (1995) arguments discussed above.  In particular, the type 
of contract, the content and the roles of the parties involved, especially Headquarters, 
the contractors and prison establishments, are analysed to demonstrate the change 
from traditional prison management to the use of a ‘business-like’ approach (see 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 below).  
  
III. Downsizing and decentralisation  
Hood (1991:5) has pointed out that, in the NPM era, the formerly ‘monolithic’ units 
of public sector organisation have been broken up into corporate units organised 
around products, operating on decentralised ‘one-line’ budgets and dealing with one 
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another on an ‘arms-length’ basis.  Decision making has been decentralised to heads 
of units and the number of staff at headquarters has been reduced.  The organisation 
tends to be smaller but has become more functional.  These observations are 
consistent with Peters’ (1996) models of governance (set out in Table 2.1 above) 
which indicate that market government does not monopolise the public services and 
that, in term of structure and policy making, it promotes decentralisation, the internal 
market and market incentives to enhance the efficiency of public service delivery. 
 
Devolution of financial control and the establishment of internal agencies to operate 
as autonomous units are the two means commonly used in the public service 
organisations (Walsh 1995:165).   The introduction of the Financial Management 
Initiative (FMI) scheme can be seen as an attempt to delegate financial ‘power’ to 
local managers 
 
In this research, I examine the extent which the SPS delegated its decision making 
power from Headquarters to prison establishments.  Moreover, in Chapter 5, I 
discuss how the relationship between Headquarters and prison establishments, the 
Board and governors, and management and staff changed as a result of 
decentralisation. 
 
2.2 Critics of NPM 
Why did NPM find favour? Dawson and Dargie (2002:37) explain that, since there 
has been no large scale of opposition to NPM, it has survived for decades.  Hood 
(1991), as referred to above, provides four possible reasons why NPM ‘caught on’.  
He suggests that, ‘for those who took a sceptical view of administrative reform as a 
series of evanescent fads and fashions, NPM’s rise might be interpreted as a sudden 
and unpredictable product of “loquocentric
10
” success’ (1991:6).  However, this 
explanation does not really account for the ‘endurance’ of the seven doctrines 
mentioned above.  Second, an explanation from the perspective that NPM is a ‘cargo 
cult’ phenomenon − the endless rebirth, in spite of repeated failures, of the idea that 
substantive (cargo) can be gained by the practice of particular kinds of (managerial) 
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ritual (ibid. 7)’.  But this, according to Hood, ‘cannot tell us why the NPM variant of 
the recurring public management “cargo cult” appeared at the time that it did, rather 
than at any other’ (ibid. 7).  Third, the rise of NPM is explained in the light of the 
view that NPM is ‘an epoch-making attraction of opposites’ (ibid. 7).  Hood argues 
that the opposites in this case are the two distinct approaches to the public 
administration – the German tradition of state-led economic development and 
utilitarianism.  But, he argues, this explanation also does not tell us why those two 
distinct traditions of public administration should have united at this particular time 
rather than at any other. And fourth, it is claimed that NPM emerged ‘as a response 
to a set of special social conditions developing in the long peace in the developed 
countries since WWII, and in unique periods of economic growth which 
accompanied it’ (ibid: 7).  As discussed earlier, the conditions which led to NPM 
included changes in income level; changes in the socio-technical system; a shift 
towards ‘new machine politics’; and ‘a shift to a more white-collar, socially 
heterogeneous population less tolerant of “statist” and uniform approaches in public 
policy’ (ibid. 7). 
 
Hood outlines four major criticisms of NPM.  First and foremost, the claim that NPM 
is ‘all hype and no substance’.  This implies that the advent of the new 
managerialism has changed little, apart from the language in which senior public 
‘managers’ speak in public. Underneath, all the old problems and weaknesses 
remain’ (1991:9).  Second, ‘NPM has damaged the public service while being 
ineffective in its ability to deliver on its central claim that it lowers costs per unit of 
service’ (ibid. 9).  Third, ‘NPM, in spite of its professed claims to promote the 
“public good” (of cheaper and better public services for all), is actually a vehicle for 
particularistic advantage’ (ibid. 9).  ‘An elite group of new managerialist”, rather 
than operational staff and the public, benefits from NPM in terms of their career 
paths.  Fourth, the focal interest of Hood’s work is on this criticism − the attack on 
NPM’s claim of universality.  He explains that ‘contrary to NPM’s claim to be a 
public management for all seasons, these critics argue that different administrative 
values have different implications for fundamental aspects of administrative design-




When considering debates on NPM, it is clear that there has been a shift over these 
two decades-from arguments about its managerialist and rational choice ideology to 
debates on ethics, accountability, democracy, regulation, and the intrinsic nature of 
the public sector (Dawson and Dargie 2002:41).  Hood and Jackson (1991) note that 
‘NPM does appear to contain several of the organisational ingredients which have 
been associated with socially-created disasters.  At the worst, NPM could be a 
disaster waiting to happen’.  Likewise, Rhodes (in Lynn 2006:148) argues that NPM 
is potentially a ‘catastrophe’ as it is ‘the trends in the United Kingdom toward a 
smaller public sector with a reduced role in service delivery, a loss of function to the 
EU, and reductions in civil service discretion’.  He refers to these developments as 
‘the bold new era of the hollow state’, suggesting that they “risk institutional 
fragmentation, a loss of accountability, and a decline in the centre’s ability to steer 
the system’ (p. 127).   
 
As for criticisms on ethical grounds, Lynn (2006) raises concerns expressed by well-
known NPM scholars: Martin Minogue, and Carsten Greve and Peter Jesperson.  
Minogue (in Lynn 2006) fears that ‘deregulation, contracting, and market testing in 
the United Kingdom will sacrifice important values such as equity, community, 
democracy, citizenship, and constitutional protection’ (p.129) and argues that ‘the 
traditional public service system, with its mix of political leadership and 
professionalism, is a careful balancing of interests, both internal and external’ (p. 
129).  Likewise, Greve and Jesperson (in Lynn 2006) claim that traditional values 
like equity, due process and general public are threatened by the birth of NPM. ‘The 
shift of public services to more autonomous forms excludes or minimises democratic 
forms of accountability, and efficiency may come at the expense of service to 
difficult clients, patients, and citizens’ (p.129).  
 
Lynn (ibid.) herself makes some pertinent comments on the conflict between 
delegation and accountability.  She examines New Public Management in the light of 
the doctrines and practices of Old Public Management to demonstrate why 
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accountability has become an issue in the managerial era.  For Old Public 
Management,  
 
public managers are governed by rules and hierarchy and by the 
public service values of reliability, consistency, predictability, and 
accountability to legislatures and courts in executing and maintaining 
the rule of law (constitutional, administrative, jurisprudential) or the 
principles of Rechtsstaat, all on behalf of the common good or the 
public interest…In contrast, public managers of NPM are ‘assumed to 
be entrepreneurial “rational actors” who, in their pursuit of their 
interests, create public value much as actors in private markets do”.  
The original assumption of NPM was that introducing relatively 
uniform, market-like incentives-competition and rewards, 
proportional to performance would produce more accountability than 
the rule-bound bureaucracies of the Old Public Management. (ibid. 
142-143) 
 
The accountability issue raised by NPM is not so much delegation per 
se as the extensive sub-delegation of authority to lengthening chains 
of subordinate agents in both the public and the private sectors.  These 
elongated ‘chains of delegation’ increase the distance between the 
sovereign authority of the people’s name and financed by their 
resources, other.  By increasing the power at the lower reaches of 
administration, NPM arguably strengthens centrifugal forces of 
democratic governance weakening the hold of traditional command-
and-control and other integrative institutions, all of this with 
indeterminate consequences. (ibid. 143) 
 
Criticisms of NPM are expanded in Chapter 7 where I discuss ethics and 
accountability mechanisms for the management of prisons in Scotland. 
 
2.3 Prison management in the NPM era 
Since the focus of this research is on the management of prisons in the period 
beginning in the late 1980s and ending in 2007, with particular reference to the SPS, 
special attention is given to research and studies which covered prison management 
during this period.  In this section, I examine the impact of managerialism on prison 
management ideology, the management of prisons in the dynamic, managerial era, 






2.3.1 Managerialism and Prison discourses 
Among the academic literature, one work that had a significant influence on the 
present study in terms of its analytical approach is Michael Adler and Brian 
Longhurst’s book Discourse, Power and Justice: Towards a New Sociology of 
Imprisonment (Adler and Longhurst 1994).  This book focuses on the management of 
adult, male, long-term prisoners in Scotland and sought to provide a new perspective 
on the sociology of imprisonment.  It is relevant to this research in many ways 
especially in identifying the key actors in the management of Scottish prisons, in the 
development of prisons policy and in changing policy discourses.  In terms of key 
actors in the Scottish prison system, Adler and Longhurst (1994) classified them into 
five layers: (1) ‘an inner core’; (2) ‘an outer penumbra’; (3) ‘a ring of political 
accountability’; (4) ‘a ring of external influence’; and (5) ‘an outer ring of legal 
accountability’.  In each layer significant groups of actors are identified (see Table 
2.4).  Within the inner core of the system there were five significant groups of actors: 
civil servants at Headquarters; prison governors; prison officers; prison 
professionals; and prisoners.  In this layer, as Adler and Longhurst (ibid. 7) put it, 
although prison governors and Headquarters staff were the most influential groups in 
administrative decision-making, one cannot deny the influence of other groups.  
Prison officers, for example, were central to daily management as they were also 
involved in a decision-making process via their reports and recommendations on a 
variety of issues i.e. prisoner classification and transfer.   
 
The outer penumbra comprised the Prisons Inspectorate, Visiting Committees and 
Parole Board.  These institutions, although ‘technically’ located outside the SPS, 
were established by statute and regarded as having a legitimate input into its working 
(ibid. 8).  Next, the political accountability layer consisted of ministers and civil 
servants.  They exerted influence over the management of Scottish prisons by 
formulating policy and proposing legislation (p.10).  External influences included the 
Association of Scottish Prison Governors, the Scottish Prison Officers’ Association, 
pressure groups, professional associations and political influences.  The institutions 
in this layer represented people involved in the prison system i.e. prison staff, 
professionals, victims, prisoners’ family, and political parties.  However, according 
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to Adler and Longhurst, they did not have a great impact on penal policy in Scotland.  
‘It would seem that ministers and their civil servants are relatively free to determine 
prison policy.  They are not likely to be seriously troubled by Parliament or its 
Committees’ (ibid.12).  The last layer in the model was legal accountability 
comprising Scottish criminal courts, the superior civil courts, the European 
Commission on Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Court, and the Parliament 
Commissioner for Administration (PCA).  Adler and Longhurst point out that ‘one 
could argue that the Government treats the criminal court (even for policy purposes) 
as if they were entirely external, belonging to the outer ring of legal accountability 
when they could be treated, at least in part, as internal to the policy-making process 
and as part of the outer penumbra of the prison system’ (ibid. 13).  Meanwhile, the 
other three institutions belonging to the outer circle had a minimal impact on the 

















































































Note: * Actors/Institution deemed by Adler and Longhurst to have a significant and 
direct impact on administrative decision making. 
 
Table 2.4: Adler and Longhurst’s model of main actors in  




Adler and Longhurst’s model is used as an analytical framework in Chapter 5 and 7 
when I analyse the relationship between key actors in the Scottish prison system in 
the managerialist era.  To understand the roles of each actor and their relationships in 
the NPM period after Adler and Longhurst’s study, I re-examine these actors, 
focusing on the SPS Board, Chief Executive, prison governors and staff, to see if 
there has been any change in terms of management, hierarchy and accountability 
when the SPS decided to adopt ‘business-like’ tools, in particular contractualism, in 
its approach to management.  In Chapter 5, I argue that as a result of managerialism, 
the SPS treated prisoners more like customers and the services provided were 
increasingly designed to meet customers’ needs with advice from specialists rather 
than to serve bureaucratic needs per se.  The adoption of case management and ‘risk 
and needs assessment’ was among the most innovative examples of the so-called 
‘responsive services’.  I also attempt to find the location for new actors in the 
Scottish prison system, e.g. private partners and the Community Justice Authority 
(CJA), which were not included in the original model.  The point I wish to raise here 
is that these two actors are very likely to play influential roles, both directly and 
indirectly, in the prison system.  The role of the former, for example, became 
particularly important when the SPS contracted out some of its main services (such 
as prisoner transportation and drugs programmes) to private partners in the 1990s.  
Perhaps the most significant event in the growth of private sector involvement was 
when the SPS opened the first private prison in Scotland (HMP Kilmarnock Prison) 
in 1999 (see Chapter 6).  The latter, on the other hand, is likely to impact the SPS 
more on service delivery and resource management dimensions.  As CJA comprises 
both public and private agencies relevant to the criminal justice system and the 
community which works together to achieve common goal of public safety, its roles 
inevitably influence how prisons are managed especially in the local or community 
context.  SPS’s policies in the areas of financial management, community 
involvement and public scrutiny might need certain degree of modification when this 
new actor becomes more functional (see Chapter 4 and Chapter 5).   
 
The most relevant contribution of Discourse, Power and Justice to this study is its 
analysis of penal policy developments relating to the Scottish prison system.  Adler 
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and Longhurst (ibid.) examine the movements of prison policy in Scotland during the 
period 1985-1992, when there were many significant pressures on the SPS, 
especially resulting from overcrowding and hostage-taking incidents in prisons 
across the country.  They demonstrate that the power to determine prison policy in 
the Scottish prison system, which used to be driven by a combination of bureaucratic 
(civil servants at Headquarters) and professional (prison professionals) concerns, 
came to be shaped by an enterprising managerialism.  They explain that: 
 
The strategies outlined in C&C [Custody and Care] and A&C 
[Assessment and Control] were clearly centralising ones, which 
reflected the power bases of their authors (civil servants at 
Headquarters).  Since then, a new strategy has been developed which 
attempts to foster a common sense of ownership of the SPS.  The 
policies outlined in O&R [Opportunity and Responsibility] implied an 
alliance between administrative civil servants and professional 
governors, while the latest thinking in ASE [A Shared Enterprise] and 
OFE [Organising for Excellence] takes this one stage further by 
proposing a new form of managerial fusion.  Whether or not the 
power relations between the two existing groups of power-holders, i.e. 
between civil servants and prison governors, will allow this symbiosis 
to take place is another matter… 
 
The discursive site of this fusion between the two existing groups of 
power-holders is a specific form of managerial discourse which is 
heavily influenced by the enterprise culture and can be described as 
enterprise discourse… (ibid. 236-7) 
 
The present study takes forward Adler and Longhurst’s interest in prison discourse.  
While Adler and Longhurst focus on prison discourse between the mid 1980s and the 
early 1990s, this study deals with the developments in penal policy over a longer 
time-frame, from the late 1980s until 2007.  Their work is now discussed at some 
length in order to understand how their ‘discourse matrix’ was developed and to 
demonstrate how this matrix was adapted in this study and used as a framework for 
the analysis of prison policies in NPM era.  
 
The ‘discourse matrix’ proposed by Adler and Longhurst (ibid.) was the product of 
their analysis of prison policy between the mid 1980s to the early 1990s.  Indeed, the 
matrix was aimed at characterising those prison discourses which dominated the 
management of prisons in Scotland at the time.  These discourses were broken down 
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into two principal categories: the ends discourse and the means discourse.  The 
former refers to discourses concerned with ‘what prisons are for’.  The latter, on the 
other hand, refers to discourses concerned with ‘how prisons should be run’.  Their 
analysis demonstrated that the ends discourses at the time were rehabilitation, 
normalisation and control.  The characteristics of each ends discourse are set out in 
Table 2.5.  For example, while the focus of rehabilitation discourse was on the 
deviant individual, those of normalisation and control were on the normal individual 
and the disruptive individual respectively.  According to Adler and Longhurst, the 
dominance of one particular form of discourse and the emergence of policies that 
embodied it reflected the dominant position occupied by those who promoted it.  
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Table 2.5: Characteristics of ‘end’ discourses 
 
As for the means discourse implying how prisons should be run, Adler and 
Longhurst (ibid.) argue that, during the mid 1980s and the early 1990s, there were in 
three competing forms: bureaucracy, professionalism, and legality (see Table 2.6).  
Their source of legitimacy, focus, dominant concerns and accountability were simply 
different from each other.  For example, traditional prison management 
(bureaucracy) tended to focus on the system rather than on establishments or on 
individual prisoners and staff, and emphasised uniformity, consistency and 
conformity with rules.  Professionalism, on the other hand, put the spotlight on each 
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establishment and emphasised leadership, experience, discretion and decision-
making as well as institutional ethos.  In contrast to these two means discourses, 
legality focused on individual prisoners and sought to promote their rights.  Adler 
and Longhurst suggest that these means discourse, similar to the end discourses 
reflected ideologies promoted by key actors who had power at the time.    
 
Discourse Bureaucracy Professionalism Legality 
Source of legitimacy Fairness, 
impartiality 
Inmate knowledge Rule of law 
Focus On the system On establishments On individual 
prisoners  
Dominant concerns Uniformity, 
consistency, 












Internal Negotiated External 
 
Table 2.6: Characteristics of ‘means’ discourse 
 
Combining Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 produces a 3x3 discourse matrix (referred to by 
Adler and Longhurst as the ‘old discourse matrix’) which reflects combinations of 
means (columns) and ends discourses (rows).  They are associated with particular 
actors and institutions.  Policy documents can be located on the matrix, and one can 
chart changes in policy and practice in terms of moves between the cells of the 
matrix which reflect shifts in power between actors and institutions associated with 
those cells.   
 
The analysis approach in this research was adapted from Adler and Longhurst’s 
(ibid.) study (see Chapter 3).  Essentially, each policy document was analysed in 
order to identify dominant discourses and highlight the power holders.  Adler and 
Longhurst (ibid.) argue that the developments in penal policy in the Scottish prison 
system were evolving towards enterprising managerialism.  Notable evidence in 
support of this claim was the development from the publication of Opportunity and 
Responsibility in 1990 to the publication of A Shared Enterprise and Organising for 
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Excellence soon after that.  At the time that Opportunity and Responsibility was 
launched, bureaucracy and professionalism were the influential ‘means discourses’ 
and the document reflected rehabilitation and normalisation as dominant ‘end 
discourses’ which were driven by the key actors located at Headquarters.  A few 
years later, however, witnessed a shift in prison discourse how prison should be run.  
The launch of A Shared Enterprise and Organising for Excellence signalled the 
move toward managerialism.  Both documents set out the need to develop a unified 
workforce comprising prison staff and prison professionals as well as Headquarters 
staff. Adler and Longhurst argue that ‘the discursive site of this fusion between the 
two existing groups or power-holders is a specific form of the managerial discourse 
which is heavily influenced by the enterprise culture and can be described as 
enterprise discourse’ (ibid. 237).  As a result, Adler and Longhurst decided to adjust 
the “old discourse matrix” by replacing the rows representing bureaucracy and 
professionalism with a single row representing managerialism (Table 2.7). Although 
the end discourses remained unchanged, the means discourses had shifted towards 
the use of a ‘business-like’ approach.  As Adler and Longhurst put it, this 
development ‘reflects the pervasive impact of the ideology of managerialism on 
policy-making in Government’ (ibid. 238).   
 
Discourse Rehabilitation Normalization Control 












Legality - - - 
 
Table 2.7: Policy documents in ‘new’ discourse matrix 
 
In this study, I decided to examine the most important policy documents, i.e. those 
which were defined by the SPS as ‘key’ policy documents on its website and which 
were available to the public, namely Framework Document (SPS 1993), Vision for 
Correctional Excellence (SPS 2000b), Intervention and Integration for a Safer 
Society (SPS 2000a), Inclusion Policy (SPS 2002a), ACT 2 Care (2005a), and Health 
Care Standards (2006b).  These documents are significant in terms of their impact 
on prison regimes, prison staff, and prisoner management.  With reference to Adler 
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and Longhurst (1994)’s framework, I attempt to examine the extent in which these 
policy documents were influenced by managerialist ideology.  The analysis of these 
documents is presented in Chapter 4.  
 
2.3.2 Prison management in the time of change  
Research on the influence of managerialism on prison management are relatively 
limited (for example, Adler and Longhurst 1994; DiIulio 1991; Liebling 2004; 
Sparks, Bottoms and Hay, 1996), particularly so for the management of Scottish 
prisons.  The books by Andrew Coyle namely Inside: Rethinking Scotland's Prisons 
(1991) and The Prisons We Deserve (1994) were among the first publications that 
comprehensively documented the management of prisons in Scotland in modern 
times.  His later book, Managing Prisons in a Time of Change (2002), also makes 
important references to Scotland’s experience.  One of the strengths of this book is 
that it portrays the changes in prison management in Europe, USA, Latin America, 
Asian and developing countries.  In the early chapters of this book, Coyle describes 
the changing context of prison management, referring to political and legal change, 
the influence of international organisations and legislation, and academic knowledge 
of imprisonment.  The prison itself, he argues, is a dynamic institution.   
 
Organisational change, sometimes of radical nature, is a fact of life in 
all institutions.  In respect of prison systems this has implications for 
the work which staff are expected to undertake and for the type of 
staff which the organisation wishes to employ.  In respect of the staff 
themselves, it is likely to imply a change in the way they approach 
their daily work and their attitude to prisoners (Coyle 2002:12-13) 
 
It is possible to develop appropriate response strategies provided it is 
accepted that prison systems are no longer static hierarchical 
organisations but are dynamic institutions, subject to continuous 
change and development.  If staff at all levels can be encouraged to 
recognise this fact, they can be given the opportunity to direct and 
drive change rather than merely to respond when things go wrong 
(ibid. 13). 
 
When examining the countries in Western Europe, points out: 
 
In some countries in recent years, for example, there has been an 
increasing political expectation that prisons can make an important 
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contribution to crime reduction strategies by requiring individual 
prisoners to undertake specific programmes and courses while in 
prison in the expectation that this will lead them to break away from 
criminal activities after they are released. In the United Kingdom, for 
example, the government has been especially demanding about 
predictions of recidivism when considering prisoners for early release 
on parole or license (ibid. 31). 
 
This issue of risk and prediction is also reflected by Sparks (2007) in his recent 
article on the politics of imprisonment.  When discussing changes in the ‘mode of 
calculation’ for imprisonment, he argues:  
 
Here we encounter debates about risk and prediction, and the use of 
cost-benefit arithmetic to argue the utility of particular penal 
strategies.  One important possibility is that the current prominence of 
incapacitation as a rationale for imprisonment in the advanced liberal 
societies (and for more intensive forms of non-custodial supervision) 
stems rather directly from the invention of new techniques for 
calculating the frequency and prevalence of offending.  The 
implication is that the penal system is entirely a regulatory 
instrument-a kind of social sluice gate whose optimal rate of flow can 
in principle be rationally determined.  This perspective has certainly 
had its influential intellectual proponents in recent years. (Sparks 
2007:79) 
 
The impact of managerialism on the management of prisons in this NPM era is 
systematically captured in Prisons and Their Moral Performance: A study of Values, 
Quality, and Prison Life by Liebling (2004).  Although it is not a primary concern of 
her study, this book demonstrates how prison management has been affected by a 
managerialist ideology by referring to the experience of English prisons.  The term 
‘late modern’ prisons used in her study reflects the fact that prisons are now 
managed in a different era.  It is, I argue, the NPM era.  Liebling (2004) explains that 
the term ‘highlights the rapidly changing social context in which the prison currently 
exists − a context which shapes the prison but in which certain important features 
persist’ (p. 3).  What is potentially relevant to the present study is her argument about 
the changes of prison values and management and the relationship between key 
actors in the current prison system.  Liebling’s analytical framework and the results 
from her interviews with prison managers are also referred to in Chapter 5 when I 




When examining the management of public service agencies including the prison 
service in the era of NPM, one of the major concerns has been that of ethics and 
accountability especially when privatisation of public organisations is concerned.  To 
ensure the transparency and integrity of the service, accountability mechanisms were 
put in place so that service delivery could be closely monitored.  Coyle (2002) points 
out that public accountability comes in different shapes.  It ranges from internal 
accountability, where the prison is responsible to the administration for letting the 
public know what happens behind the walls and fences, the utilisation of formal 
mechanisms e.g. independent prison inspections and informal mechanisms, like 
encouraging non-governmental organisations and other groups of public citizens to 
visit prisons and engaging them in prison activities.  Adler and Longhurst (1994) also 
examined the role of various mechanisms for holding the prison system in Scotland 
to account (pp.137-181), in particular the use of petitions to Secretary of State and 
the role of the Prison Inspectorate.  These mechanisms are re-examined in this 
research to see whether they are still significant in the managerialist era.  Chapter 7 
discusses in detail the mechanisms that are currently used in the Scottish prison 
system, referring to Harding’s (1997) book on the public accountability of private 
prisons and Kolthoff’s (2007) research which studies the relations between NPM and 






This chapter deals with the research design adopted in the thesis.  The focus is on 
how the research was developed, what methods were used and how the data were 
analysed and presented.  Limitations and ethical aspects of the methodology used are 
discussed at the end of the chapter. 
 
3.1 Objectives and research questions  
As indicated in Chapter I, the objectives of this research were: 
1. To describe and understand the influence of managerialism on prison 
management in Scotland. 
2. To describe the SPS’s response to the reform of prison management.  
And this research was aimed to answer the following principal questions:  
1. To what extent has managerialism had an influence on prison 
management?; 
2. What does managerialism in the SPS look like?; and 
3. How has the SPS approached ‘New Public Management’ (NPM)?   
 
3.2 Research strategy 
This research builds on a pilot project that was carried out during 2005-2006.  It 
employed the principles of field research suggested by previous scholars (Burgess 
1991; Van Maanen 1988, 1995). The aims of the pilot project were to obtain an 
overview of prison management and prison privatisation issues in England and 
Scotland (partly inspired by Parry 1990, 2005; Shaw 1990; Shichor 1995); and to 
explore the possibility of data collection from the SPS and from private prisons; and, 
most importantly, to inform the research.  The pilot project started in November 2005 
after reviewing the relevant academic literatures (in particular, Adler and Longhurst 





 were established with reference to the academic literature and 
my personal interests, and were used as a guideline during the field study.   
 
I began my journey with a visit to the Serco Group.  The visiting programme was 
arranged with Serco’s contact person, who I had met during the annual conference of 
the International Corrections and Prisons Association (ICPA) in Edinburgh earlier 
that year.  The coordination process took approximately 2 months before the 
schedule was finalised in January 2006.  For this pilot project, Serco invited me to 
visit the Serco Institute and three of the prisons under its management: HMP&YOI 
Doncaster, HMP&YOI Ashfield and HMP Kilmarnock.   
 
At the Serco Institute, an informal interview was conducted with the Executive 
Director.  The Serco Institute was established in 1994.  Its main missions involve 
research in various areas corresponding to Serco’s business ranging from defence, 
transportation, education and health to prisons.  The Serco Institute also serves as a 
member of the Public Services Strategy Board of the Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI)
12
.  The establishment this institute by Serco reflects an increasing 
involvement in research by the private sector.  Research studies have been carried 
out to produce ‘evidence’ that undoubtedly aimed to support its business, reflecting 
the assertive role that private companies have come to play in increasing their 
influence in the market and responding to the British government’s evidence-based 
policy regime.   
 
Later, visits to HMP&YOI Doncaster, HMP&YOI Ashfield and HMP Kilmarnock 
provided a more vivid picture of how private prisons in the UK are managed.  At the 
time of my visits, Serco was the only private company to have won contracts to 
manage prisons in both England and Scotland.  Based on my prison tours and those 
                                                 
11
 Initial interview questions were general questions used as a guideline for the interviews with prison 
administrators, staff and civil servants of the SPS as well as the staff of the Serco Group plc.  The 
questions covered issues concerned with prison management, private prisons, prison privatisation, 
prisoner programmes, prison staff and prison policy.  Interview materials from these initial interviews 
were not transcribed in full but rather summarized and used to categorize the issues needed to be 
examined in the main research.    
12
 Board membership provides ‘liaison across the UK public services sector, with particular focus on 
policy developments affecting the delivery of public services’ (Serco 2008b).  
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initial interviews with prison administrators and staff, I found that the management 
of private prisons in the two jurisdictions differed as a result of many factors 
including penal policy and the size of the prison population.  Serco’s management 
and staff suggested that the relationship between the Home Office and private 
providers in England was more contractually based and one member of staff referred 
to it as a demanding-detecting relationship.  In Scotland, where private prisons were 
relatively new, the contractual relationship was more consensual, due in part to the 
fact that the private company and the SPS were still at the stage of getting to know 
each other.  From this point, I asked a further question of what the contractual 
management in Scotland actually looked like, what type of contracts were used and 
how the management of prisons was changed by contractualism.  In Chapter 5 and 6 
of this thesis, I examine and discuss different dimensions of the prison contracts, in 
particular their content and influence, and the identity of key actors, for contract 
management.    
 
Another issue that I found interesting was that the staff in private prisons did not 
seem to differ in terms of work ethic and accountability from their counterparts in 
public establishments.  From my observations and, judging from the answers they 
gave me during informal conversations, staff of the private prisons were just as 
enthusiastic as those in public prisons.  They knew what they were supposed to do.  
They were not just going through routines in order to make profits for their company 
as claimed by some critics of private prisons.  This may have resulted from the fact 
that their performance was being closely monitored, not only by the prison service 
but also by the public and the media.  Administrators and staff attributed this to the 
Key Performance Indicators (KPI) scheme that was being used as a mechanism for 
assessing goal attainment, and to teamwork orientation and bottom-up management.  
In public prisons, however, these managerial techniques were relatively new.  Some 
of the questions raised during the interviews, e.g. (1) to what extent has the 
‘business-like’ approach been used for the management of public prisons? (2) which 
business strategies were employed? and (3) did they bring improvement to prison 
management? were taken on board and later became the main research questions for 




After my visits to the Serco Institute and the three prisons under Serco’s 
management, I came back to Scotland and conducted preliminary interviews with 
SPS administrators and staff.  As these were only exploratory interviews, they were 
not recorded and transcribed in full.  The interviewees were drawn from different 
units and the interviews covered a range of topics including the development of 
prison management in Scotland, contracts with private providers, contracts with 
establishments, contract management, prisoner programme contracts, personnel 
management, and political influences on prison management.  The interviewees were 
also asked to comment on challenges and opportunities raised by the issues 
discussed.  Data from these interviews with SPS staff were then used to shape my 
research questions. 
 
The common issues raised by the interviewees in Scotland were the development of 
managerialism and the extent it had affected their daily work.  For instance, a 
member of the operational staff mentioned that ‘the principle of KPI is good. 
However, it makes the work of prison staff more difficult.  We have not only to 
concentrate on our job description but also on managerial work.’
13
 The 
administrators, on the other hand, took the view that managerialism would create a 
more systematic operation and enhance the management of prisons at the macro 
level.  A middle manager from Headquarters commented that ‘the development of 
prison policy and operations gradually move toward managerialism.  It is the trend 
and the policy from the government which aim to improve the quality of prison 
service.’
14
  These different perspectives of the SPS members were among issues used 
to establish the themes for the data collection process of the main research (discussed 
below).   
 
The above findings from the pilot project were then integrated with arguments from 
the literature to develop the research questions as mentioned earlier and to determine 
the research approach to be used for the present study.  Taking all into consideration, 
a deductive approach was adopted as the key strategy for the examination of the 
                                                 
13,14




research questions.  That is, we know for the fact that the management of the UK’s 
public services in general has been influenced by the managerialist approach 
launched by the Thatcher Government in the 1980s and that prison service 
management in Scotland has changed a great deal since the late 1980s especially in 
terms of internal prison policy and daily operations (as presented in Chapter 2).  This 
thesis, therefore, attempts to demonstrate that the management of prisons in 
Scotland, as part of the public service management, has shifted from a traditional 
bureaucratic approach to a managerialist approach.  The research method used in this 
thesis is presented below.  
 
3.2.1 Case Study  
After conducting the pilot project, my research interest expanded beyond the 
management of private prisons.  It shifted to the macro level of prison service 
management.  As suggested by the exploratory interviews during the past two 
decades the management of prisons in the UK has changed a great deal as a result of 
the reform of public services management.  Private prisons were merely one of the 
managerial alternatives that the government used as a means of improving the 
quality of the prison service.  I, therefore, decided to study the management of both 
public and private prisons, in order to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of 
how the prison service as an organisation has changed overtime.  Other ‘business-
like’ managerial approaches in addition to privatisation, e.g. ‘customer-oriented’ 
management and contract management, were therefore also examined.    
 
Despite the fact that my initial intention had been to compare Scotland with England 
and Wales, I did not pursue a comparative approach in my main study because of 
time constraints and my limited budget.  Collecting data in two jurisdictions would 
have demanded substantially more time and cost considerably more money.  Besides, 
the size of the prison service of Scotland was much smaller than that of England and 
Wales.  Also, differences in prison regimes and in prison culture as well as 
management challenges (Garland 1985, 1990; SPS 2005b) would also have made 
such a comparative study much more difficult.  Equally important, as mentioned 
earlier, since the research approach used in this research is a deductive one that aims 
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to examine whether changes in the management of SPS followed the general trend, a 
case study approach certainly suited the purpose of this research more than other 
alternatives including a comparative study. 
 
A case study was therefore selected as the principal method for this research.  The 
primary advantage of a case study is the potential for generating in-depth data.  As 
suggested by Gerring (2007:20), “the fewer cases there are, the more intensively they 
are studied, the more work merits the appellation ‘case study’”.  Since this study 
attempts to examine in detail the influence of managerialism on the SPS and the 
extent to which the SPS has employed a ‘business-like’ approach to running its 
prisons, a case study enabled me to concentrate on collecting in-depth data about the 
SPS and to produce comprehensive evidence to support my arguments.  These 
strengths of a case study approach compensated the generalisation problem for which 
it has always been attacked.  As suggested by previous scholars, the benefits of case 
study can overcome its flaws depending on the research purpose (Bryman and 
Burgess 1999):   
 
‘Over the years, the case study has been controversial.  The bulk of 
the controversy surrounding it has been concerned with the question 
of generalisation: how can the study of a single case (or even two or 
three cases) be representative of other cases so that it is possible to 
generalise findings to those other cases?  The answer, of course, is 
that it cannot.  What the case study can provide is the opportunity to 
develop rich contextual data from which generalisation to theory 
becomes possible’. (p. XIV) 
 
Why was the SPS selected as a case study in this research?  First and foremost, 
although the period from late 1980s to the present witnessed the emergence of 
managerialism and dramatic developments in prison management in Scotland, 
research on managerialism in the Scottish prison system has been relatively limited.  
We know for a fact that, from the late 1980s, there was a shift in the management of 
prisons including the reorganisation of the SPS in 1991, the reassignment of its status 
when it became an Executive Agency in 1993, the establishment of the first private 
prison in Scotland in 1997 and the more political scrutiny after devolution in 1999.  
Despite these changes, very few studies have focused on this issue.  Accordingly, the 
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present study attempts to fill this gap by exploring those changes and demonstrating 
that they were driven by managerialist ideology. 
 
Convenience also made the SPS an appropriate case study in particular in terms of 
access to the agency’s documents and prison establishments.  With my background 
as a civil servant of the Department of Corrections of Thailand, I could refer to my 
experience in my contacts with the SPS staff both at Headquarters and in prison 
establishments.  In addition, before coming to pursue my degree in Scotland, I had 
visited SPS Headquarters and some of its prisons in 2002.  This was on an official 
visit organised by the SPS.  The delegation from Thailand comprised high-level 
prison administrators, prison governors and civil servants from Headquarters.  The 
persons whom I met during that visit had been promoted to a higher level by the time 
the data collection process was conducted and some of them were invited to 
participate in the research.   
 
My connection with the SPS was strengthened during the course of this research 
when I volunteered to help the SPS in organising the annual conferences of the ICPA 
(for which the SPS provides the secretariat) on two occasions.  In addition, in 2007 I 
was invited by the SPS research team to assist with its annual prison survey.  This 
gave me an opportunity to visit and observe various prisons in Scotland and also to 
interview prisoners who were asked to comment on the services provided by SPS.  
My experience during the survey helped increase the validity and reliability of my 
research, especially in terms of analysing the ‘customer-oriented’ policy of the SPS.   
 
When looking at the timeframe of this research, I chose to focus on the influence of 
managerialism from the late 1980s to 2007 (until the 2007 general election).  During 
these 20 years, the SPS has undergone a number of significant changes, especially in 
its agency status, mission, organisational structure and management.  These changes 
resulted from both internal factors (i.e. security incidents and the problem of 
overcrowding) and external pressures (i.e. privatisation policy, social and economic 
change, and local and national political pressures).  To assist with data collection and 
analysis approach in the present study, the timeframe of this research was initially 
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divided into three phases: (1) from the late 1980s to the early 1990s; (2) from early 
1990s to 1997 (from its designation as an Executive Agency to devolution); and (3) 
from 1997 to 2007 (from devolution to the present)
15
.   
 
What made the late 1980s an appropriate starting-point was the fact that there were, 
at the time, a range of unprecedented security incidents; significant changes in prison 
policies and management were proposed, and that there was a privatisation boom that 
led to major changes in public sector management (see James, Bottomley, Liebling 
and Clare 1997).  The security incidents in Scottish prisons in the late 1980s 
obviously called for attention from all the parties involved ranging from policy 
makers and operational staff, and ultimately led to significant changes in prison 
management in Scotland.  A series of important policy papers, Custody and Care 
(1988), Assessment and Control (1989) and Opportunity and Responsibility (1990a), 
were the product of these incidents.  These policy papers, along with the SPS 
Framework Document (1993), produced a basis for the reorganisation of SPS in 
1990s.  Adler and Longhurst (1994) analysed these policies in detail and produced a 
‘discourse matrix’ out of these policy papers (as presented in Chapter 2).  However, 
there were some areas that Adler and Longhurst did not cover in their book, for 
instance, the use of ‘business-like’ techniques as a result of the changing prison 
policy and the management of private prison contracts.  Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 of 
this research discuss these issues with reference to Adler and Longhurst’s arguments 
on the aforementioned policy papers. 
 
In any event, evidence showed that, prior to the late 1980s, penal policy in Scotland 
focused on traditional objectives like welfare, rehabilitation, normalisation and 
control (Adler and Longhurst 1994; Duff and Hutton 1999; McAra 1999, 2005; 
Muncie and Sparks 1991).   In May 1990 the Scottish Prison Service published 
Opportunity and Responsibility: Developing New Approaches to the Management of 
the Long Term Prison System in Scotland.  In this document, Malcolm Rifkind, 
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 The interviewees were asked to reflect on this timeframe and whether the development of 




Secretary of State for Scotland at the time, addressed the need to change prison 
policy based on the two earlier documents.  In his statement, he commented: 
 
It is clear that the old objectives of ‘treatment and training’ are 
outmoded.  A new approach is required, which will recognise the 
mutual responsibilities of the prisoner and the prison authorities and 
ensure that the long term prisoner is encouraged to address his 
offending behaviour and offered an appropriate range of opportunities 
to use his time in prison responsibly for personal development…’. 
(SPS 1990a) 
 
When considering the UK context, the 1980s witnessed major changes in many 
public sector organisations.  Ferlie, Ashburner, Fitzgerald and Pettigrew (1996) 
suggest that the key changes included the introduction of a large-scale privatisation 
programme in the sphere of economic activity; the subjection of many social policy 
functions to the processes of managerialisation and marketisation (i.e. the creation of 
devolved and quasi-autonomous agencies (the so-called ‘Next-Step’ agencies); an 
emphasis on the ethos of ‘doing more with less’; and the move from maintenance 
management to the management of change.  In 1988, when Next Steps was launched 
by the UK government, its aims were to ‘create durable improvements in 
management in government and to deliver services more efficiently and effectively 
within available resources for the benefit of customers, taxpayers and staff’ (Greer 
1994).  In due course, it led to the changes in prison management in Scotland.   
 
From 1990 to 1999 there were many significant changes in the political realm in 
Scotland and these, of course, affected the development of Scottish prison 
management.  These ranged from conferring Executive Agency status on the SPS by 
the Scottish Office in 1993 to the reorganisation resulting from devolution in 1997.  
During this decade, another significant development in SPS was the establishment of 
the first private prison in Scotland.  The opening of HMP Kilmarnock in 1997 
received considerable attention from politicians and the public, and from prison staff 
and administrators.  Expectations of this new private prison were high.  Politicians 
anticipated that competition between private and public prisons would ultimately 
lead to a better service for the public.  Administrators expected a more efficient 
service while the public and interest groups called for a punitive but humane 
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approach to the treatment of prisoners.  The present study attempts to argue that 
private prisons in Scotland should be viewed as both a product of and as a catalyst 
for managerialism (see Chapters 5 and 6). 
 
The period from devolution in 1997 to 2007 witnessed a major development of 
managerialism in SPS.  Contractual management become the principal means for 
enabling SPS to achieve its mission.  In the Forward to its Annual Report and 
Accounts 2005-2006, the SPS Chief Executive spent paragraph after paragraph 
describing its business plan, vision, Policy Framework, Key Performance Indicators 
(KPI), agreements with Ministers, and contract (SPS 2006a).  These reflect the 
gradual growth of managerialism in prison policy discourse.    
 
An alternative research method for this research would have involved a survey 
and/or the use of focus groups.  A survey would have enabled a large number of 
informants to be included in the study and standardised questionnaires would have 
made generalisation possible.  In addition, focus groups would have helped to 
elucidate what survey questions could not capture.  However, this approach was 
rejected because it was not flexible enough to suit the objectives of this research.  
The in-depth data which this research required could not have been produced through 
the use of questionnaires.  Questions could not have been modified since survey 
research requires that the original research design remains unchanged until the data 
collection process is finished (Maxfield and Babbie 2005).  Moreover, even though 
the use of focus groups might have helped to solve the flexibility problem, it would 
have been very difficult and costly to arrange focus groups for the informants of this 
study as they were ‘high profile’ politicians, civil servants and academics who were 
(a) very busy people and (b) lived far apart from one another.   
 
3.3 Data sources 
Both primary and secondary data were used in this research.  Primary data were 
mainly drawn from the interviews while secondary data were obtained from the 
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analysis of publicly-available documents
16
.  With few exceptions, the data used in 
this research were qualitative. 
 
3.3.1 Primary data 
The research technique used to obtain primary data for this thesis was the interview.  
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with informants at locations convenient 
for them, ranging from their office, the School of Law of the University of 
Edinburgh to the National Library of Scotland.  Purposive sampling, which is a non-
probability sampling procedure, was used to draw up an initial list of potential 
informants.  Maxfield and Babbie (2005) state that 
 
‘Occasionally, it may be appropriate to select a sample on the basis of 
our own knowledge of the population, its elements, and the nature of 
our research aims in short, based on our judgment and the purpose of 
the study.  Such a sample called a purposive sample.’ (p.238) 
 
Purposive sampling is used when researchers wish to select specific 
elements of a population.  This may be because the elements are 
believed to be representative, extreme cases or because they represent 
the range of variation expected in a population’ (p. 243).   
 
In this study, considering that the prison service in Scotland is relatively small and 
that it was not very difficult to identify those who were actively involved in prison 
management and could act as expert informants, purposive sampling was a 
reasonable choice.   
 
The process of identifying potential informants was simple but effective.  A list of 
prospective interviewees was drawn up after reviewing relevant policy documents, 
for example, SPS annual reports, policy papers, parliamentary reports, and previous 
research.  The main selection criteria were that informants had to have knowledge 
and/or experience of prison management in Scotland between the late 1980s and 
2007.  In order to ensure that the key informants, who could enhance the validity of 
this research, were selected, I brought this list to the attention of Dr. Jim Carnie, 
Research Manager of the SPS, and asked him to comment on the initial list.  After 
                                                 
16
 At the SPS headquarters, I had access to some unpublished documents. However, for confidentiality 
reason, I decided not to include these documents in the research.    
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this consultation, a ‘revised’ version of the interviewee list was drawn up.  In 
addition, after the interview process had started, a snowball technique was used to 
make sure that this study included as many key informants as possible.  I applied this 
technique by asking each informant if there was anyone else who could comment of 
this particular issue.  When the informants suggested the name of another potential 
informant, I took note of their names and discussed it with my supervisors and with 
Dr. Carnie to determine whether the suggested individual should be included in the 
study.   
 
Who did ultimately participate in the interviews? The ‘revised’ list of informants 
comprised 38 individuals.  They were categorised into three broad groups: politicians 
(11); civil servants (21); and academics and others (6).  The definitions of each 
category were as follows: 
 
Politicians referred to individuals who were Members of Parliament (MP) 
and Members of Scottish Parliament (MSP) and whose professional 
responsibility involved prison policies and prison management in Scotland.   
 
Civil servants were those who were still working (non-retired) at the time of 
the interviews and those who used to work (retired) for the Scottish 
government or the SPS.  It should be noted that those who were retired civil 
servants and later became academics were classified as retired civil servants 
not as academics.   
 
Academics referred to individuals working as academics and/or researchers at 
universities or similar institutions. Others included individuals who worked 
for independent agencies, for private providers or for the Trade Union Side, 
and whose professional responsibilities involved the SPS. 
 
After thirty eight invitations were sent out, I received twenty four responses of whom 
twenty one agreed to participate in the research (Table 3.1).  Acceptance rates among 
non-retired and retired civil servants and among academics and others were very 
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high indeed.  However, the acceptance rate among politicians was disappointingly 
low (less than 10%).  The political situation at the time of the interview might help to 
explain this low participation rate.  It was unfortunate that the data collection process 
for this research started in 2007, the same year as elections for the Scottish 
Parliament were held.  Many politicians seemed to be pre-occupied with 
campaigning.  More importantly, professional politicians did not always retain a 
strong interest in their former fields of responsibility once they had moved on to 
other tasks, or had retired from active political work. They may not have felt that 
they had anything to contribute, and/or they may not have been all that interested.  
Out of eleven invitations to politicians, only four responses were received.  All four 
refused to be interviewed and provided the same reason; that is, in their current 
position they were no longer involved with the SPS and their knowledge of Scottish 
prisons was not up-to-date.  Two of them, however, suggested alternatives.  Luckily, 
both the alternatives (one was an SPS staff member and the other was an MP) agreed 
to participate in this research.  While the SPS staff member agreed to a face-to-face 
interview, the MP requested a postal interview.  Nevertheless, in order to compensate 
for the low participation rate of politicians that might have affected the validity of 
this research, I used the SPS annual reports and policy papers − which contain 
comments from politicians, for instance, from the Secretary of State for Scotland, the 
First Minister, other Ministers, MPs and MSPs − as substitutes.  
 
 
Table 3.1:  Summary of samples used in this research 
 
It should be noted that one of the main problems which is likely to occur in research 

















6 6  21 
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what they think now rather than what they thought at the time and may be motivated 
by a desire to present themselves in a positive light.  To avoid this danger, interview 
data was crosschecked with contemporaneous documentary data to assess whether 
they supported or conflicted with each other.   
 
3.3.2 Secondary data 
Secondary data, such as historical facts, statistics and policy documents, were just as 
important as primary data in this study because they also provide empirical evidence 
that could be used to support my argument.  With few exceptions, the secondary used 
in this research were qualitative.  The main advantage of secondary data was that 
they were convenient to obtain, saving both time and expense. 
 
The use of secondary data in this research was twofold.  First, they were used 
independently as the sources of information to support my arguments.  Inferences, 
however, were drawn with care as suggested by others (e.g. Altheide 1996; Platt 
1981) because they were not originally produced to serve the purpose of the present 
study.  Secondly, I used secondary data to check the reliability of interview data.  I 
found during the interviews that some informants were not certain about historical 
facts and statistics and that they sometimes made claims that could not be true.  In 
these circumstances, the data from documents such as annual reports and policy 
statements were used to verify what the informants had said. 
 
3.4 Data collection methods 
As mentioned above, two types of data were used in this study: primary data and 
secondary data.  To obtain the primary data, face-to-face, semi-structured interviews 
were used (except for one case where a postal interview was conducted).  The 
interview process started when the research proposal received ethics clearance from 
the School of Law.  In total, it took approximately 12 months to complete the 21 
interviews.  On the other hand, the documentary research was a continuous process 
involving a review of relevant academic literature, a summary and a categorisation of 
data into the identified themes.  Having said that, the analysis of the policy papers 
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and the prison records alone took approximately 18 months.  Details are discussed 
below. 
 
3.4.1 The interviews 
The interviewing process started in March 2007 when invitation letters (see 
Appendix One) were sent out to prospective informants (as discussed in section 3.3.1 
above).  Prospective informants were informed of the background of the study, their 
roles in the research, the nature of the interview, the issue of confidentiality and the 
benefits that would arise from their participation.  It was made clear that their 
participation was voluntary and that their decisions would be respected.  In total 
twenty-one informants agreed to be interviewed − nineteen of whom were from the 
‘revised’ list of prospective interviewees and two were from snowball sampling. 
 
All prospective informants except the non-retired civil servants in the SPS were 
directly approached by the aforementioned letters.  For the non-retired civil servants, 
seven were from the SPS and one was working for a former Director at the SPS 
Headquarters.  Before the interview with these civil servants started, access was 
negotiated through the Research and Development Unit at the SPS Headquarters.  I 
was asked to fill out the SPS research ethics form and then submit it to the Research 
and Development Unit along with the research proposal, tentative interview 
questions and invitation letters for approval.  When the proposal was approved, the 
invitation letters were then distributed by the Research and Development Unit on my 
behalf to each prospective civil servant.  This process took approximately two weeks.  
The final list of interviewees is presented in Appendix Four. 
 
Since the interviews were semi-structured, the questions were relatively flexible and 
could be altered to suit particular informants.  Skeleton interview questions (see 
Appendix Two) were drawn from the main research questions and used as general 
guidance.  Some of these questions aim to explore the issues that emerged during the 
pilot project and literature review stage, for instance, the challenges in managing 
prisons in Scotland from the 1980s to 2007 (Ferrant 1997; Garland and Young 1992; 
Garland 2001a, 2001b; Girling, Loader and Sparks 2000; Hope and Sparks 2000; 
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Hughes 1998; Hughes, McLaughlin and Muncie 2002; Johnson and Scholes 2001; 
Young 1997), the emergence of private prisons (Jones and Newburn 1998; Matthews 
1989), the role of politics and politicians (Goldstein 1999; Hudson 1993; Hutchison 
2001; Ryan 1978; Ryan, Savage and Wall 2001; Sarabi and Bender 2000) and the 
effect of the devolution on prison management in the late 1990s (Curtice 2002; 
McAra 2005).    
 
Most face-to-face interviews were carried out at the informants’ place of work.  One 
of the benefits of this was that I was able to observe their working environment and 
practices.  I found this very helpful for the validity and reliability of this research 
when the researcher can crosscheck between what the interviewees had commented 
and what actually took place at work.  In fact, some of the interview questions arose 
after I had entered the premises and observed the interactions between informants 
and their colleagues.  These were spontaneous questions that would not have been 
asked if the interviews were carried out somewhere else.  For the postal interview, 
the list of questions was sent to the informant by post.  A hand-written letter was sent 
back along with the answers to the questions asked.   
 
I started each face-to-face interview with an introduction to the research, its aims and 
methodology.  Informants were given an opportunity to ask any question they wished 
regarding the research.  Some asked about my personal background and work 
experience.  Others asked me to say something about my work at the Department of 
Corrections in Thailand.  During this introductory stage, interviewees were also 
informed that they could withdraw from the research at any time.  Fortunately, no 
one withdrew.  I made sure that they had no further questions before giving them the 
consent form to sign.  All but one informant agreed to the use of their name in this 
research.  Two requested I should consult them before using any quotes.  In any 
event, I took the liberty of presenting the quotes by using the interviewees’ recent 
position(s) relevant to the SPS instead of giving their full names.  Once the informed 
consent form was signed, the process of asking questions began.  All interviews were 
noted and digitally recorded.  The average length of each interview was one hour.  At 
the end of each interview, I requested an opportunity to make further contact with the 
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informant if clarification of any issue discussed during the interview was needed.  
All informants agreed to this.  There were two informants who I subsequently 
contacted for additional information.  In addition, each informant was asked to 
suggest other potential informants for the research.  The snowball technique enabled 
me to add two additional informants.   
 
For the management of interview data, the initial themes established in advance were 
used to organise interview questions and comments from the interviewees.  These 
themes were based on findings from the pilot project and informed by the literature 




N3 Pros and con 
 
Prison management in Scotland (PM) 
PM1 Historical events from the 1980s 
PM2 The emergence of NPM 
PM3 Prison policy development  
PM4 Changes in prison management in NPM era  
 













Private prisons in Scotland (PP) 
PP1 Private prison policy 
PP2 Private providers  
PP3 HMP Kilmarnock 
PP4 HMP Addiewell 
 
The process is known as open coding (Strauss 1987) which is a process of ‘breaking 
down, examining, comparing, conceptualising and categorising data’ (Strauss and 
Corbin 1990:61).  According to Bryman and Burgess (1994), ‘coding (or indexing) is 
seen as a key process since it serves to organise the copious notes, transcripts or 
documents that have been collected and it also represents the first step in the 
conceptualisation of the data’ (p.218).  In addition, the flexible nature of coding in 
qualitative research allowed new categories to emerge after the data collection had 
started.  In this research, emerging categories developed at the later stage were: 
Leadership (L) 
L1 Roles of Chief Executive 
L2 Roles of Governors 
L3 Relationship between headquarters and prison establishments 
 
Ethics and accountability (EA) 
EA1 Internal accountability 
EA2 External accountability 
 
Contractual management (CM) 
CM1 Internal contracts (contracts between headquarters and 
establishments) 













C1  Challenges of prison management in NPM era 
 
3.4.2 Documentary research 
Documentary research was the technique used to obtain secondary data.  The main 
data sources for this research were academic literature and research, institutional 
reports and statistics, contracts and agreements, policy papers, minutes of the 
meetings and newspapers.  With a few exceptions
17
, these documents were published 
and publicly available.   
 
The process of the aforementioned open coding was also used with secondary data 
and the categories were similar to those used in the analysis of primary data.  The 
collection of secondary data took from late 2006 and lasted until early 2008, with 
some of the data obtained during the pilot project.  As mentioned earlier, most of the 
secondary data could be retrieved online, from the university’s library and the SPS’s 
library.     
 
3.5 Data analysis 
Data analysis in this research was similar to other qualitative studies that were based 
on identifying themes and categorising patterns of data collected from interviews and 
documentary sources (Gulland 2007).  Furthermore, triangulation was used as a 
means of checking internal consistency among informants and between interview 
data as well as the various documentary sources to guarantee the validity and 




                                                 
17
 Some of unpublished documents were provided by informants during the interviews.   
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3.5.1 Interview materials 
After each interview, the audio record was transcribed.  However, it was not done in 
full as discussions during the interviews were developed beyond the scope of the 
present research.  In addition, I took the liberty of improving the grammar of the 
transcriptions.  Nevertheless, although the interview data were grammatically edited, 
I did my utmost not to alter the meaning of what I was told.  I also referred to my 
interview notes during the transcription process and the analysis. 
 
Data from the transcriptions were then coded and sorted into relevant categories as 
described above.  Although this was a manual process, the coding of the interview 
data (and the documentary material) for the analysis was undertaken in the same 
fashion as by the computer software programme NVivo
18
.  For example, responses to 
Interview Question 4, ‘As a policy maker/board member/civil servant, how do you 
proactively deal with these challenges (of the SPS)?  What are the consequences?’, 
were categorised into four indices: 
L2 Roles of Governors 
  ‘There was resistance from some staff but I made it very clear 
to the staff that they could be part of it’. (Interview, Former 
SPS Governor and Director, 12 December 2007) 
 
BM1 Decentralisation 
 ‘Staffing structure review was one which we started at the end 
of my first year in the prison service’.  (Interview, Former SPS 
Director, 18 April 2007) 
 
PM3 Prison policy development  
 ‘Our response as an organization was to produce a number of 
documents which make us rethink prison policies in Scotland’. 
(Interview, Current SPS Director, 3 July 2007) 
                                                 
18
 NVivo is a software programme that helps researchers to systematically organise a wide range of 
data, including word documents, PDFs, audio files and pictures.  It is launched by QSR International 





C1  Challenges in NPM era 
 ‘We had real difficulty getting prison staff out of armours and 
back into normal uniform’.  (Interview, Former SPS Chief 
Executive of SPS, 4 June 2007)   
 
Similarly, the interviewees’ comments on Interview Question 29, ‘how do you 
perceive the current prison service in term of management style?’, were  categorised 
into at least three indices: 
BM1 Decentralisation 
 ‘What we tried to do was to allow governors more discretion 
over how to spend the money’. (Interview, Former SPS 
Director, 13 December 2007) 
 
BM2 Customer-oriented service 
 ‘We have seen the development of the arrangement to be more 
responsive to prisoners’ complaints and concerns; the 
introduction of prisons to the Complaint Commissioner; and 
the development of the complaints procedures’. (Interview, 
Former SPS Director, 15 May 2007)  
 
C1  Challenges in NPM era 
 ‘If you wish to change anything in any organisation, you have 
to involve the staff, which has not been the tradition of the 
prison service’. (Interview, Former SPS Director, 18 April 
2007) 
 
The analysis of interview data was done using the same method as other qualitative 
researches do.  For instance, to analyse business-like mechanisms used by the SPS to 
run its prisons, I attempted to find out what options the SPS had, why the particular 
option was selected, and how it changed the prison management.  Based on 
comments from the interviewees (linked with findings from documentary research), 
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three significant market mechanisms employed by the SPS were identified: 
decentralisation, customer-oriented service and contractual management.  Each 
approach was then discussed in detail based on the aforementioned questions and 
supported by relevant empirical evidence (Chapter 5). 
 
The second example was the analysis of the development of private prisons in 
Scotland.  The questions asked during the interviews included ‘has the prison 
privatisation scheme affected the prison service in Scotland? Why/Why not?  How?’; 
‘Can private prison be viewed as a pressure for change?’ and ‘Is there any lesson 
learned from the private company in term of prison management?’  Interviewees 
were asked to reflect on these questions.  After the transcription of the audio records, 
their comments were coded into four main themes: private prison policy; private 
providers; HMP Kilmarnock; and HMP Addiewell.  Following are the examples of 
comments provided: 
 
PP1 Private prison policy 
‘According to the Estate Review, we need three new prisons 
and they should be private prisons’. (Interview, Current SPS 
Director, 3 July 2007) 
 
PP3 HMP Kilmarnock 
‘Challenges for Kilmarnock are coming on budget; managing 
the new legislative changes within a tight budget is not easy. 
In addition, managing the increasing turn-over of prisoners as 
of an increase in short-term remand population has a torrent 
effect within prisons’. (Interview, Senior Manager of 
Kilmarnock, 1 May 2007) 
 
3.5.2 Documentary materials 
The analysis of data from documentary sources was conducted in the same way as 
interview data.  That is, the same indices and themes were used for the analysis.  
However, the focus of the documentary analysis was on the development of prison 
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policy and discourse.  I attempted to identify empirical evidence to support my 
argument that prison discourse had shifted towards managerialist ideology and that 
prison operations tended to be run by the use of ‘business-like’ techniques.  The 
example was the analysis of Custody and Care.  The publication of Custody and 
Care in the late 1980s was aimed at setting out appropriate measures for dealing with 
prison management in general and for solving the problem of prison disorder at the 
same time.  Given the themes introduced earlier, I asked questions such as what was 
the focus of such policy paper means or ends discourses?; who were the key actors 
and target groups?; why was such a policy launched?; and how did the policy paper 
affect the management of prisons as a whole? These questions were used as a guide 
to sort data into appropriate categories as discussed above.  For Custody and Care, 
the analysis revealed its ends discourse covers rehabilitation, normalisation and 
control while its means discourse emphasised the role of bureaucracy.   
 
Another example was the analysis of Inclusion Policy.  The focus of this paper was 
on ‘customers’ who were short-term prisoners.  Again, by asking the above 
questions, I found that the paper was aimed at the normalisation and rehabilitation 
(ends discourses) of short-term prisoners by providing them with appropriate 
intervention and under the management of specialists (means discourse).  Compared 
to Custody and Care, however, Inclusion Policy put a greater focus on ‘means 
discourse’ or ‘how to’ than ‘ends discourse’.   
 
It should be noted that when analysing the documentary data, I tended to integrate 
the comments of the interviewees with my interview notes to see whether the two 
were consistent.  In addition, with reference to the main research questions, the 
results of the analysis (of both interviews and documents) could be presented in three 
main themes: changes in prison policy (Chapter 4), the use of a business-like 
approaches in managing prisons (Chapter 5 and 6), and ethical and accountability 






3.6 Ethical Issues 
3.6.1 Informed Consent and confidentiality  
Confidentiality and anonymity are at heart of this research.  As mentioned earlier, 
before the interviews, invitation letters were sent out to prospective informants 
providing them with information about the study.  Those who agreed to participate 
were given a consent form to read and sign before the interview was conducted.  As 
shown in Appendix Three, the informants were made aware that they had an 
opportunity to raise any questions related to this study until they were satisfied.  
They were also informed that all the information they provided would be used only 
for this research and treated confidentially and that they had the right to withdraw 
from the research at any time.  In addition, they were assured that their name would 
appear in the research and/or publications to come from this research only with their 
permission. 
 
After the interviews were conducted, all notes and audio records were kept in the 
study room at my flat where only I had access to.  Notes that were taken during the 
interviews were kept in a file along with the signed consent forms.  Original audio 
records were stored in my computer which required a password for access.  Each 
audio record was copied to a compact disc for transcribing purposes.  Given time 
limitation, two assistants were hired to help transcribe these audio records.  They 
were made aware of the need to treat interview material with confidentiality and not 
to make any copy of audio records.  Each assistant was given two records and had to 
return both once they finished.  An electronic version of each transcription was 
stored in my computer and the paper version was kept in the secured file.  No other 
person but me had access to the data once the transcriptions were done. 
 
3.6.2 Data Protection 
For those who refused to be identified, the data were treated anonymously.  
Accordingly, to assure them that I would be faithful to the information given and that 
I would conform to ethical research principles, interviewees were given an 




In this research, I took full responsibility for data protection and made sure that the 
treatment of data was compliant with the University Data Protection procedure.  All 
personal details of informants were kept in electronic format and were printed out 
only when necessary.  All printed documents were kept in secure files and stored in 
the study room at my flat.  This was to ensure that all personal data of informants 
were treated with care and security.   
 
3.6.3 Moral issues  
To the best of my knowledge, this research did not cause any personal and/or 
institutional conflicts of interest for any individual and/or agency.  Data from the 
research were treated without prejudice.  They were analysed and reported as they 
were.  In addition, this was a small research project with no financial or non-financial 
benefit for any particular person or agency.  There was no reason to compromise 
research objectivity.   
 
Because of the nature of this research, there was no potential physical or 
psychological harm, discomfort or stress for the individuals who participated in it.  
Before the interviews, informants could choose whether they wanted to be identified 
in this research.  They were also informed that if they felt uneasy about participating 
in this research, they could withdraw at any time.  During the interviews, informants 
were asked to provide facts and opinions in response to the questions asked.  They 
were not forced in any way to answer questions that caused them discomfort.  
Fortunately, at the end of this research, no one had withdrawn. 
 
3.7 Limitations   
3.7.1 Generalisation 
In adopting a case study approach in the research, I was aware of its limitations.  
Generalisability was among the most prominent.  According to their critics, ‘case 
studies are difficult to generalise because of their inherent subjectivity and because 
they are based on qualitative subjective data, generalisable only to a particular 
context’ (Becker et al 2005).  According to Yin (1989:21-2), there are three major 
criticisms of case studies compared to quantitative methods.  First, it is claimed that 
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case studies are subjective and only produce biased findings.  Second, it is argued 
that it is not possible to generalise from a single case or even from a number of cases 
because each case has it own unique features.  Lastly, by comparing case studies 
with such methods of data collection as participant observation and ethnography, 
critics claim that case studies consume a great deal of time and produce 
unmanageable amount of data.   
 
However, case study research also has many strengths that can cancel out its 
limitations.  According to Becker et al (2005), the case study is a relatively flexible 
research method.  In addition, case study research can provide in-depth data. 
 
The looser format of case studies allows researchers to begin with 
broad questions and narrow their focus as their experiment 
progresses rather than attempt to predict every possible outcome 
before the experiment is conducted. 
 
Case studies produce much more detailed information than what is 
available through a statistical analysis.  Advocates will also hold 
that while statistical methods might be able to deal with situations 
where behaviour is homogeneous and routine, case studies are 
needed to deal with creativity, innovation, and context. (Becker et al 
2005) 
 
Moreover, according to Yin (2003), case studies can be used to make generalisations 
but not in a statistical sense.  Yin argued that ‘analytic generalisation’ is what case 
studies offer. 
 
Case studies, like experiments, are generalisable to theoretical 
propositions and not to populations or universes.  In this sense, the 
case study, like the experiment, does not represent a “sample,” and the 
investigator’s goal is to expand and generalise theories (analytic 
generalisation) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical 
generalisation). (Yin 2003:10) 
 
3.7.2 Language problems 
Difference in language and culture made this research difficult for me to conduct.  
Since English is not my first language, I found it hard to undertake research 
involving interviews.  A great deal of effort was put into capturing what the 
informants said and what they really meant.  For instance, when jargon and slang 
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were used during the interview, to make sure that my understanding was correct, 
informants were asked to clarify what they had said when they had finished 
answering the question.  This may have delayed the interview but it guaranteed that 
misinterpretation did not occur.  Further, at some interviews, informants spoke so 
fast that I could not catch up what they were saying.  To ask them to repeat what had 
been just said was sometimes a bit awkward for me.  This is because, in my culture 
asking too many questions, or making too many requests, are considered impolite.  
However, I found the use of an audio recorder really helped me to overcome the 
problem.  With an audio recording, I could replay it and take note of what I had 
missed during the interviews.    
 
At the writing-up stage it was not easy for use to tell a story in another language.  
When I started writing up this research, at times I sometimes spent hours just to find 
a right word or sentence that fitted what I was trying to describe or explain.  In 
Thailand, people do not say things in a straightforward way and they tend to be 
modest when presenting their ideas to the public.  This became a problem for me 
when I began writing up.  At first, the concerns that I might offend someone or be 
judgmental with people or scenarios held me back.  Once the writing progressed, this 
problem was overcome with support from my supervisors and university resources.  I 
regained my confidence in presenting my work and learnt that a researcher had to be 
honest with audiences by presenting them with actual findings from the research.  To 
improve my writing skills, I attended an academic writing course and kept on 
writing.  Also, proofreaders who are native speakers of English were asked to help 
edit my writing.  At the end of writing-up stage I was very satisfied that I had 







CHANGING POLICY DISCOURSES 
 
This chapter seeks to demonstrate the impact of NPM on the SPS’s internal policies.  
My main argument is that, during the last two decades, prison policies have been 
influenced by managerialist ideology which has shifted the focus of prison policies 
from traditional concepts like control, deterrence and rehabilitation to managerial 
ones, such as standards of service, effectiveness, efficiency and value for money.   
 
As presented in Chapter 3, the principal sources of data for the analysis of prison 
discourses were the SPS policy documents
19
 available to the public.  The analytical 
approach taken to these documents involved: identifying the key focus of such policy 
statements; determining whether it reflected a means or an end discourse or both; 
revealing its key stakeholders; and finally, assigning it to the discourse matrix 
adapted from the model developed by Adler and Longhurst (1994).  In addition, the 
method of documentary analysis was similar to that used in analysing the interviews 
(as discussed in Chapter 3, in particular, sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2).  That is, the 
themes and the categories were set out in advance and were used to allocate each 
policy paper.  For example, the prison discourse was among original themes 
developed after the pilot project as I attempted to explore the extent which NPM 
influenced prison policy, as suggested by informants in the pilot project.  With 
reference to the discourse matrix proposed by Adler and Longhurst, I then assigned 
prison discourses to one of the eight categories comprising rehabilitation, 
normalisation, managerialism, bureaucracy, professionalism, control, legality and 
others.  The ‘others’ category was developed in case there was a policy paper which 
suggested prison means or ends beyond what had already been indicated.  It should 
be noted that during the documentary analysis, data from the policy papers were 
integrated and contrasted with the interview data and my research notes to ensure the 
validity and reliability of this research.  
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 The policy documents included in this research were the documents that the SPS defined on its 






For the classification of the policy papers used in the analysis, I categorised them 
into three groups with reference to the period in which they were published (Table 
4.1).  The first category consists of documents published prior to 1990 which I 
termed ‘the initial phase’.  The documents in this period, I argue, demonstrate the 
SPS’s early attempt to manage prisons with professional and managerial knowledge.  
The policy documents provided informative evidence to support the reform of prison 
management so that the SPS could effectively cope with the prisons crisis.  They also 
laid the foundation for SPS to move in the direction it moved later on.  The second 
category consists of policy documents published from 1991 until 1999.  I classified 
these documents together because they reflected a ‘trial and error’ stage for the SPS.  
It was the period when the SPS started to bring in a ‘business-like’ approach for the 
management of its prisons.  The decision to establish Kilmarnock as a private prison, 
for example, was a significant move for the SPS, due to the controversial nature of 
private prisons and criticisms of many politicians.  Why did the SPS make this 
decision?  What was the key driver of change?  Who were key stakeholders?  These 
were examples of the questions asked during documentary analysis.  The last 
category consists of policy documents launched between 1999 and 2007.  My 
observation here is that the change of language used in policy papers after Scottish 
devolution demonstrated strong support for a managerialist ideology and for the 
extensive use of ‘business-like’ mechanisms in the management of Scottish prisons.  
I, therefore, attempted to discuss this change in light of discourse matrix and to 
demonstrate the development of prison discourse after devolution. 
 
Initial phase 
‘Trial and error’ 
phase 
Post-devolution phase 
Custody and Care Framework Document 
Vision for correctional 
Excellence 
Assessment and Control 
Health Promoting 
Prison and Health Care 
Standards 
Intervention and Integration 

















The organisation of this chapter begins by outlining the key features of each policy 
document
20
.  This should help those who are not familiar with these papers to have a 
better understanding of their content.  It should be noted that the content of the policy 
papers in the initial phase and some in the trial-and-error phase are not presented in 
full here as they were examined in detail by Adler and Longhurst (1994:215-137).  
Rather, I opted to use them as foundation stones to demonstrate the development of 
prison policies from the late 1980s onwards.  The new policy papers published after 
the period covered by Adler and Longhurst’s study, on the other hand, are described 
in more detail.  The aim is to reveal how far the SPS had come in terms of policy 
change.  After describing the relevant policy documents (some of which were 
informed by comments of the interviewees), I then attempted to identify the ‘means 
discourse’ and ‘ends discourse’ of each document by using an analytical framework 
adapted from the study of Adler and Longhurst.  Finally, I allocated all the policy 
papers in the ‘discourse matrix’ developed for the prison management policy during 
the last twenty years.  Findings and arguments from this chapter are developed 
further in Chapter 5 where I argue that NPM not only influenced policy discourse but 
also prison operations.   
 
4.1 The initial phase 
The publications of Custody and Care in 1988 and Assessment and Control in 1989 
immediately followed by Opportunity and Responsibility, A Shared Enterprise, and 
Organising for Excellence in 1990 brought significant changes to the SPS in terms of 
prisoner regimes and management.  These policy documents moved the SPS towards 
a more ‘professional’ management of prisoners that no longer relied solely on staff 
experience but depended heavily on professional knowledge and managerial skills.  
Goals, targets and missions were set by Headquarters for prison governors and staff 
to carry out.  My main argument here is that these five policy documents constitute 
the foundation for shifting prison management in Scotland from focusing on 
traditional ideologies, e.g. control, normalisation and rehabilitation to emphasising a 
managerialist agenda.    
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4.1.1 Custody and Care  
With reference to Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1, the number of the daily inmate population 
in Scotland had been increased over time.  A significant increase was in 1985 (5,273 
prisoners) and 1986 (5,588 prisoners).  Even though there was a slight decrease in 
1987 (5,446 prisoners), the daily inmate population has not been below 5,000 since 
1985.  This created a problem of overcrowding for almost every establishment.  
During the same period, moreover, the prison situation became worse due to the 
unprecedented chaos in several prisons across Scotland
21
 resulting from hostage-
taking incidents and demonstrations.  These two significant crises prompted the 
Government to take urgent action.  One of the significant developments in tackling 
the situation that the SPS was confronting was what Adler and Longhurst (1994:216) 
call the ‘iteration of the task’ of the SPS by the Secretary of State in October 1985 
which was re-emphasised in a speech given to representatives of the SPS in January 
1988 (SPS 1989a). 
 
Two months after the policy statement was announced, Custody and Care (CC 
hereafter) launched in March 1988.  CC, in a way, was a tangible evidence of a top-
down policy deployment aimed at solving the crises and keeping prison in order.  
According to CC, the tasks of SPS which were ‘reiterated’ by the management were 
as follows (para. 2.4):  
 
1. to keep in custody untried or unsentenced prisoners, and to ensure 
that they are available to be presented to court for trial or sentence; 
2. to keep in custody, with such degree of security as is appropriate, 
having regard to the nature of the individual prisoner and his 
offence, sentenced prisoners for the duration of their sentence or for 
such shorter time as the Secretary of State may determine in cases 
where he has discretion; 
3. to provide for prisoners as full a life as is consistent with the facts of 
custody, in particular making available the physical necessities of 
life; care for physical and mental health; advice and help with 
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 For more details, see SPS (1989), Assessment and Control: the Management of Violent and 
Disruptive Prisoners.  It summarises prison chaos from 1984-87 which were one of the significant 
challenges that the SPS had to deal with at the late 1980s.  Also, Wozniak (1989) summarised critical 
issues in the Scottish prisons at the late 1980s in Current issues in Scottish prisons: systems of 
accountability and regimes for difficult prisoners; Proceedings of a Conference held at Stirling 
University 8th and 9th June 1988 and supported by the Criminology and Law Research Group and 






personal problems; work, education, skill training, physical exercise 
and recreation; and opportunity to practice their religion; 
4. to promote and preserve the self-respect of prisoners; 
5. to enable prisoners to retain links with family and community; and 
6. to encourage them to respond and contribute positively to society on 
discharge. 
 
The clarification of the SPS’s tasks was a key feature of CC.  The point here was that 
when staff recognised what prisons were for and what they were supposed to do to 
serve these ends, they would work towards them and prevent future prison disorder.  
The ‘ends’ discourse presented in CC was mainly control and normalisation (i.e. the 
aforementioned SPS’s tasks which focused on ‘such degree of security as is 
appropriate’ and at the same time normalised them through ‘physical and mental 
health’, consultation, ‘work, education, skill training, physical exercise and 
recreation’) which require dedication and supports from prison staff and also civil 
servants at the headquarters (bureaucratic). 
 
Dealing with several challenges at the same time required a coherent corporate 
philosophy to guide the regimes and management of individual penal establishments.  
As indicated in the Foreword of CC, running prisons at the time was not easy and a 
great deal was expected from the SPS, in particular an effective and efficient 
management.  The Minister for Home Affairs and the Environment in the Scottish 
Office stated that: 
 
High standards of integrity, humanity and consistency are essential.  
This demands professionalism and skills of high order and we have 
announced important measures to improve the condition of service, 
training and organisation of staff to make this possible (SPS 
1988:Foreword). 
 
The former SPS Chief Executive described the development of prison management 
during this period as an attempt to change the ‘culture’ of the SPS.  He commented 
that  
 
‘Prison management changed in 1989.  My predecessor started it by 
reviewing and implementing policies as well as trying to change ‘the 
culture of the prison service’ in which prisoners were managed.  





point.  A number of policies had been launched and basically I think 
we were going in the right direction.  However, the organisation 
suffered from quite a lot of stress because of the change that was 
involved in that’.  (Interview, Former SPS Chief Executive, 4 June 
2007) 
 
The publication of CC, therefore, was an immediate response of the SPS to the 
challenges which it was confronting at the time.  It set out a framework of aims and 
objectives for the future management of penal establishments in Scotland.  CC is 
divided into five sections.  The Task and Responsibilities of the SPS deals with 
imprisonment and penal policy (as indicated above).  Policies and Priorities for 
Inmates focuses on the placement of prisoners to appropriate locations, sets out 
general principles on the opportunities and restrictions for inmates in custody, and 
deals with sentence planning and preparation for release.  Planning for Individual 
Establishments sets out regimes for each establishment and category of inmates, 
management structures and the use of specialists, and co-operation and parity 
between establishments.  Finally, Training and Development of Staff deals with the 
organisation and content of training programmes and sets out the roles of Governors, 
prison officers and other staff. 
 
4.1.2 Assessment and Control: the Management of Violent and Disruptive 
Prisoners  
Seven months after CC was published, the SPS published another policy paper, 
Assessment and Control (AC hereafter) which was primarily aimed at improving the 
management of ‘difficult’ prisoners.  AC was the product of the commitment in CC 
to produce a further document that would set out the SPS’s approach to violent and 
disruptive prisoners.  The document recognised assessment and control as two key 
features for a better management of difficult and long-term prisoners.     
 
AC comprised three main parts.  The first part of the document dealt with the 
rationale for improving the management of ‘difficult’ prisoners, starting with a 
discussion of the causes of the spate of major incidents in Scottish prisons at the 
time, the extent of the problem of disruptive behaviour and the need to improve the 





plans for dealing with ‘difficult’ prisoners, in particular the development of control 
risk profiles and the use of specialised units.  The last part, in addition, dealt briefly 
with the management of long-term prisoners that was laid out in CC. 
 
Prior to the publication of AC, the assessment processes focused primarily on 
security classification; that is, the potential risk to the public if the individual were to 
escape (para. 4.2).  AC, on the other hand, expressed a need to improve the processes 
of assessing inmates by paying attention to assessing control risk; that is the degree 
of dangerousness that the individual inmate presents.  Paragraph 4.13 of AC 
emphasised the need to focus on the present state of an individual (based on previous 
criminal history, current conviction and sentence, security categorisation, 
intelligence, record and response in custody) rather than the behaviour that he/she 
might display in the future.  Moreover, the role of prison officers was recognised as 
critical for achieving a better process of assessing inmates.  It suggested that ‘when 
preparing profiles, however, staff must be encouraged to observe the individual 
objectively and seek to discuss or communicate with him about practical problems.’ 
 
For the control dimension, AC reviewed the use of small units in the Scottish prison 
system to deal with the problem of persistently difficult and disruptive prisoners.  
The small units in use at the time were the Barlinnie Special Unit
22
, the Inverness 
Segregation Unit and the Peterhead 10-cell Unit.  AC proposed to proceed with plans 
for the provision of a new maximum security unit of 60 places (at Shotts) to 
complement the existing small units (para. 8.3).  The key factors affecting this 
proposal were (para. 8.4): 
 
1. Firstly, it would be better if the concentration of risk in one 
establishment were to be diminished in some way, without more serious 
risk to the mainstream.  This points to the conclusion that one 
establishment in one location may not be sufficient for the longer term. 
2. Secondly, the scale of provision should be the minimum necessary 
for those who cannot cope in the mainstream but for whom longer-term 
small units would be unnecessarily costly or restrictive.  The eventual 
planning requirement would appear to be for places for about 120 
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 Barlinnie Special Unit was examined in Bottomley, Liebling and Sparks (1994).  See more details 






prisoners requiring the most stringent conditions of security and 
control. 
3. Thirdly, it is important to test and assess new concepts and layout, 
design, regime and management of maximum security accommodation 
before there is an irrevocable commitment to one particular type of unit.  
Experience of the design of prison suggests that there has to be close 
integration of all the elements and that while it can take many years to 
eliminate avoidable problems or errors, it is all too easy to replicate 
mistakes. 
 
At the end of AC, an initial assessment and continuous sentence-planning of long-
term prisoners was presented.  AC recognised options for allocation, sentence-
planning, opportunities in closed conditions, semi-open and open conditions, and 
opportunities for outside activities and home leave.  Improving these opportunities 
for long-term prisoners would provide a better balance and provide worthwhile 
incentives for exemplary conduct (para. 11.15) 
 
4.1.3 Opportunity and Responsibility: Developing New Approaches to the 
Management of the Long Term Prison System in Scotland 
After the publication of CC and AC in 1988 and 1989 respectively, an open 
discussion of these two consultation documents was invited.  The SPS promised that 
comments on CC and AC would be taken into consideration in the development of 
its strategies.  Opportunity and Responsibility (OR hereafter) was the product of this 
process, expressing the SPS’s ambition to develop a new approach (‘end discourse’) 
within the Scottish prison system.  It was called ‘a remarkable document’ by Adler 
and Longhurst (1994) perhaps because OR provided an in-depth theoretical basis for 
imprisonment (Coyle 1995). 
 
OR was built on the foundations laid out in CC and AC.  The main assertions in this 
document were that the use of a rehabilitation model for long term prisoners was 
‘outmoded’ and that a new approach which recognised the mutual responsibilities of 
the prisoner and the authorities was required.  The former SPS Chief Executive 
explained that 
 
‘Basically my board and I built on the policies that had begun in 1989-





Opportunity and Responsibility was the key document.  The concept 
was to move away from rehabilitation to the notion that you would 
make prisoners take responsibility by giving them some responsibility 
and letting them make choices.  If they wanted to take advantage of 
opportunities to address offending behaviour, drug addiction or 
whatever, they could progress through the system by getting their 
security classification lowered and they could move to an open prison 
and then be released.  This is the theoretical context’. (Interview, 
Former SPS Chief Executive, 4 June 2007) 
 
The document consisted of two parts.  The first part (Chapters 2-4) focused on the 
purpose of imprisonment and the second part (Chapters 5-9) dealt with the 
development of the long-term prisoner system by reacting to comments on AC.  As 
for the first part, it reviews the aims of imprisonment and the statement of the 
Secretary of State that was mentioned in CC.  It then set out a new approach which 
recognised the mutual responsibilities of the prisoner and the SPS as discussed 
above.  The document then moved on to discuss ‘the pressures for change’ which 
contributed to prison disorder confronted by the SPS in the late 1980s.  These 
pressures included overcrowding; Grand Design
23
, differential progress to liberalise 
regimes, drugs and deterrent sentencing which increased a number of long term 
prisoners and changes in parole policy which caused considerable anxiety among 
long term prisoners.  By the end of the first part, the document reviewed significant 
prison developments from 1986-1990 which included a decrease in the prison 
population in 1986, the re-establishment of control and order as a result of restricted 
regimes, the reduced role of Peterhead in holding prisoners who presented 
management problems, and improvements in classification, assessment and sentence 
planning as well as staff training.   
 
On the other hand, the second part of OR set out how the SPS intended to approach 
the new penal philosophy.  It addressed the need to encourage a sense of personal 
responsibility in long-term prisoners and promoted sentence planning to enable long 
term prisoners to make decisions about how they would spend their prison sentence.  
Also, it recognised a need for the SPS to provide responsive opportunities so that the 
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 Grand Design was among the measures to cope with the problem of overcrowding which involved a 
reallocation of prisoners across Scotland.  It turned out to create tremendous tension for several 





prisoners could use their time in prison responsibly for personal development.  The 
term ‘responsive’ was officially mentioned and tailor-made programmes were to be 
developed for specific group of prisoners.  This reflected a ‘customer-oriented’ 
approach employed by the SPS to enhance the life of each prisoner.  The second part 
also discussed the ‘normalisation’ principle which allows prisoners to live as normal 
lives as possible.  It proposed that prison regimes should enable prisoners to retain 
links with family and community and also assist them to successfully manage their 
lives upon discharge.   
 
It then moved on to address the balance between security, order and regime.  OR 
notes that ‘an establishment with an overemphasis on opportunities, will find security 
and control under pressure’ (para 7.5).  This implied the need for clarification of the 
ends and means of prisons and for securing a balance between the two.  Coyle (1991: 
177) suggests that ‘incompatibility of goals presents a particular difficulty for prison 
officers.’  This issue was raised in OR because it was obviously a big concern of the 
management at the time.  The former SPS Chief Executive reflected that  
 
‘Another big concern, of course, was taking forward this reform 
without making security less tight because there cannot be a trade-off.  
If you let prisoners progress too quickly and if you don’t pay close 
attention to what I call ‘basic custody requirements’, you can have 
problems.  In a situation in which you try to reform a system and 
encourage more engagement between prison officers and prisoners, 
the management has to be careful not to send a signal to prison staff 
that somehow they are more important than security.  Security is still 
basic.  One of the concerns that my colleagues and I had was to get 
the ‘right balance’. (Interview, Former SPS Chief Executive, 4 June 
2007)   
 
OR moves toward the end by proposing the use of specialised units for prisoners who 
continue to have difficulty in adjusting themselves in prison.  However, a greater 
number of small units within the mainstream would be used instead of the initial 
proposal to establish a 60-cell maximum security complex at Shotts.  It emphasises 
that these small units should be regarded as a part of the whole prison system, not as 






4.1.4 Shared Enterprise  
Shared Enterprise (SE hereafter) was published in 1990 as an ‘outline corporate 
strategy’ (SPS 1990c).  It, therefore, was more about ‘how prisons should be run’ 
than about ‘what prisons are for’.  SE focused on managerial strategies especially in 
terms of corporate mission which covered the following (para. 2):   
 
• To keep in custody those committed by the courts; 
• To maintain good order in each prison; 
• To care for prisoners with humanity and; 
• To provide all possible opportunities to help prisoners to lead 
law-abiding and useful lives after release. 
 
The SWOT (Strengths, Weakness, Opportunities and Threats) technique was used to 
analyse the SPS as an organisation.  Findings from the analysis were then used to 
outline the strategic priorities which addressed a wide range of managerial tools, for 
instance values and principles, quality of service, staff relations, staff development, 




4.1.5 Organising for Excellence: Review of the Organisation of the Scottish 
Prison Service  
The publication of Organising for Excellence (OE hereafter) in December 1990 
reflected the desire of the SPS to create a management structure which promoted 
cooperation and teamwork.  Also, the managerial structure of the organisation was 
established to ensure internal accountability (Coyle 1995).  The structure at the time 
comprised seven Headquarters divisions, each headed by a Deputy Director who was 
responsible to the Director for a defined area of activity.  The Directors were 
responsible to the Chief Executive who was the head of the SPS.  The seven 
Headquarters divisions were: Administration, Operations, Personnel, Regime 
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 The strategic priorities of the SPS stated in SE were: 
• To define, assert and give effect to the values and principles by which the SPS will operate; 
• To improve the quality of service to prisoners, so as to provide them with as full, active and 
constructive a life as possible; 
• To foster good staff relations, and to help staff develop their skills and abilities in support of 
the aims and mission of the SPS; and 
• To develop the appropriate organisational structure and management style to deliver the 






Services and Supplies, Planning and Development, Estates and Training and 
Organisation Development Support.  The SPS recognised the limitations of the 
structure at the time that did not integrate strategic planning and operational activities 
effectively.  There were centralisation issues; a lack of coherent line management 





OE proposed that the Chief Executive, as the head of the SPS, should be accountable 
for four major directorates: Strategy and Planning, Human Resources, Prisons, 
Finance and Information Systems (para. v).  Each Directorate would be headed by a 
Director, with the Director of Prisons being the Deputy Chief Executive.  A new 
Prison Board, made up by the above posts, the four Directors and two non-executive 
members appointed by the Secretary of State, would be established.  The document 
also addressed key elements of the new strategic vision that addressed value for 
money; responsiveness to the needs of prisoners, staff and the community; 
improvement of service quality; devolution of accountability to staff; and promotion 
of public interest and awareness (para. iii). 
 
With reference to the organisational vision mentioned above, a new set of the 
objectives and principles were developed
26
.  This restructuring process was not only 
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 In terms of the management problem which the SPS encountered at the time, OE recognised that 
“the organisational culture of SPS currently reflects centralised control of senior management in the 
field.  Prison Governors tend to feel constrained and disenfranchised by administrators who often 
place greater value on adherence to procedures and guidelines than on making decisions appropriate to 
local circumstances on the basis of a framework of clearly defined policies.” (para. ii) 
 
26
 The new set of objectives and principles of the SPS were as follows: 
             “1. Delineate between strategic and operational management. 
 2. Devolve greater authority and managerial accountability to establishment level. 
3. Establish financial control and MIS systems which support devolution of authority to 
establishments, whilst ensuring prison management can be held accountable to the 
Director and top management. 
4. Create the basis for building a unified service in which headquarters and prison staff 
share a common culture value system and career opportunities. 
 5. Maintain Ministerial accountability for overall direction and control of SPS. 
6. Establishment and maintain a coherent line management structure with a clear chain 
of command between the Director and Governor-in-Charge. 
7. Support the development of a Service which sets and achieves key strategic 
objectives rather than reacts to events. 






aimed at improving the organisation but also preparing the SPS in a way for the 
change of its bureaucratic status to the executive agency which was announced in 
1993. 
 
4.2 The ‘trial and error’ phrase 
From 1991 to 1999, there were many significant changes in Scottish politics 
especially devolution which had a considerable impact on the management of the 
public sector (Audit Scotland 2002, 2004; Bovaird and Loffler 2003; Brown, 
McCrone and Paterson 1998; Coxall, Robin and Leach 2003; Dorey 2005; Hassan 
and Warhurst 1999, 2000, 2002a, 2002b; Hazell 2003; Hutton and Duff 1999; 
Keating 2005; Klein 2001; Lynch 2001; Mackie 2004; Massey and Pyper 2005; 
McFadden and Lazarowicz 2003; Mooney and Scott 2005; Painter 1999; Paterson 
2001; Pollitt 2001; Stolz 2002; Trench 2001, 2004, 2005).  As for the SPS, this 
period witnessed a number of major reforms in terms of management starting from 
the change of its status to that of an executive agency in 1993 which made the SPS 
more independent and autonomous, the renovation of its internal structure and staff 
management to the establishment of the first private prison in Scotland which 
ultimately led to the use of contractual management for public prisons a few years 
later and the opening of the second private prison in 2008.  The following policy 
documents reflected the aforementioned reforms and policy development during this 
period.   
 
4.2.1 The first Framework Document 
The first Framework Document (FD hereafter) was published in 1993 when the SPS 
became an executive agency.  This document set out ‘the policy and resources 
framework within which the Agency will operate and constitutes the main authority 
for the Chief Executive to conduct the operations of the Scottish Prison Service’ 
(SPS 1993:5).  My observation here is that the FD was in a way an extended 
document complementing SPS’s first Business Plan 1989-1992 and OE and that it 






FD was divided into eight sections: Status, Aims and Objectives, Organisation, 
Accountability to Parliament, Financial Regime, Corporate Planning, Human 
Resources and Support Services.  It laid the foundation for the SPS to move forward 
as an executive agency on 1
st
 April 1993.  It was also part of the modernisation 
process of the SPS as suggested in OE.  The Secretary of State for Scotland at the 
time commented on its significance as follows:  
 
Agency Status is a logical step in the process of change towards an ever 
higher quality of service on which the Service has embarked.  Agency 
status is about specifying clearly and publicly the tasks and 
responsibilities of the Scottish Prison Service and the levels of service 
which must be delivered.  It will assist the Service in fulfilling the 
principles of the Citizen’s Charter in all aspects of its operation, and in 
meeting the commitments set out in the Justice Charter for Scotland.  
(SPS 1993:3) 
 
The document introduced the revised version of the objectives
27
 which addressed the 
significance of safe and secure service; responsive operation; service quality and 
value for money; prisoners’ opportunities; and the fulfilment of Citizen’s Charter
28
.   
 
In terms of the organisational structure, FD revealed the progress of the managerial 
restructuring process proposed in OE.  That is, the Chief Executive formally became 
head of SPS and answerable to the Secretary of State for Scotland.  The Chief 
Executive had the authority to make changes in the organisation and management 
structure to achieve SPS’s aims, and was supported by the a Prisons Board 
comprising the Deputy Chief Executive (also acted as Director of Prisons), the 
Director of Strategy and Corporate Affairs, the Director of Human Resources, the 
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 The objectives of the SPS stated in the FD was revised and narrowed down based on the original 
version proposed in OE.  They were: 
  “  1. To operate a safe and secure service; 
  2. To be responsive to the needs of those it serves; 
  3. To deliver quality of service and value for money within available resources; 
4. To present prisoners with a range of opportunities to allow them to use their time in prison 
responsibly; and  
5. To strive to fulfil the Citizen’s Charter principles in all aspects of its operations.” 
 
28
 The Citizen’s Charter was initiated by the John Major Government in 1991 as part of the 
improvement and modernisation of the public service.  Its focuses were on public accountability; 
transparency; information access; motivation for civil service; stakeholder approach and time 
efficiency.  A ‘Charter Mark’ (now ‘Customer Service Excellence’) award was granted as an incentive 





Director of Finance and Information Systems and two non-Executive Directors 
appointed by the Secretary of State for Scotland.   
 
In terms of corporate planning, the Framework specified that, by April of each year, 
the Chief Executive would prepare and submit for the approval to the Secretary of 
State, a combined corporate and business plan covering the three forward years of 
the forthcoming Public Expenditure Survey (PES) period (para 6.3).  One of the most 
important features of this document was the key performance measures that were 
referred to for the first time.  The eight initial key performance indicators were (1) 
the number of prisoners, (2) the number of significant incidents, (3) the number of 
serious assaults on staff and prisoners, (4) quality of life for prisoners, (5) 
opportunities for prisoner’s self development, (6) time of out cell for unconvicted 
prisoners, (7) average annual cost per prisoner place and (8) the level of absence 
through staff sickness (stated in Annex B of FD).   
 
4.2.2 The Health Promoting Prison: A framework for promoting health in the 
Scottish Prison Service  
In 2002, in cooperation with the Scottish Executive Health Department, the Health 
Education Board for Scotland and NHS Boards, the SPS launched the Health 
Promoting Prison (HPP hereafter) campaign to ensure that health promotion and 
disease prevention were carried forward in Scotland’s prisons.  This framework was 
developed from the 1998 Standards of Health Care for Prisoners with principal goals 
to prevent illness, promote health and enable prisoners to make reasoned choices 
regarding the adoption of a healthy lifestyle.  The Rehabilitation and Care 
Directorate was responsible for the managerial works including the creation and 
dissemination of the HPP campaign, the provision of guidance and the audit of 
outcomes across the service.  At an operational level, each establishment was 
responsible for local ownership, implementation and internal monitoring, with 
supports from local Health Promotion Departments and other relevant local agencies. 
 
In order to achieve the goals of HPP, four basic principles were addressed.  They 





the priorities, HPP focused on four main areas: addictions, offending behaviour, 
health care, services for specific prisoners such as females and young offenders and 
the strategic direction of the SPS.  It also identified four core health agendas which 
SPS aimed to succeed which were eating for health; active living; tobacco use and 
mental health well-being (p.6).  A guide to achieving these four areas is provided in 
Framework for Promoting Health in the Scottish Prison Service.  One of key success 
factors for HPP was the cooperation with all stakeholders and the involvement of 
each individual establishment.   
 
The development of HPP policy subsequently led to the publication the Health Care 
Standards (HCS hereafter) in 2006 after the review of the existing health care 
standards by a sub-group of the SPS Prison Nurses Forum.  HCS was aimed to 
reflect the changing needs of prisoners and to match the prisons’ health services with 
those available to the public.  In addition, it provided a healthcare framework for all 
key stakeholders with particular attention paid to four groups of key actors: 
governors, healthcare staff, prisoners, and external partners and stakeholders
29
.   
 
HCS covered 13 main areas: (1) Health Assessment on reception into prison from the 
community; (2) Primary Care Services; (3) Mental Health Services; (4) Stepped Up 
Services and supporting guidance; (5) Health Care on Transfer or Liberation; (6) 
Clinical and Related Services for Promoting Health; (7) Blood Borne Virus Services; 
(8) Management of Medicines; (9) Dental Services; (10) Prescribing for Clinical 
Management of Drug and Alcohol Dependency and supporting guidance; (11) Health 
Care Facilities; (12) Principle of Preventing Health Care Associated Infection; and 
(13) Health Care Records.  In order to make sure that these standards were carried 
out appropriately, a self-assessment process was established as an accountability 
mechanism and was annually carried out by the healthcare managers in each local 
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 HCS describes the role of its key stakeholders that: “Governors provides evidence of measurable 
outcomes on the delivery of healthcare across all establishments and allows delivery within their own 
establishment to be benchmarked with the service overall; Healthcare staff who are given guidance 
on the expectations the organisation has of them in respect of the standard of care they are required to 
deliver; Prisoners who are given a framework that demonstrates the level of service they can expect 
to receive; and External partners and stakeholder who are provided with a guide to the level of care 
















 were developed and used for specific purposes.   
 
4.2.3 Suicide Risk Management Strategy  
ACT&Care Suicide Risk Management Strategy was an original programme launched 
by the SPS in 1998 that aimed at the effective management of prisoners who were at 
risk of suicide (SPS 1998).  The programme was carried out in Scottish prisons and 
monitored by an external team.  Findings from the first evaluation demonstrated that 
the programme had a positive impact on prisoners and the management of suicidal 
prisoners in general (Power, Swanson, Luke, Jackson and Biggam 2003).  As part of 
the internal monitoring, a seminar with the Scottish Executive was held in 2003 and 
the recommendation came out from the seminar was that ACT&Care should be 
integrated with Choose Life, the Scotland-wide Strategy for Suicide Prevention (SPS 
2005a).  This integration concept was recognised as key success factor for the suicide 
prevention management. It was classified into two categories: internal and external.  
The former referred to the integration between the Positive Mental Health 
programme that was used inside prisons across the country and the strategies 
proposed by ACT&Care.  The latter, on the other hand, was the integration between 
ACT&Care strategies and the aforementioned Choose Life and the National 
Programme for Improving Mental Health and Well-Being.   
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 ‘The baseline audit and evidence template allows for each Standard to be measured against clearly 
defined statements.  The evidence template is a useful guide as to the information or documentation 
that is likely to be required for the Establishment to demonstrate that it meets compliance with the 
Standard.’ (SPS 2006b) 
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 ‘After the local audit has been completed, the Health Care Manager/Clinical Manager in Charge is 




 ‘To ensure actions are actually put in place to overcome the shortfall from the standard, a progress 
report will be completed and agreed with the GIC before being submitted to the Nursing Services 




 ‘The performance summary is a process to quickly identify compliance through a simple scoring 






In 2005, ACT&Care was officially revised and replaced with ACT2Care.  Though 
the key principles were unchanged, the revised strategies were more comprehensive 
and responsive to each individual prisoner or what the document called ‘an improved 
person catered care approach’ (p.2).  In fact, the initial aims
34
 emphasised in 
ACT&Care (which focussed on ‘shared responsibility’ between all stakeholders, 
teamwork and integration and identification of an individual’s needs) were 
complemented by additional essential concepts recommended in ACT2Care focusing 
on ‘assessment’, ‘context’, ‘care’ and ‘teamwork’.  They were other concepts raised 
by the ACT2Care, which are relevant to the effective management of prisoners who 
are at risk, i.e. ‘effective multidisciplinary networks’, integration between residential 
team and specialists, information sharing, group decision, case conferences, care 
plans and family involvement (see SPS 2005a:2). 
 
ACT2Care was a vivid example which demonstrated that the ‘managerial’ dimension 
of the policy was just as essential as the ‘content’.  The document dealt mostly with 
the ‘how’.  Managerial language, for instance teamwork, consultation, team decision-
making, audit and reviews, accountability, plans and staff competency, was used 
throughout the document.  In particular, at the end of the document, it concluded that 
‘care will be delivered by multi-disciplinary teams, working together through the 
case conferencing process to help and support prisoners’ address their problems.  
Needs will be addressed on an individual basis.  Clear and effective communication 
with any parties, within or outwith, the prison environment, will be maintained, with 
enhanced family contact and involvement, wherever that is possible’ (p.9). 
 
4.3 The post-devolution phase 
It goes without saying that devolution in 1998 brought significant changes, especially 
in terms of management policy and accountability, to the public services in Scotland 
including SPS.  Several policy documents in this period were prone to address the 
future of SPS (after devolution), new visions and strategies for prisoner management 
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 The original key aims of ACT&Care which remain valid today were ‘to assume a shared 
responsibility for the care of those 'at risk' of self-harm or suicide; to work together to provide a caring 
environment where prisoners who are in distress can ask for help to avert a crisis; and to identify 






and the focus of the organisation.  In this section, three key documents are examined: 
Vision for Correctional Excellence, Intervention and Integration for a Safer Society 
and Inclusion Policy. 
 
4.3.1 Vision for Correctional Excellence  
In response to the devolution and the new government, the SPS published Vision for 
Correctional Excellence (VCE hereafter) in 2000.  The vision was set as a guideline 
for the development of SPS as an organisation, concentrating on ambitions to be 
recognised as the leader in correctional service and also to provide prison services 
that would protect the public and reduce re-offending.  It covers five key themes 
which remain valid today: ‘leadership in correctional service’, ‘the prison estate that 
is fit for the future’, ‘highest standard of service’, ‘respect for our staff’ and ‘value 
for  money for the taxpayer’. 
 
All these key themes, I argue, indicate that SPS acknowledged the need to reform its 
organisation based on ‘managerial’ approaches and techniques.  In this case, for 
example, ‘leadership in correctional service’ was linked with competitiveness in 
private business.  On the other hand, efficiency was reflected in the SPS’s goal to 
provide ‘highest standard of service’ and enhance ‘value for money for the taxpayer’.  
The language used here went beyond traditional ‘end discourses’ which focused on 
either control or rehabilitation.  In addition, the vision of improving prison 
establishments and making them fit for the future also reflected efficiency and value 
for money concepts.  One of the outstanding outputs of this vision was the 
publication of SPS Estates Review in 2002, which recommended managerial options 
for effectively managing prison spaces, solving prison overcrowding issues and 
ending the ‘slopping out’ problem.   
 
In addition, in order to achieve correctional excellence in terms of responsive service 
with a highest standard, the SPS committed itself to the development of prisoner 
programmes
35
 as well as to seeking new partnerships to ensure that prisoners under 
its supervision were less likely to re-offend after release.  New management 
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techniques and monitoring systems as well as the application of best practices from 
other jurisdictions were among managerial choices the SPS opted for to ensure 
quality of service and value for money for the public.   
 
VCE has been a strong pillar for prison management in Scotland until today.  With 
reference to the key themes presented above, the organisation’s ambitions were 
revised.  For instance, the SPS recognised the need to open its prisons to the public 
for transparency reasons and also for an acknowledgement of the significance of 
prison services.  It announced that ‘over the next three years we intend actively to 
promote the work of the Service to the people of Scotland and do all that we can to 
ensure that our work is valued by society’ (SPS 2008a).   
 
In addition, the aim of correctional excellence did not necessarily mean that the SPS 
would totally alter what had been set out as key tasks of the organisation by CC and 
AC.  In fact, those tasks were reviewed and reaffirmed in the SPS Business Plan 
2006-08.  This recent business plan emphasised the key missions
36
 of the SPS with 
the focus on four significant principles comprising custody, order, care and 
opportunity.  These principles known as COCO are central to the current 
management of Scottish prisons.  The top management of SPS recalled that 
 
‘We had a mission statement and I thought it was a very good one-
custody, order, care and opportunity.  It has been modified a little bit 
since then.  But secure custody has been the first thing and good order 
the second thing.  The third thing has been to provide decent care.  
The last one is opportunity because if you did not get the first two 
right, you could not stick it on to the next two.  It was a good mission 
because it explained exactly what the prison service has to do’. 
(Interview, Former SPS Chief Executive, 4 June 2007)   
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 The Mission Statement indicated that the SPS were: 
1. to keep in Custody those committed by the courts; 
2. to maintaining good Order in each prison; 
3. to Care for prisoners with humanity;  
4. to provide prisoners with a range of Opportunity to exercise personal 
responsibility and to prepare for release; and 






Nevertheless, what made the current statement different from the original tasks 
indicated in CC and AC was the introduction of a managerial concept, in this case 
‘integration’.   
 
VCE recognised the significance of partnerships between the SPS and related 
agencies for making the community safer.  This implies that the SPS should no 
longer be regarded as a closed institution that functions behind the high walls.  
Instead, it needs to take what the public demands into account and provide a more 
responsive and proactive service.  VCE stated that: 
 
The expectations of the public about what kind of service we should 
provide for them have changed over the years. As well as responding 
to those expectations we have to try to influence and shape them by 
informing the public about the good quality of the work we are doing 
and the real differences we are making in reducing offending, so that 
our service is something the Scottish public is prepared to pay for. 
(SPS 2000b) 
 
4.3.2 Intervention and Integration for a Safer Society 
After the publication of OR in 1990, there was no policy paper that dealt specifically 
with the question of ‘what prisons are for’.  The launch of Intervention and 
Integration for a Safer Society (IISS hereafter) in 2000 was, therefore, one of the 
significant developments of SPS (SPS 2000a).  IISS was regarded by SPS as key 
policy framework set out for the new era of the Scottish prisons as it was the first 
policy paper which came out after devolution
37
.  Similar to OR, it recognised the 
concept of the ‘responsible prisoner’.  However, while OR focused on long-term 
prisoners, IISS dealt particularly with prisoners with special needs, namely short-
term prisoners, remand prisoners
38
, young offenders, female offenders, mentally 
disordered and disturbed prisoners, sexual offenders and older prisoners.  The 
rationales for IISS stemmed from a sharp increase in the number of prisoners, 
increased drug abuse and larger numbers of difficult and vulnerable prisoners inside 
prisons across the country (para. 4). 
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 The work of Normand reflects the need for integration of aims, objectives and targets in the Scottish 
criminal justice system which includes the role of the Prison Service as part of the system.  See more 
details in Normand (2003). 
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IISS was divided into three main parts.  The first part (Chapter 1-2) reviewed the 
development of opportunities for prisoners’ self development since 1990 and 
demonstrated how the delivery of the SPS service has changed over time.  The 
second part (Chapter 3) identified groups of prisoners with particular needs and 
addressed the principles for dealing with them.  Lastly, the third part (Chapter 4-10) 
focused on the SPS’s plans for each category of prisoners with particular challenges.   
 
IISS is based on two foundation concepts: intervention and integration.  For an 
effective management of prisoners who present special challenges, IISS suggested 
that appropriate intervention be developed by taking into account prisoners’ special 
risks and needs.  It stated that ‘the Service must provide a workable system to assess 
risks and needs rigorously, to challenge prisoners, to devise incentives for them to 
participate fully in activities designed to address their offending behaviour; and to 
improve their prospects of employment on release’ (para. 5). In terms of integration, 
IISS pointed out that although imprisonment requires the removal of an individual 
from the society, it should not isolate them from community supports.  The process 
of integrating a prisoner into society should be promoted.  According to its strategy, 
‘SPS will work with external agencies to ensure a continuity of care in the 
management of prisoners and to enhance the likelihood of their successful 
reintegration to the community in due course.  Importantly, although the present 
document describes the active interventionist position now adopted by the Service, it 
should not be seen to lessen the Service’s emphasis on the ‘responsible prisoner’’ 
(para. 6).  Indeed, the principles of IISS are to assist prisoners to overcome their 
social and psychological deficits by identifying their need for personal development 
and provide them with appropriate interventions (para. 7-11). 
 
4.3.3 Inclusion Policy 
The second prominent policy paper coming out after devolution was Inclusion Policy 
(IP hereafter).  The paper was published in 2002 and dealt with short-term prisoners 
serving prison sentence of less than four years (almost ten years after the publication 





recognised as one of the key policies that has had a great impact on prisoner 
treatment.  Its key principles cover evidence-based assessment of prisoners’ needs; 
meaningful and appropriate interventions; effective transition from prison to 
community; and information sharing between partners. 
 
The most significant initiative resulting from IP was the introduction of the concept 
of inclusion.  Its main strategy was to include supports from the community in 
prisoner programmes, interventions and activities.  IP proposed that ‘the primary aim 
of inclusion is to strategically integrate a range of opportunities that research has 
suggested should have the greatest impact on the lives of released offenders (SPS 
2002a:5).  In addition, it identified a number of short-term prisoners’ issues before 
classifying them into ‘three discrete, yet inter-related policy areas’, which were 
learning, skills and employability; addictions; and social care (Figure 4.1).  These 
areas, IP suggested, should be seriously taken into account when designing and 
planning programmes for short-term prisons.   
 
 
Figure 4.1: Three Clusters of policy areas addressed in IP 
Source: Scottish Prison Service (2002a) 
 
The most significant output of IP was the ‘Core Plus’ initiative that was introduced 
in 2004 as a framework for developing a sentence plan for each short-term prisoner.       
The ‘Core’ or fundamental programme for prisoners comprised 18 activities that 
each prisoner had to attend.  These core activities take 0-30 days to complete.  The 





sentence of less than two months.  For those serving a prison sentence of between 
two months and two years, the ‘Core+A’ programme was applied.  Prisoners can take 
31 days to a year to complete it.  In addition, prisoners with sentences of two to four 
years would be provided with a ‘Core+A, B’ programme which requires one to two 
years.  Lastly, prisoners with sentences of more than four years would be offered the 
‘Core+A,B,C’ which takes two years or more to complete.  The flexible nature of the 
‘Core Plus’ was expected to meet the needs of short-term prisoners.  The SPS, 
however, revealed in its report prepared for the Auditor General for Scotland in 2005 
that the results of ‘Core Plus’ still varied from one prison to another.  It pointed out 
that ‘prisons are inconsistent in the way they plan and manage the opportunities 
offered to individual prisoners.  Our examination of 150 short-term prisoners’ files 
showed that completion of the forms was variable, and we were unable to asses 
whether opportunities appropriate for short-term prisoners were being delivered’ 
(p.1). 
 
4.4 Key themes of SPS policy papers 
As suggested above, the analysis of policy documents aimed to describe the 
development of prison discourses during the last twenty years.  In preparation for 
further analysis, this section summarises the dominant concerns, foci and 
accountability mechanisms of each policy document in one table (Table 4.2).  What I 
wish to argue here is that when taking into account these three themes, each policy 
document demonstrates, to some extent, the characteristics of a managerialist 
ideology.  That is, although there were some differences in terms of content, what 
these documents had in common was an attempt to use managerialist principles and 
tools to improve the quality of prison service.   
 
Table 4.2 shows that while the principal concern and focus of CC, AC, OR, ACT&C, 
ACT2C, IISS, HPP, HCS and IP was on the prisoner as an individual and on the 
prison regime, SE, OE, FD and CE dealt with the enhancement of organisation 
structure and management.  In addition, although the ‘means discourse’ and the ‘ends 
discourse’ of some documents did not explicitly refer to managerialism, the policy 





for money’, ‘standards’, ‘responsibility’ and ‘accountability’.  Further discussion and 




Dominant concern Focus Accountability 
Initial Phase 
CC A framework for future 




SPS; prison regimes; 
policy for prisoners 
Internal/ 
external 
AC Improving assessment of 
control and security risk 
and the management of  
violent and disruptive 
prisoners 
Control Risk Profiles; 




OR A new approach for 
dealing with long-term 
prisoners which involve 





and prison officers 
Internal 
SE The strategies of how 
prison should be run 
A corporate strategy Internal 
OE A new organisation 
structure which creates a 






Trail and error period 
FD The management of the 
Scottish prison system at 





HPP/HCS A healthcare service of 
which equivalent to that 







A shared responsibility  
for the care of those who 
are ‘at-risk’ of self-harm 
or suicide based on their 
assessed need 
Prisoners who are 




Post-devolution period  
VCE The management of 
prison system in the 
Key aims of the SPS; 









Dominant concern Focus Accountability 
twenty first century service; value for 
money; respect for 
staff 
IISS The diversity of prisoners 
in Scottish prisons who 
have particular needs 




IP Interventions for short-
term prisoners in 3 inter-
related policy areas: 
learning, skills and 
employability; 
addictions; and social 
care  
Short-term prisoners Internal/ 
negotiated 
  
Table 4.2: Summary of characteristics of the SPS’s policy documents 
 
4.5 ‘Discourse matrix’ of the SPS in the NPM era 
The above sections reveal the content of the policy documents published between the 
late 1980s and 2007.  The language used in each document is evidence of 
managerialism in the SPS and indicates that the management of prisoners and prison 
establishments in Scotland was driven in this direction.  Traditional bureaucratic 
hierarchies, top-down communication and a centralised organisation that relied 
heavily on civil servants became less significant and were gradually replaced by a 
private-like approach, characterised, for example, by decentralisation, a ‘flat’ 
organisation and a mix of top-down and bottom-up communications.    
 
This section goes further by adapting the ‘end discourse’ and ‘means discourse’ 
framework of Adler and Longhurst (1994) as explained in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 
to assign the aforementioned documents to cells in the ‘discourse matrix’.  The 
assignment began with identifying the principal ‘end discourses’ and/or ‘means 
discourses’ of each policy.  This was not a simple task because the ‘end’ and ‘means’ 
discourses were not always straightforwardly addressed in the documents.  To avoid 
the ambiguity and misinterpretation of the policy papers, I used the interview 
materials to interpret those documents that did not send out a clear message.  For 





discourse’.  In such case, I needed to review my transcription and my research notes 
relevant to that particular policy.  After the ‘discourse’ was identified, I 
systematically assigned each document to those cells in the matrix which reflected its 
key characteristics.  These policy documents could be assigned to more than one cell 
in the matrix if they were found to address more than one ‘ends or means discourse’. 
 
After digesting the policy papers included in this thesis, evidence showed that the 
‘ends discourses’ of the SPS from the mid 1990s to 2007 (the period after Adler and 
Longhurst’s (1994) study) were ‘rehabilitation’, ‘normalisation’, ‘control’ and 
‘managerialism’.  The first three were similar to Adler and Longhurst’s study while 
the last one was the finding which confirmed what Adler and Longhurst (ibid.) had 
anticipated at the end of their work (pp.236-238).  What this study moved further 
was the argument that ‘managerialism’ was referred to as both a ‘means’ and ‘end’ 
of the SPS especially in the policy papers which came out after devolution.  In fact, 
the line between the ‘means discourse’ and ‘end discourse’ was no longer clear.  For 
example, SE, OE and VCE addressed the ‘what’ question with a focus on value for 
money and efficiency rather than traditional aims and in the meantime they 
suggested the method of achieving those goals was by a ‘business-like’ approach.  
These documents were, therefore, allocated in the discourse matrix ‘managerialism x 
managerialism’ as presented in Table 4.3. 
 
Discourse Rehabilitation Normalisation Control Managerialism 
Bureaucracy 
OR, HPP, HCS, 
ACT&C,  
ACT2C,IISS,IP 
CC, AC, HPP, 







OR, HPP, HCS, 
ACT&C,  
ACT2C, IISS,IP 







Managerialism SE, OE, IP SE, OE, IP SE, OE SE, OE, VCE 
Legality - - - - 
 
Table 4.3: The ‘discourse matrix’ of the SPS in the NPM era 
 
In Table 4.3, I reveal the results of the policy document analysis.  It demonstrates 





an analysis of the aims and the approach it advocated.  In general, findings from the 
analysis indicate that, during the last two decades, the management of prisons in 
Scotland had not been dominated by one specific ideology and that prison 
administrators did not rely on one particular model.  Despite the fact that 
rehabilitation was still in play, it was in a more voluntary form.  Rather, recent policy 
documents reflected the mixture between traditional ideologies and managerialism, 
with an inclination towards the latter.  That is why one policy document was 
allocated in several boxes in the ‘discourse matrix’.  For example, ACT&C and 
ACT2C were aimed at ‘rehabilitation’, ‘normalisation’ and ‘control’ and were 
managed by the headquarters (‘bureaucracy’) and by ‘professionals’ at prison 
establishments. 
 
4.5.1 ‘Initial phase’ documents 
In the ‘initial phase’ (from the late 1980s to the early 1990s), the publication of CC, 
AC, OR, SE and OE reflected the SPS’s attempts to sort out a new management 
approach to deal with dynamic circumstances of the prison service at the time, 
especially the problem of overcrowding and prison disorder.  As pointed out by 
Adler and Longhurst (1994), the dominant ‘end discourses’ during this period were 
rehabilitation, normalisation and control.  What I wish to suggest here is that the SPS 
succeeded in taking control of the crisis by developing its strategies step by step.  
First, CC was published with the aim of setting out a coherent corporate philosophy 
for the SPS and was intended to guide the regimes and the management of individual 
establishments, ‘to make possible a better quality of life for inmates’ as well as ‘to 
enable prisoners to retain links with family and community’.  This reflects a well-
planned strategy to gain ‘control’ over the management of prison establishments, 
‘normalise’ prisoners and treat them like individuals.  Staff at the headquarters were 
the key actors in achieving these goals
39
.  In addition, the use of bureaucratic means 
to fulfil those goals was stated in Section A of the document and re-emphasised 
throughout the document.  For instance, Section A addressed that ‘This statement or 
                                                 
39
 There have been significant changes in the personnel at ‘Headquarters’.  Before the granting of 
agency status, ‘Headquarters’ was located in the Scottish Office and staffed by civil servants 
(bureaucrats).  After the granting of agency status, it was staffed by a mixture of (seconded) civil 
servants and former governors (professions) and, with the passage of time, it became hard to recognise 





regime plan will be discussed and agreed between the Governor and the 
headquarters.  Thereafter, it will be the joint responsibility of the establishment and 
the headquarters to pursue the agreed aims, objectives and targets within the 
framework of the regime plan’ (para. 10.1).  This justified why it was assigned to the 
‘normalisation x bureaucracy’ and ‘control x bureaucracy’ cells in the matrix.    
 
In AC, as its name suggests, control was the dominant ideology.  The similarity 
between AC and CC was the fact that both emphasised the use of a bureaucratic 
means to dealing with the challenges the SPS was facing at the time.  The roles of 
Headquarters were highly significant in both documents.  However, AC went further 
by analysing the causes of the incidents and then proposing the development of 
Control Risk Profiles as well as the use of small units for persistently ‘difficult’ 
prisoners.  These were obvious evidence of control and normalisation discourse and 
explain why AC was assigned to the same cells in the matrix as CC. 
 
Following CC and AC, the publication of OR aimed to address the need to 
concentrate on the concepts of opportunity and responsibility as discussed above.  
Responsibility represented a new form of rehabilitation in that prisoners shared 
certain responsibilities in taking control of their lives, making choices and facing the 
consequences of their decisions (presented in its Chapter 5).  Prison staff, on the 
other hand, were responsible for providing appropriate opportunities for prisoners 
and acting as facilitators.  OR was a very broad policy document for dealing with 
long-term prisoners.  In addition, the aims to normalise and control prisoners were 
also addressed in OR (presented in Chapter 6 and 7 of OR).  Paragraph 6.3 of the 
document reflects the fact that normalisation in ‘the SPS fully accepts the 
responsibility to provide regimes which allow prisoners the opportunity to live as 
normal lives as possible, and as may be consistent with the requirements of security 
and order’.  On the other hand, control was reemphasised in Paragraph 7.1 which 
stated that ‘the first objective of the SPS is the secure the custody of the prisoners, 






OR differed from CC and AC in terms of its ‘means discourses’.  It did not rely 
solely on civil servants at Headquarters.  Rather, it addressed the professionalism of 
prison staff who needed to act as facilitators, encouraging prisoners to see themselves 
as responsible individuals and helping them make sound decisions.  ‘The role of the 
prison officer was being enhanced in this way through existing training programmes 
and through the Personal Officer Schemes that had been recently introduced into a 
number of establishments’ (para. 6.3).  Accordingly, OR was allocated to the 
‘rehabilitation x bureaucracy’, ‘rehabilitation x professionalism’, ‘control x 
professionalism’ and ‘normalisation x professionalism’ cells in the matrix.   
 
The two documents in the ‘initial phase’ following OR were SE and OE.  Both 
reflected the official move towards NPM.  While SE set out a corporate strategy 
based on the results of the ‘SWOT’ analysis (strengths, weakness, opportunities and 
threats) of the organisation, OE focussed specifically on analysing the organisational 
structure and the development of the new one, preparing the SPS for the Executive 
Agency status.  Adler and Longhurst commented that neither SE nor OE dealt with 
what prisons are for and suggested that they rather focused on how prisons should be 
run (1994:235).  In other words, they both concentrated on the ‘means discourses’.  
Adler and Longhurst, therefore, located SE and OE in their ‘new discourse matrix’ 
(see Table 2.7 in Chapter 2) in which the first two ‘means’ rows (bureaucracy and 
professionalism) were replaced by the new single row of managerialism and the 
‘legality’ row remained empty as there was no significant prison policy addressing 
the issue.  As for the ‘end discourses’, SE and OE were put in all three ‘ends’ 
columns (‘rehabilitation’, ‘control’ and ‘normalisation’).  What I wish to add to 
Adler and Longhurst’s findings is that managerialism should be viewed not only as a 
‘means’ but also as an ‘end’.  Consequently, there should be another ‘ends’ column 
for this newly emerging ‘end discourse’ which was hidden in these two documents.  
My argument here is based on the fact that, when considering the messages sent out 
by SE and OE carefully, both simply implied that prisons were no longer run for 
rehabilitation, control or normalisation per se.  In fact, SE and OE suggest that the 
management of prisons should also aim for ‘excellence’, ‘efficiency’, ‘effectiveness’ 





documents as presented in Section 4.1 above.  In other words, I argue that the line 
between the ‘end discourses’ and ‘means discourses’ in the NPM era was no longer 
clear because ‘managerialism’ was referred to as both a ‘means’ and an ‘end’.  In 
Table 4.2, I have therefore added a ‘managerialism’ column to the original matrix 
and assigned both SE and OE in this new ‘managerialism x managerialism’ cell.   
 
4.5.2 ‘Trial and error phase’ documents 
During the ‘trial and error’ phrase, FD was published to provide a managerial 
framework for the SPS as an Executive Agency to run its prisons effectively.  
Relatively similar to SE and OE, FD focused on the ‘how’.  Meanwhile, it also 
reemphasised the aims and objectives of the prison service and addressed the 
management approach for the organisation, financial arrangement, corporate 
planning and human resources.  Key actors identified in FD were the Chief 
Executive and Headquarters.  The roles of both actors were clearly identified in FD 
as presented above.  What I wish to highlight here is that, despite the move towards 
the use of managerial means, the role of bureaucracy was not totally deserted.  In any 
event, SPS was still the public organisation in which public employees including 
civil servants and professional staff played key roles in the delivery of prison 
services.  This is why I have added the ‘bureaucracy’ row back to the discourse 
matrix (while Adler and Longhurst combined ‘bureaucracy’ with ‘professionalism’ 
and replaced them with ‘managerialism’).   
 
Following the publication of FD, the launch of HPP, HCS, ACT&C and ACT2C 
showed that the development of prison discourse was not linear one.  That is, the SPS 
did not necessarily address only managerialist ideology.  There were times that the 
SPS reemphasised the need to concentrate on traditional aims of prisons 
management, for instance control (as reflected in HPP, HCS, ACT&C and ACT2C), 
normalisation (as in ACT&C and ACT2C), and rehabilitation (as in HPP, HCS, 
ACT&C and ACT2C).  In most policy documents, bureaucratic and professional 
approaches returned as dominant ‘means discourses’ while the Headquarters, civil 
servants, local staff and specialists were considered key actors.  For instance, as 





those who interact with prisoners are clearly in the best position to identify any risk.  
If staff consider someone to be ‘at risk’, they should commence the ACT2C process 
by providing a safe environment and discussing this with their line manager’ (p.5). 
 
4.5.3 ‘Post-devolution phase’ documents 
After devolution, the first significant movement in terms of prison policy was the 
announcement of the Vision for Correctional Excellence (VCE) to be used as a guide 
for the management of prisons in the twenty first century.  Similar to SE, OE and FD, 
VCE concentrated on the ‘what’ question.  The key messages of the VCE, in 
particular ‘leadership in correctional service’, a ‘prison estate that is fit for the 
future’, ‘highest standards of service’, ‘respect for our staff’ and ‘value for money for 
the taxpayer’, obviously represented managerialism.  Moreover, the principal 
approach which was suggested to achieve these aims was the use of ‘business-like’ 
tools, such as standards, benchmarking and a ‘customer’ survey.  VCE confirms my 
argument that managerialism deserved a place in the ‘discourse matrix’ as one of the 
key the ‘ends discourses’.  At the same time, it was still regarded as one of the 
dominant ‘means’ for the management of prisons in this NPM era.  Accordingly, 
VCE was allocated in the ‘managerialism x managerialism’ cell in the matrix along 
with SE and OE. 
 
Last but not least, IISS and IP differed from VCE as both dealt mainly with 
traditional aims (the ‘what’) of prisons.  These documents, therefore, support my 
argument that the development of prison policy did not only focus on managerialism, 
although it did move in that direction.  IISS and IP brought the SPS back to think 
again about the roles of rehabilitation and normalisation in prisons.  IISS addressed 
the need to treat certain types of prisoners with certain interventions according to 
their risk and need profiles.  It recommended that appropriate programmes and 
activities be developed and managed through cooperation between prison staff and 
specialists.  This justified its location in the ‘rehabilitation x bureaucracy’, 
‘rehabilitation x professionalism’, ‘normalisation x bureaucracy’, and ‘normalisation 






IP, on the other hand, focused on the treatment of short-term prisoners.  Bureaucratic 
and professional approaches were put in place to create the ‘Core Plus’ regime which 
provided short-term prisoners with flexible programmes responsive to the length of 
their sentence.  What made IP different from IISS was the fact that IP addressed the 
managerialist approach through information sharing, and management was added to 
develop more meaningful and appropriate interventions for short-term prisoners.  IP 
was, therefore, assigned to the same cell as IISS and to the ‘rehabilitation x 
managerialism’ and ‘normalisation x managerialism’ cells of the matrix.   
 
In summary, the analysis of prison policy documents between 1980s and 2007 
revealed that the management of prison in Scotland during the past twenty years was 
not dominated by one single ideology; that managerialism became one of the key 
‘ends discourses; that the development of prison policy was not limited to 
‘managerialism’ as there were times when traditional aims of prisons were restated; 
and that managerialist means did not totally replace bureaucracy and 
professionalism.  Obviously, the impact of managerialism on prison policy in general 
was significant.  It was the new ideology adopted by prison management as part of 
the public sector reform in the UK.  In the next chapter, its influence on prison 







MANAGING PRISONS WITH MARKET MECHANISMS 
 
As noted in Chapter 2, Hood (1991) points out that one of the key features of NPM is 
the use of market mechanisms to run a public organisation or what Walsh (1995) 
calls ‘the marketisation of the public service’.  Much has been written about market 
mechanisms in areas such as health and education (e.g. Dawson and Dargie 2002; 
Flynn 1993; Lane 2000a, 2000b; Mackie 2005; Walsh 1995).  In the prison system, 
however, little has been written on this issue (Armstrong 2007).  In this chapter, I 
therefore attempt to unpack the market mechanisms used in the Scottish prison 
system over the past twenty years and examine them from a policy-oriented 
perspective.
40
  The argument I advance in this chapter is that the management of the 
prison system is no longer confined to the traditional bureaucratic approach.  This is 
because it has been exposed to a variety of managerial choices that the private sector 
has presented.  With reference to the findings in Chapter 4, which indicate that a 
managerialist ideology has had a significant impact on the SPS at the policy level, I 
wish to demonstrate in this chapter its influence at an operational level.   
 
The discussion in this chapter builds on the NPM literature reviewed in Chapter 2 
and the interview material.  In Chapter 2, I discussed the concept of market 
mechanisms as suggested by previous scholars.  Before taking this discussion further, 
I wish to briefly clarify my use of the term ‘market mechanism’.  It is not my 
intention to use this term in the way in which it is deployed in the marketing or 
business administration fields.  Rather, the meaning of ‘market mechanism’ refers to 
the broad interplay between ‘sellers’, ‘buyers’, ‘products’ and ‘price’ within the 
prison system.  To serve the main purpose of this chapter, which seeks to 
demonstrate the extent to which the management of prisons in Scotland has become 
more like that of the private sector, it is used interchangeably with the terms 
‘business-like approach’ and ‘business-like tools’  
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 Armstrong (2007) suggests that the analysis of markets in punishment is at two levels: moral and 
policy-oriented ones.  ‘For the latter, they are empirical phenomena, whereas the former analyses 





The key market mechanisms or business-like approaches that are examined in the 
chapter are decentralisation, contract management and a customer-oriented approach.  
Why these three? According to most NPM scholars, particularly Hood (1991), these 
three mechanisms are central features of NPM and best describe the development 
and impact of managerialism on the management of the public services (see Chapter 
2).  What I wish to argue in this chapter is that the SPS, as a public organisation, has 
embraced these mechanisms to ensure the quality of service delivery and the 
management of its organisation under internal and external pressures and challenges, 
for instance for dealing with ‘slopping out’ issues, the overcrowding problem, 
political scrutiny and public accountability.  In addition, they were used to increase 
the competitive ability of the SPS not only compared to other public organisations 
but also to private companies in the prison ‘business’. 
 
The presentation of each mechanism in this chapter is based on documentary analysis 
and the interview material, the latter being used to complement and/or contrast with 
the former.  In order to achieve a better understanding of the use of business-like 
approaches in the prison service, I start with a brief discussion of the context of 
public sector reform which is drawn from a combination of relevant policy papers, 
academic literature and the interview material. 
 
I then move on to discuss the first mechanism − decentralisation.  Evidence of 
decentralised management confirms that the SPS shifted in the direction set out by 
the government policy to reform the management of the public sector.  Based on 
prison discourse at the time (see Chapter 4), decentralisation was among the key 
strategies that administrators opted for.  Delegation of decision power to prison 
governors and the new financial administration in local establishments are the two 
best examples of decentralisation in the SPS.   
 
The second mechanism that is discussed is contract management.  The discussion of 
contractualism in this chapter lays the foundation for the examination of private 
prisons in Scotland in Chapter 6.  Here I explore the development of contract 





Although the SPS had contracts with a wide range of partners, my main focus is on 
the contracts it had with private companies for the delivery of its core service, 
namely the private prison contracts.  In general, private prison contracts have always 
been a controversial matter among both academics and practitioners.  For Scotland, 
however, there was a relatively minimal resistance.  What was written into the 
contracts for Kilmarnock and Addiewell (the latest private prison in Scotland)? How 
were the contracts managed? Did they affect the management of prisons in general? 
These are the issues that are developed in the analysis of contract management in this 
chapter and are elaborated in Chapter 6.   
 
Lastly, I argue that NPM encouraged the reform of SPS from a closed, ‘military-like’ 
institution to one which promoted the use ‘business-like’ approaches.  Considering 
the policy documents discussed in Chapter 4, prisoners who were formerly sent to 
prisons for punishment and compulsory reform became the centre of attention in the 
NPM era and were treated as key ‘customers’ or ‘clients’ of the prison service.  This 
chapter reveals the extent to which the SPS adopted a customer-oriented strategy 
from the private sector in the management of its prisoners.  Evidence shows that, for 
example, a range of communication channels were developed for prisoners.  The 
Prisoner Survey is a good example.  The use of it was twofold.  On the one hand, it 
provided feedback from the service’s recipient to the SPS.  Results from the survey 
were used by SPS management to develop appropriate prison policies and strategies 
i.e. the improvement of healthcare standard as indicated in HPP and HCS; the 
provision of programmes for prisoners who had special needs by the launch of IISS; 
and the launch of IP to meet the needs of short-term prisoners (see Chapter 4).  On 
the other hand, the survey was used by policy makers and administrators to assess the 
performance of SPS. 
 
5.1 Marketisation of the public sector in political context 
In Chapter 4, I described changes in prison policies during the ‘initial’, ‘trial and 
error’ and ‘post devolution’ periods (from the late 1980s to 2007).  In this chapter, I 
wish to emphasise the influence of the marketisation policy, which was a political 





market mechanisms was one of the key strategies for changing the management of 
public services that sought to move beyond organisational restructuring or work 
process changes.  Government policy clearly addressed the need for a fundamental 
change which involved changing the governing norms, values and beliefs of public 
sector organisations.  As argued by Walsh (1995), this reform, which started in the 
late 1980s, introduced ‘new values of entrepreneurial managerialism’.   He explains 
that:   
The ideological basis of the development of market approaches to 
public service management lies in the ideas of the New Right 
theorists…The New Right sees the market not only as a mechanism 
for ensuring efficient production and distribution, but also as a moral 
necessity in preventing the exploitation by the individual of another.  
The primary role of the state in a market-oriented system is then to 
guarantee the conditions of freedom, within which individuals can 
pursue their own interests without interference.  The role of the state 
is a neutral one for enabling people to pursue their own idea of the 
good, rather than the forwarding of any particular form of social 
organisation. (Walsh 1995:58) 
 
Walsh points out that theorists agree that, in order to operate effectively, 
organisations need to deal effectively with key issues such as information, incentives, 
trust, quality and risk but the traditional approach for dealing with these issues 
seemed to concentrate only on professionalism, hierarchy, self-sufficiency, 
incremental patterns of planning and budgeting, and a departmental pattern of 
organisation.  Therefore, when the total reform is expected, the organisation can no 
longer rely on conventional techniques and tools.  Rather, it needs to be more 
innovative in terms of strategies as ‘the culture of markets and contracts requires a 
different set of institutions’ (ibid. 47).   
 
Considering the UK context, as discussed in Chapter 2, the managerialist ideology 
and the introduction of marketisation into the public sector officially began when the 
Thatcher Government came to power in 1979.  Efficiency was the key aim of this 
reform in accordance with the principle that civil service had to be smaller but more 
active.  In addition, a range of policies was launched to promote the involvement of 
the private sector in the delivery of public services (Ascher 1987; Bowman, Hakim 





1980s witnessed the fact that more and more public sector organisations were forced 
into ‘market-testing’.  Governmental departments were disaggregated into smaller 
and autonomous agencies that were still responsible to a minister.   
 
In 1988, Improving Management in Government: The ‘Next Steps’, a report produced 
by the Prime Minister’s Efficiency Unit, was adopted by the government as a 
political initiative to drive the transformation of the civil service.  It key features 
included the use of a commercial approach to run public agencies and the 
development of Framework Documents, which set up goals, missions, objectives and 
accountability mechanisms for each agency.  It is clear that the ultimate goal of ‘Next 
Steps’ was the privatisation of public services.  The late 1980s witnessed the 
expansion of contract and competition with the passage of the Local Government Act 
1988.  Walsh (1995) points out that the Act ‘required local authorities to subject a 
range of manual services to competitive tender.  If the local authority won the right 
to provide the services then it had to do so on a quasi-contractual basis, operating an 
internal trading account, which could not be cross-subsidised, and had to meet stated 
targets that were set by central government’ (p.120).  
 
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) and the privatisation policies of the Thatcher 
Government were sustained and actually strengthened when the Conservative Party 
won the general election in 1992 and John Major became the Prime Minister.  This 
was the fourth consecutive victory of the Conservative Party and later that year the 
Major Government announced the Public Finance Initiative (PFI)
41
.  One of the SPS 
senior managers commented on this change in public services, saying that ‘as I 
recall, 1990-91 was the first time we had a mixed economy, if you like, in terms of 
what traditionally had been in-house activities’ (Interview, Current SPS Director, 3 
July 2007).  In terms of its organisational status, the SPS, like many other civil 
service departments, became an executive agency in 1993.  The impact of this 
development on the SPS was described by the former Director and Board Member of 
SPS as follows: 
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‘So for example we had responsibility and authority to decide on the 
way in which we recruited, paid, graded and managed our staff rather 
than having to stick to a formula which we either inherited or which 
was decided for us from elsewhere.  In 1993 we did a very big review 
of our staffing structure.  We changed the roles and responsibility of 
prison officers which divided prison officer into two categories one of 
which was remarkably less than the other [in terms of number].  We 
reduced the number of managers and supervisors and we changed the 
ranks and roles of the most senior staff.  So obviously making changes 
like that creates difficulties and produces resistance.  Of course, it 
does’.  (Interview, Former SPS Director, 18 April 2007) 
 
In the 1997 general election, the Conservatives were defeated by the Labour Party.  
Yet the reform of public services remained one the key agendas of the new 
government.  The Labour Government’s programme to ‘modernise’
42
 the public 
services reflected the move towards increased marketisation.  The main focus was on 
‘value for money’ rather than on a reduction of public debt which was the original 
purpose of the reform.  In modernising the governance, two significant, yet 
contradictory, concepts were in play in the Labour Government’s discourses-
partnership and principal and agents (Newman 2001:84-85; Walsh 1995:110-136).  
The former involved an attempt by the government to include its staff in the 
management of public services from the policy level to the operational level.  Staff 
involvement was recognised as one of key determinants of success.  The latter 
concept, however, referred to the contractual relationship between central 
government and local managers.  Agents were required to deliver services against the 
goals and targets set by the principal.   
 
Prior to devolution, Scottish legislation was passed by the UK Parliament.  The 
Scottish Office and the Secretary of State for Scotland, who was an MP from the 
ruling party, were responsible for formulating legislative proposals and for all 
administrative matters involving Scotland as well as for making policies and 
lobbying for Scotland at the centre (Keating 2005:6).  Unlike education, where there 
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was a long history of Scottish particularism, Scottish penal policy
43
 conformed to the 
UK thrust.  Legislation was dependent on central government as Scottish politicians 
chose access (a strong Scottish presence at Westminster and material benefits for 
their constituents) over autonomy (Keating 2005:5).  Although England and Scotland 
were tied in terms of legislation and penal policy, through the UK Government, when 
it came to prison management what happened in England was not necessarily applied 
to Scotland.  One of the civil servants who used to serve as an SPS Board Member 
described: 
 
‘It’s always been the case that we are slower and do not reorganise so 
quickly.  We don’t have the same resources.  I think it is quite 
beneficial actually not to reorganise.  But England has gone through 
lots of crises and dramatic changes…We watch what happens in 
England but we definitely don’t copy it’.  (Interview, Former SPS 
Director, 15 May 2007) 
 
After devolution, the management of prisons in Scotland shifted again.  
Undoubtedly, the SPS experienced more political influence and there was more 
parliamentary scrutiny of penal policy and prison practice.  One of the senior 
managers of the SPS described that ‘the proximity of the ministerial interest is 
greater than it was because we have a Scottish Parliament.  Clearly, there is more 
interest.  We have our own Justice Minister’ (Interview, Current SPS Director, 3 July 
2007).   
 
At a macro level, during the late 1990s the SPS also faced another challenge when 
the UK Government published its White Paper, Modernising Government in March 
1999.  The Scottish Executive (now the Scottish Government) took this policy 
agenda forward by producing its own ‘Modernising Government’ Programme in 
February 2000.  Modernising Government set up a wide-ranging, long-term 
programme to reform public services of the UK with the three main aims of 
‘ensuring that policy making is joined up and strategic; making sure that public 
service users, not providers, are the focus by matching the services more closely to 
people’s lives; [and] delivering services that are high quality and efficient’ (Cabinet 
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Office 1999).  The influence of this programme on the management of Scottish 
prisons was monumental as shown in the following sections. 
 
Another significant change in the late 1990s was the so-called cash crisis which 
contributed to a change in human resource management and in service delivery by 
encouraging the involvement of private sector.  The cash crisis started in the summer 
of 1999 when the government decided to cut the budget that would have been 
allocated to the SPS.  This not only resulted in a substantial reduction in resources 
for the SPS but also introduced considerable tension into the organisation.  The SPS 
decided to resolve the crisis by closing some prisons and reducing the number of 
prison officers, which clearly affected the management of prisons as a whole.  The 
philosophy behind these solutions was explained by the senior manager of SPS as 
follows:    
 
‘So I had immediately to deal with the fact that, in the following year 
we would have 13 million pounds less money than we had planned to 
spend.  And two thirds of that money was going on staff salaries.  We 
had too many people.  So instead of closing small places or cutting 
everybody by a small amount, which gives a very negative feeling to 
the whole service, I decided that we should shut some prisons 
completely and walk away from them because you’d save everything 
not just staff but the electricity and everything.  And you could maybe 
sell the site that the prison was on.   
 
Interestingly the Prison Service Board which I chaired decided which 
prisons to close and the First Minister knew of it when we first told 
him what we intended to do.  They were not happy about it but they 
wanted the money.  That’s the point.  And I said if you want the 
money, you can have it but we have to reduce the number of prison 
officers.  And they accepted it because they had to have the money.  
But I can imagine that, in other circumstances, they would want to cut 
everything by a little bit’.  (Interview, Former SPS Chief Executive, 
13 December 2007)  
 
The decision to close unsuitable prisons and the need to find 2,200 additional spaces 
were later officially discussed in the SPS Estates Review which was published in 
2002.  The Review aimed to identify potential pressures on the SPS prison estate in 
the long term and to find appropriate options for responding to them.  Three new 





as a public prison as the SPS could not afford to open more than one new prison at a 
time.  Another two would follow the PPPs approach: one would be privately built 
and publicly operated and the other would be privately built and privately operated.  
For efficiency reasons, Peterhead
44
 and Low Moss were to be closed and Barlinnie 
refurbished with a new houseblock.  The policy on human resource management, 
however, was slightly altered from its original formulation.  That is, the SPS did not 
actually go for a lay-off policy.  Instead, staff who wished to continue working with 
the SPS would be transferred to work in other establishments.  Nevertheless, at the 
end of the day, there would be a total reduction of 670 staff as a result of the 
proposed approach.   
 
The proposal to close Low Moss, one of the ‘three worst prisons’ especially in terms 
of prisoners’ living conditions, had been a controversial issue in Parliament.  The 
SNP, the opposition at that time, claimed that this decision would create chaos for 
the SPS.  Kenny MacAskill, the SNP Justice Spokesman (the Justice Minister) 
commented to the BBC News Online on 22 February 2007 that ‘having less cells 
when we have ever more convicted criminals is a dangerous situation that threatens 
prison security. The Labour and Lib Dem government's prison policy was in turmoil 
but it's now in chaos.  Inadequate as Low Moss may be, closing it puts further 
pressure on an already overcrowded prison system which is already bursting at the 
seams’ (BBC 2007).  
 
What I wish to highlight here is that the Modernising Government White Paper, 
which led to significant prison reform policy including the Estate Review, 
transformed the SPS into a state in which a business-like approach was significantly 
favoured
45
.  In fact, one of the most significant features of the White Paper which 
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affected the SPS most was the regulation of professional work.  Prior to this, the SPS 
had enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy especially in terms of its professional 
knowledge and practice.  Formerly, what happened behind the prison walls had been 
largely, if not solely, controlled by SPS itself and was not subject to much scrutiny.  
The White Paper introduced a new ideology and new mechanisms for public service 
delivery and these created tensions in many public agencies, including the SPS, 
which were accustomed to traditional forms of bureaucratic management.  The SPS 
had to adjust itself to a wide range of new managerial mechanisms
46
 introduced by 
the new policy i.e. financial management and Public Service Agreements (see 
Section 5.3 below).  Besides, the White Paper attempted to create and control the 
outputs and processes of professional work (Newman 2001).  ‘The former is 
represented in the expansion of targets, league tables and performance indicators; the 
latter in the tightening of regulation of the labour process itself (the pedagogic 
practices of teachers, the clinical practice of doctors, or the nature of the interaction 
between probation officers and young offenders)’ (2001:87).   
 
As far as prisons are concerned, the most significant effect of the White Paper on the 
SPS was that it led to the creation of the National Strategy for the Management of 
Offenders (NSMO) which came into force in September 2007.  Under NSMO, 
                                                                                                                                          
This Government believes in the public service and public servants. But that does not 
mean the public service at any price. The British public has grown accustomed to 
consumer choice and competition in the private sector. If our public service is to 
survive and thrive, it must match the best in its ability to innovate, to share good 
ideas and to control costs. Above all, the public service must deliver efficiently and 
effectively the policies, programmes and services of government. Some of our public 
services achieve this now. But others do not. We intend to bring them up to the level 
of the best, and make the best even better, by modernising the controls under which 
they operate, by encouraging new ways of working and wherever practicable by 
giving the public the right to choose.   
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Community Justice Authorities (CJAs) were to be established as a mechanism for 
bringing together all stakeholders in criminal justice, including the SPS, local 
authorities and key partners, to deliver effective offender management, protect 
society and reduce re-offending.  NSMO was an excellent example of the 
government’s attempt to control both the ‘outputs’ and ‘process’ of its agents as 
pointed out above.  It laid out what was expected from the SPS and also provided 
recommendations on how to do it.  For instance, in the period of September 2007 to 
April 2008, SPS was required to ‘provide each CJA with early briefing on SPS 
activity relevant to CJA; contribute to the production of each area plan; reconsider its 
investment in rehabilitative activities in the light of this strategy and CJA area plans; 
and agree priorities and align services to deliver area plan’ (NSMO 2006:13). 
 
NSMO also reflected the significance of the partnership concept which was deemed 
a key success factor for the responsive and effective management of prisoners.  It 
was actually one of the key strategies of the Labour Government for the reform of 
the public sector.  This approach was highlighted by Cathy Jamieson, the then 
Minister of Justice with responsibility for the SPS, in the Ministerial Foreword of 
NSMO (Scottish Executive 2006) as follows: 
 
This, our first national offender management strategy, lays the ground 
for deep-rooted partnerships able to reduce re-offending and protect 
public safety.  Such partnerships are built upon commitment and 
shared purpose.  But, above all, they are built upon the people who 
work within them.  We have an opportunity and an obligation to break 
down the barriers that hold back our staff from working ever more 
closely together.  Prison officers and criminal justice social workers, 
alongside partners from across criminal justice and beyond, must be 
able to exchange experience and skills, to learn from each other and to 
bring their joint efforts to bear to reduce reoffending.  I expect 
everyone involved in the management of offenders, aided by the 
National Advisory Body, to work together to remove those barriers 
and to embrace joint working in spirit and reality. 
 
After the second general election of Scotland in May 2003, partnership discourse was 
still in play as there was no significant change in terms of political power in the 
Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Executive (now the Scottish Government).  The 





Soon after, the leaders of the two parties, Jack McConnell and Jim Wallace signed a 
joint partnership agreement, A Partnership for a Better Scotland (2003), which set 
out the principles for jointly developing and implementing policies and a 
commitment to improve the public services for Scotland.  The PPP approach, a 
legacy of the UK government, remained a practical option for Scotland, according to 
this agreement, that would guarantee ‘value for money’ in the delivery of public 
services, including the prison service.  
 
The new wave of change in penal policy began when the SNP won the general 
election in 2007.  The most obvious change, which created a great deal of 
controversy, was the fact that SNP was not in favour of private prisons.  This resulted 
in the cancellation and retendering of Bishopbriggs Prison, which was to have been 
run as private prison.  The Justice Secretary (Kenny MacAskill) attempted to justify, 
at some length, the government’s policy to stop private prisons in Scotland in a news 
release on the Scottish Government’s website on 23 August 2007, saying that: 
If I had allowed the private sector contract for Bishopbriggs to 
progress we would have had around a quarter of prisoners in Scotland 
in private sector jails − some five times the level of private sector 
involvement in the United States. 
A modern prison environment must be one where staff can work with 
high risk offenders to tackle reoffending − enhancing public 
protection in the process. Public safety must be paramount, not private 
profit. We want to rebuild a Scottish Prison Service that is exactly that 
− a public service not a management agency. 
That's why I am proud that we are delivering on our manifesto so that 
the replacement prison at Bishopbriggs will be run in the public 
sector, for the public good, and not for private profit. 
We are drawing a clear line in the sand in terms of future policy with 
the decision to stop and restart procurement of a replacement prison at 
Bishopbriggs. Prisons focused on protecting the public from serious 
and dangerous offenders should be publicly-run by dedicated 






Putting prison management into a political context over a period of twenty years, 
SPS encountered a radical shift from the promotion of business-like approaches and 
privatisation of the Thatcher Government to the anti-privatisation policy of the SNP 
Government.  The impact of the SNP government’s policy on SPS and the 
management of private prisons are beyond the timeline of this research.  But, it will 
be interesting for future study to examine this issue in light of the changing political 
context.  Under the SNP, the fate of the existing private prison, Kilmarnock, and the 
newly established Addiewell Prison will clearly be worth exploring, particularly if 
prison privatisation is no longer the favoured option. 
 
5.2 Decentralisation  
As suggested by Hood (1991), one notable feature of NPM is the disaggregation of 
units in the public sector.  He points out that disaggregation means the ‘break up of 
formerly ‘monolithic’ units, unbundling of a ‘U-form’ management system 
[centralised management] into corporatised units around products, operating on 
decentralised ‘one-line’ budgets and dealing with one another on an ‘arms’ length 
basis’ (1991:5).  The justification for this doctrine was ‘to create ‘manageable’ units, 
separate provision and production interests, gain efficiency advantages through the 
use of contract or franchise arrangements inside as well as outside the public sector’ 
(ibid. 5).  Decentralisation, in addition, creates a new relationship among individuals 
working in the organisation.  The concepts of principal and agent as discussed above 
were clearly reflected in the public management policy of the Blair Government 
when the government (the principal) focused on the control measures designed to 
ensure that local governmental units (the agents) delivered services as required by 
central government (Newman 2001:86).  The impact of this policy on public 
agencies, especially in terms of their organisation structure and the delegation of 
power, was clearly paramount.  Taking SPS as an example, decentralisation policy 
altered the relationship between Headquarters and prison establishments and this led 
to the restructuring of staff grades and salary bands (this issue is elaborated in section 






At this point I wish to clarify the meaning given to decentralisation in this study 
before presenting my empirical findings in the prison context.  First of all, 
decentralisation did not simply mean a change of organisational structure.  Rather, it 
was a change that also covered governing values, norms, and beliefs of the agency 
concerned.  As Walsh (1995) put it, ‘it is not easy to change institutions, because any 
change will be resisted by those who benefit from the existing institutional pattern, 
and because institutions exist not only as external systems of constraints, but also as 
internal patterns of interests and values’ (p.31).   
 
Analysts have given a variety of meanings to organisational change.  Tushman and 
Romanelli (1985) pointed out that organisational change can be found in two forms: 
convergence and reorientation.  Walsh (1995) explains that the former refers to the 
change which ‘takes place over the long term and involves slow and steady patterns 
of evolutionary development.  The basic patterns of organisational structure and 
culture do not change, but there is a gradual development of internal consistency 
within the organisation’ (p.31).  The latter, on the other hand, means that ‘the 
fundamental character of the organisation is transformed, involving radical changes 
in organisational structures and values.  Change is rapid and disruptive.  Institutional 
understandings and patterns of behaviour are systematically undermined.  
Reorientation involves revolution rather than evolution.  In many ways the public 
service developments of the 1960s and 1970s were convergent changes, as the 
bureaucratic form became more explicit and firmly established.  It is clear that public 
services in many countries are now going through a period of rapid change which 
means a major reorientation of their basic institutional form’ (p.32).  With reference 
to this framework, the changes of SPS from the 1980s to 2007, I argue, was prone to 
reorientation.  That is, the reform of prison management started with finding its own 
identity and mission, reflected in its ‘end discourse’ presented in Chapter 4.  It was a 
relatively rapid process, enhanced by the publication of series of policy papers 
especially Custody and Care, Assessment and Control and Opportunity and 
Responsibility at the first stage.  This changed the SPS a great deal not only in terms 
of work responsibility but also in terms of ethics and accountability (see Chapter 7).  





adoption of a business like approach to running its prisons, the establishment of 
Kilmarnock as a private prison and the shift in organisational values and culture 
toward a focus on ‘vision for correctional excellence’ rather than ‘routine-based 
management’. 
 
The establishment of CJAs in the 2000s also represented a change in orientation as 
noted by the SPS director, who reflected that ‘not only are there cultural shifts, 
internally there have been changes in the whole dynamic of how we interface and 
what strategy we use to deal with the community justice authorities who are making 
more and more demands in health and things.  CJAs are asking real question about 
how we are delivering the service.  Who’s delivering it for us? And they are trying to 
specify what we do’ (Interview, Current SPS Director, 3 July 2007).  
 
I wish to point out that, with such a dramatic change, an organisation like SPS cannot 
afford resistance from staff.  Administrators needed to make sure that all the parties 
involved understood these changes and willingly agreed to work towards the same 
goals.  The former senior manager of the SPS explained the strategy used in the SPS 
at that time as follows:     
 
‘The work we did at that time was done in a way that involved the 
staff to a substantial degree.  If you wish to change anything in any 
organisation you have to involve the staff.  This has not been the 
tradition of the prison service, which traditionally has been a 
hierarchical organisation based on rank and where staff at some 
degree were alienated from the management.  They did not 
necessarily have full confidence in the management. We certainly 
improved the relationship between staff and the management and the 
union and the management despite the fact that we were doing things 
that were very difficult for the trade union’. (Interview, Former SPS 
Director, 18 April 2007) 
 
Institutional changes, like decentralisation and devolution, normally involve the goal 
of performing better and more effectively.  However, the change process is not 
always as smooth as the organisation wants.  There are key issues that have to be 
solved so that the goal is achieved.  Walsh (1995) suggests that an organisation may 
face problems relating to information, incentives, trust, quality and risk and that these 





issues through its ‘professionalism, hierarchy, self-efficiency, incremental patterns of 
planning and budgeting, and the departmental pattern of organisation’ (p.47).  
However, according to Walsh, when employing the culture of markets and contracts, 
the institution needs to respond to those key issues in a different way.  In practice, 
information is not always free and is often incomplete and unequally distributed.  
‘The greater is social complexity and variation, the more necessary it is that there 
should be detailed information for decision making, but the greater will be the cost of 
creating and maintaining an information system’ (p.47).  According to Walsh, for 
performance monitoring and incentives, it will be more effective to create a contract 
that has incentives for the contractor to perform in order to avoid unnecessary 
expense on contract monitoring which can be extremely expensive (p.48-49).  The 
quality issue can be a problem if the goods are not ‘material’ ones as it is impossible 
to write objective specifications.  There are truths in this observation when 
considering the nature of the prison service.  ‘A key issue that arises in the 
development of contracts and markets is that of how contracts can be written that 
will ensure that quality services are delivered’ (p.53).  This leads to the issue of risk.  
Walsh has pointed out that ‘the development of markets and contract systems has the 
effect of creating distance between the parties to an exchange’ (p.54).  Contracts can 
impose a greater risk on one party than on the other.  The contractor may face a risk 
of financial cost of investment.  The purchaser or the client generally bears the risk 
of contractor failure or inadequate delivery which can result in a great amount of 
budgetary loss.  Therefore, Walsh suggests, ‘contracts need to be created in such a 
way that they will provide an appropriate set of incentives and reduce the risk that is 
faced by the parties to the relationship’ (p.54). 
 
The issue of trust is vital to the contractual relationship (this issue is elaborated in 
Section 5.3).  ‘Without trust there can be no confidence that future obligations and 
commitments will be met, unless contracts are complete and self-enforcing, which is 
rarely the case if there is uncertainty, opportunism or bounded rationality’ (p.50).  
Furthermore, ‘it will be necessary for the purchasers of a service to have some means 





systems of processes of quality assurance, and perhaps at a deeper level commitment 
to appropriate sets of values’ (p.51). 
 
This is consistent with Flynn (1993:126-142) who argues that the new contractual 
relationship, which is a key feature of NPM, causes structural change and divides 
people in the organisation into the centre (which performs support functions rather 
than control), the sellers (the officers and workers in the authority and any contactors 
who provide services), the workers (the contractors who provide the service), and the 
buyers (designated staff to buy the service, using money from taxpayers).   
 
The discussion above demonstrates how decentralisation was understood in this 
research.  It was generally referred to as a change in the administration of prisons 
which were traditionally controlled by Headquarters.  In other words, prison 
management was top-down management.  Recent change in policy discourse (as 
demonstrated in Chapter 4) and the influence of a managerialist ideology were the 
key factors that decreased the power of Headquarters and in the meantime promoted 
the autonomy of prison establishments.  In the following sections, I demonstrate the 
impact of decentralisation on the management of prisons as a whole with a focus on 
the new form of relationship between ‘the principal’ and ‘the agent’ and the changing 
roles of key actors as a result of decentralisation policy.  This issue laid the 
foundation for the discussion on the new contractual relationship in Section 5.3 and 
also the customer-oriented policy in Section 5.4. 
  
5.2.1 The principal and agent relationship 
I. Ministers and the Chief Executive   
During the past 20 years, especially after Scottish devolution, the political influence 
on penal policy and the prison service has been monumental.  At face value, the role 
of the Minister and the SPS Chief Executive seemed to be clearly understood.  As 
indicated in the SPS Framework Document, the former makes decisions on the 
policies for dealing with offenders, sets the targets to meet and oversees the SPS’s 
performance against those targets.  The latter, on the other hand, is delegated the 





staff and resources, the structuring of daily regimes for prisoners and other 
operational and contractual decisions within the framework.  In practice, however, it 
is inevitable that the Minister gets involved with the choices that the agency makes.  
The former Chief Executive of SPS explained that working with the Minister at the 
time was rather ‘difficult’.  He commented that:    
 
‘Working with Justice Minister was difficult.  He had a different 
approach and was more hands-on and much more concerned about 
public opinion.  More right wing basically.  He was a difficult person, 
and not just to people from the prison service − he was difficult.  He 
was a clever politician but quite difficult for the whole Scottish 
Office.  Then we had a change in Government in 1997 in the period 
before devolution.  That was OK.  There was a rocky relationship 
because of the incident involving the Minister and releasing prisoners.  
But that wasn’t difficult, that period’. (Interview, Former SPS Chief 
Executive, 4 June 2007)   
 
His comments are consistent with the work by Liebling (2004), which indicated that 
personalities and leadership skills were key factors which had a great impact on the 
relationship between politicians and senior managers of the public sector agencies.  
Based on her study of English prisons, Liebling found that the relationship between 
the English Prison Service and Ministers depended on personalities and on 
interactions between the key players: the Commissioner for Correctional Services, 
the Home Secretary, the Prisons Minister and the Director General.  In this study, my 
interview with Tony Cameron, another former Chief Executive of SPS, confirmed 
Liebling’s observation.  With reference to my interview notes on the interviewee’s 
personality and management style, I found that Eddie Frizzell seemed to be more 
involved with policy makers and that his relationship with politicians was not as 
hostile.  Tony Cameron, on the other hand, had a relatively strong personality which 
led to a more ‘aggressive’ relationship with politicians.  It was also my observation 
that, with strong personality, agents can challenge the principal if they choose to.  
The former senior manager of SPS described his relationship with the Minister as 
follows: 
 
‘The first Justice Minister we ever had didn’t get involved in these 
things [daily services].  And when there were disturbances in the 
prisons, he stood back.  We dealt with it.  I went on television.  Some 





second Minister we had wasn’t quite as good at that.  But she did 
quite well. 
 
It meant that I have a certain power to deal with the politicians and the 
Parliament. They didn’t really like it, to be honest, particularly the 
Parliament because I was difficult with the opposition.  But I knew 
that they couldn’t do anything to me personally and I kept them away 
from the prison service’.  (Interview, Former SPS Chief Executive, 13 
December 2007)  
 
The complexity of hierarchical administration in the public sector requires a good 
sense of communication and coordination from the Chief Executive.  As the head of 
the organisation, Chief Executive has to interact with a wide range of people 
surrounding the Minister, for instance, the Minister’s private secretary and political 
advisors, who play an intermediary role between the Minister and civil servants.  
These people can interfere with the daily management of the organisation as a 
‘messenger’ of the politicians.  In the SPS case, however, there were times that these 
people were disregarded as a result of the leader’s personality.  Again, one of the 
former Chief Executives of the SPS was a good case in point and he commented 
during the interview that ‘the other people in between are less important.  I always 
dealt with the Minister directly. I would phone up and say I need to speak with the 
Minister or the Minister would phone me.  Or I would send a note to the Minister.  I 
would never send a note to anybody else’ (Interview, Former SPS Chief Executive, 
13 December 2007). 
   
As described above, after the SNP won the general election in 2007 and formed a 
minority government, there have been some significant changes in policy towards 
prison management.  The most controversial one was the rejection of prison 
privatisation.  Kenny MacAskill, the Justice Minister, explained that prisons ‘are for 
public safety, not private profit, so we are drawing a line on the sand’ (Scotsman, 13 
November 2008).  The message from the policy maker to the Chief Executive was 
clear and there was no significant opposition from the latter.  The relationship 








II. Headquarters and prison establishments 
Influenced by managerialist ideology since the mid 1990s, the relationship between 
Headquarters and prison establishments gradually shifted from a traditional 
bureaucratic one to a contractual one.  In other words, Headquarters and prison 
establishments were tied together by prison agreements.  The former acted as a 
purchaser, who defined what was wanted from each establishment and monitored 
whether or not the outcome was achieved.  The latter, on the other hand, acted as a 
service provider who is responsible for the delivery of prison services.  (This issue of 
contracts is discussed in detail in section 5.3.)  Liebling (2004) calls this relationship 
‘government-at-a-distance’, which refers to as the state where ‘there is a strong 
central direction, but also devolution-within-parameters to local managers’ (p.377).  
It is very interesting that Liebling (2004) used the term strong central direction rather 
than control as it implies that managerial power is no longer limited only to the 
centre and Headquarters does not take absolute control of prison establishments 
anymore.  Rather, prison establishments are granted a degree of delegated authority 
for the delivery of prison services.  Nevertheless, I argue, the final decision is still in 
hands of the CEO who is responsible for the organisation.   
 
In the case of the SPS, the extent to which prison governors were given power to 
exercise their decisions relied heavily on the Chief Executive’s leadership and 
policy.  From my interview with one of the former Chief Executives, I found that he 
had a clear policy of limiting the role of Headquarters and promoting the roles of 
prison governors in the management of Scottish prisons.  He explained that ‘I had a 
rule that no instruction was to be given to a governor unless it was cleared by a board 
member because I wanted to reduce the number of e-mails going to the governor’s 
office from every bit of headquarters’ (Interview, Former SPS Chief Executive, 13 
December 2007).  Bottom-up communication was enhanced during this era as one of 
the former senior governors and directors of SPS pointed out that  
 
‘I talked directly to Headquarters when I needed things, for example, 
a consultant to train staff…I remember writing a letter to 
Headquarters saying that I needed extra money for developing 
training and support for a sex offenders programme which I knew was 





would be able to support me.  If not, I was going to do it anyway 
because it needed to be done.  I would have to find the money from 
somewhere else’. (Interview, Former SPS Governor and Director, 12 
December 2007)   
 
As part of decentralisation policy, the organisational structure of the SPS underwent 
several changes during the last two decades.  Re-clustering functions at 
Headquarters, pushing out a payroll system to be managed at local level and reducing 
the number of staff at the centre were evidence of the SPS’s efforts to limit the role 
of Headquarters and to devolve power to prison establishments.  The role of staff at 
Headquarters shifted from decision makers to consultants.  In addition, instructions 
from the centre had to be approved by the Board before they were delivered to 
governors.  ‘This change sent a new message to Headquarters and ultimately led to 
the reduction of its size.  According to the policy of the former chief executive 
(Interview, Former SPS Chief Executive, 13 December 2007), governors were given 
more power to say ‘no’ to Headquarters’ staff.  According to another governor, 
agency status and decentralisation policy helped to ‘reduce that chain of command 
and communication.  We have much a more direct and intimate relationship with 
Headquarters. We also have much better link with [Headquarters and with policy 
makers] informing policy up and down about what was working and what was not 
working’ (Interview, Current Prison Governor, 25 April 2008). 
 
5.2.2 The changing role of prison managers 
In his book Understanding Prisons: The New Old Penology, DiIulio (1991) argues 
that the role of prison staff has changed over time.  The ‘old penology’ views 
‘guards’ as bureaucratic automatons and state functionaries performing uninspiring 
public service and as mechanistically sadistic ogres who suffered from ‘lock 
psychosis’ (p.94).  The ‘new penology’, on the other hand, offers two visions of 
prison staff.  ‘In the new penology of the 1940s and 1950s, the guards appeared − if 
they appeared at all − as benignly conservative sources of bureaucratic inertia who 
simply needed to be retrained (or retired) so that needed reforms could take place.  
During the 1960s, in most prison systems, guards officially became the ‘corrections 
officers,’ a bureaucratic amalgam of cop and counsellor, disciplinarian and therapist’ 






What I wish to add to DiIulio’s argument is that senior prison staff now acted as 
managers.  As a matter of fact, governors, and establishments used to be accountable 
to Headquarters in a hierarchical ‘military-like’ way.  In recent years, however, their 
‘military-like’ roles were gradually phased out and their managerial roles became 
more significant (Bryans 2007; Liebling and Price 2001).  Now the situation has 
changed and, according to King and McDermott (1989), the problem of prisons in 
recent years is much more of management than of prison overcrowding, sanitation or 
resource allocation.  This argument still holds today.  One of the issues regarding the 
management of prisons in the new era was the attitude of the management and staff.  
Positive attitudes were required in order for the prison to function effectively and 
efficiently.  One of the senior governors who had a long (30-year) experience in the 
SPS emphasised the significance of attitudes, noting that ‘all of our attitudes 
changed.  My personal attitude is hugely different from what it was in the 1980s.  We 
have moved forward together.  People whose attitudes were inflexible were dealt 
with individually.  They were informed that this was not acceptable.  If it continued, 
we would find the way to move them.  If people still refused to fit in, they would 
have to leave’ (Interview, Current Prison Governor, 25 April 2008).  In addition, 
according to another prison governor, the governor position differed from the senior 
management of other agencies because they have ‘social responsibility associated 
with helping prisoners so that they will not re-offend’ (Interview, Current Prison 
Governor, 25 April 2008).   
 
Obviously, managerial skills are needed by senior prison staff to meet the targeted 
outcome and deliver service in terms of the ‘value for money’ principle.  One senior 
governor pointed out that ‘tasks and roles have increased dramatically to meet the 
internal targets.  But I have a tight budget and I have to make savings from this 
budget without diminishing performance.  In other words, doing more with less or 
the same (Interview, Current SPS Prison Governor, 25 May 2007). 
 
When looking at the changing roles of prison staff, especially those at senior level, 





resources they were managing and to what effect.  Scrutiny, of an unprecedented 
kind, was born.  The growth of management saw a decline in the influence of 
professionals in running their organisations, and some tensions between the values of 
non-managerialist ‘expert professionals’ and the need for greater ‘public 
accountability’.  This conformed to one of the NPM characteristics which 
encouraged public sector managers to be change agents and run their agencies with a 
new approach to action and thinking (Walsh 1995).  
 
Leadership which is one of the key skills of prison managers was emphasised by the 
interviewees.  The former Chief Executive of SPS stated during the interview that ‘if 
you feel vulnerable or weak, this job [CEO] is not for you.  Being the head of an 
organisation of this type is quite lonely.  You have to be careful not to try to do 
everything yourself’ (Interview, Former Chief Executive, 13 December 2007).  
Comments from one of the senior governors also reflected that leadership was the 
key to success, especially in terms of giving people confidence to get on with their 
jobs, supporting, coaching and mentoring. 
 
‘I like to create a climate in which managers and staff will do their 
best.  We don’t operate a blame culture.  I also try to engender a really 
strong team spirit so that we are proud of what we achieve in this 
establishment’. (Interview, Current SPS Governor, 25 April 2008) 
 
The recruitment of governors for the Scottish prisons is now open to the public.  
Senior managers from outside have been invited to apply for governor positions.  
The new recruits, or what former Chief Executive of SPS called ‘the new blood’ 
(Interview, Former SPS Chief Executive, 13 December 2007) have to work as 
deputies to senior governors during an induction period before being promoted to 
governors.  A so-called ‘two-way street’ policy was also developed during this 
period to encourage civil servants to change their place of work, especially to move 
from the public sector to the private sector.  The aim was to exchange ‘know how’ 
between the two sectors.  Those who wished to come back to the public sector were 






In terms of accountability, since managerialism became dominant in the management 
of public sector − including prison services − prison managers have not only had to 
be responsible for the daily regime but have also had be accountable to the Board 
and policy makers.  Their primary concerns have a lot to do more with ‘efficiency’, 
‘effectiveness’ and ‘value for money’ than with traditional ‘punishment’ and 
‘rehabilitation’ concerns (as discussed in Chapter 4).  The accountability issue is 
discussed in Chapter 7 where I explore the accountability mechanisms used in prison 
management in Scotland.  
 
5.3 Contract management and competition 
 
The use of contracting has expanded greatly over the last twenty 
years, and it has been used for the provision of core as well as support 
services … In Britain almost every service that is provided by the 
public sector has been considered for operation on a contract basis, 
including such apparently unlikely causes as prisons and aspects of 
the justice system. (Walsh 1995:118)  
 
The above quote implies that NPM has significantly changed the way that public 
services are managed.  Traditionally, the government was responsible for both the 
production and the delivery of public goods and services but this was found to be 
costly and ineffective.  The use of contracts in recent years was intended to solve the 
problem by reducing costs and increasing the effectiveness of public services.  The 
expansion of ‘contracting out’ in the late 1980s, as a result of the Local Government 
Act 1998, moved the provision of public services from a hierarchical approach 
towards a market-based approach in which the public sector becomes the ‘client’, 
‘commissioner’ or ‘purchaser’ and is responsible for defining ‘what is wanted’, ‘how 
to get it’, and ‘how to monitor and measure its performance’ (Walsh 1995:110).  The 
other party, the provider or the contractor, is responsible for the production and 
delivery of agreed goods or services.  The content of the contract can be very specific 
if the purchaser specifies both the anticipated outcome and the means to achieve it.  
Alternatively, it can be relatively flexible when the purchaser leaves it to the provider 






The use of contracts in the management of the public sector has been extensively 
discussed (e.g. by Chapman 2000; Flynn 1993; Lane 1997, 2000a, 2000b; Walsh 
1995).  Hood (1991) points out that there has been a shift towards greater 
competition in the public sector.  There is clear evidence of a new approach to public 
investment, procurement measures and public tendering.  The justification for this 
change was to reduce costs and create higher standards of service delivery.   In 
general, public sector reform involves a reconsideration of how the government uses 
market mechanisms either on their own or by mixing them with bureaucratic 
procedures with an emphasis on the employment of ‘tendering and contracting out’ 
(Lane 2000b:131).  The significance of contracts in the management of public sector 
was stated by Lane (2000b) as follows: 
 
NPM puts in place a contracting state, where personnel and other 
resources are to be managed by means of a series of contracts.  These 
contracts will cover not only the employment relation but are also to 
be used for the clarification of objectives and tasks for service 
delivery.  Government will rely heavily upon chief senior officials 
(CEOs) to write and handle these contracts, at the same time as the 
CEOs will relate to government through contracts. (ibid. 147)   
 
In Scotland, despite the fact that contracts have been used in the prison service for 
almost two decades, there has been relatively little discussion of this in the academic 
literature.  Most of what has been written discussed prison contracts at a macro level 
in a broad context and focused only on private prison contracts.  One exception is 
Sarah Armstrong (2007) who, in What Good Are Markets in Punishment?, argues 
that there are many areas in the prison service that have made it a big business, for 
instance, offender management courses, food and health care, prison clothing, bed 
linen, court transportation, and architecture.  ‘The supply of file clerks, toilet paper 
and drug test kits and training may not hold out much allure to students of crime and 
justice, but it is for these products and services that there is a real market’ 
(Armstrong 2007).  She argues that the privately supplied goods and services in 
public prisons are not less important than the privately managed prisons themselves.  
She also suggests that the involvement of the voluntary sector, which she calls a 
‘soft’ form of privatisation, should be included in the equation when looking at the 





analysis, we are prevented from seeing that far from being a quintessentially public 
activity, prisons may actually be an exemplar of developed governance in which the 
state is doing more steering than rowing and public services are, and have long been, 
delivered through complex and multi-layered arrangements of public and private 
transactions’ (ibid. 12-16).  
 
As suggested above, this thesis aims to fill a gap in the current literature.  That is, 
with reference to the SPS’s experience, it draws attention to the different types of 
contracts in the Scottish prison system, contract monitoring and the impact of private 
prison contract.  Among the key questions that it attempts to answer are: what types 
of contracts have been introduced in the SPS?; what was written into those 
contracts?; and how did contractualism affect the management of prisons in 
Scotland?  The questions are addressed below. 
 
5.3.1 Types of contract 
Lane (2000b) states that, in general, there are two types of contracts − short-term and 
long-term contracts.  He argues that ‘organisations may provide goods and services 
using either in-house production or contracting out.  In-house production tends to 
rely heavily upon long-term contracting, creating hierarchies, whereas contracting 
out relies upon tendering/bidding processes taking place in market form and resulting 
in short-term contracts’ (p.133).  With reference to Lane’s argument, I adapted the 
in-house production and contracting out concepts to categorise the SPS contracts into 
two groups: internal and external contracts.  The former refers to the prison 
agreement that the Director of Prison signs with each prison establishment.  The 
latter covers the contracts that the SPS agrees with private providers to deliver prison 
services.   
 
I. Internal Contracts: SPS Service Agreements
47
  
This section argues that the development of internal contracts was part of the SPS’s 
attempt to improve the quality of the public prisons as part of the organisational 
reform strategy after the establishment of its first private prison, Kilmarnock.  To 
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support my argument, I refer to Managing within a Contractual Framework, 
produced by the then Rehabilitation and Care Directorate (now the Partnerships and 
Commissioning Directorate) of the SPS.  This framework addresses the background 
to public prison contracts (now known as Service Agreements − SAs), its 
development from the original Service Level Agreements (SLAs) and Performance 
Contracts (PCs) and the impact of SAs on the Rehabilitation and Care Directorate 
that was the key actor responsible for internal contracts.    
 
According to the framework, the development of SAs officially began in September 
2002 when the then Justice Minister issued a statement on the significance of 
contract management in the prison service and encouraged public prisons to adopt 
the same approach that the SPS had done with Kilmarnock.  He stated that ‘the Chief 
Inspector of Prisons has drawn attention to the focus and clarity brought by contract 
management to private prisons and has called on the Prison Service to introduce 
similar measures in the public sector.  I have instructed the SPS to bring forward 
proposals to achieve that.  I expect that to result in published performance 
agreements for publicly-run prisons and full reporting of performance against those 
targets’ (SPS n.d.:1).  Following this political initiative, the SPS then took the first 
step by developing SLAs for all prison establishments.  This was a significant shift in 
terms of quality control for public prisons in Scotland.  The SLAs covered a wide 
range of performance control measures including the SPS’s Key Performance 
Indicators (KPIs) and the Minister’s targets.  
 
The original SLAs were modified in 2003 leading to the creation of Performance 
Contracts for public prison establishments.  To cope with this development, the 
senior management structure was changed in particular by the creation of the ‘client’ 
and the ‘provider’ roles.  In the first stage, the Director of Prison Services, on behalf 
of the SPS Prison Board, played the client role and was responsible for defining what 
services were required.  The Director of Prisons was the service provider responsible 






On 1 April 2004, the PCs were officially implemented.  The governor of each 
establishment, the Director of Prisons and the Director of Prison Services were key 
parties signing the contract.  These initial agreements were monitored in monthly 
reports for each establishment.  The first summary report came out in April 2005.  
The result suggested that the use of the performance contract approach had increased 
the overall quality of public prisons.    
 
In 2005, there was another restructuring of the SPS senior management.  As a result, 
the Director of Rehabilitation and Care became responsible for the client role, 
commissioning prison services specified by the Director of Prisons who was given 
the ‘corporate provider’ role.  This year also witnessed a significant challenge in the 
management of offenders in Scotland as a result of the introduction of the 
Management of Offenders (Scotland) Act 2005.  As an immediate response to this 
development, the framework document stated that ‘we need to ensure our processes 
and procedures compliment those deployed by our partner organisations such as 
Criminal Justice Social Work and the Police Service.  For this reason, the 
(Commissioning) Client will head up a Policy Development Group that will oversee 
formulation of new [policies] and changes to existing policies.  No new policies will 
be implemented without the Client’s authority (which will include consultation with 
the Provider)’.  In addition, following the recent change in the SPS’s organisational 
structure, in which the Rehabilitation and Care Directorate was replaced with 
Partnership and Commissioning, the Director of Partnership and Commissioning was 
given the client role while the Director of Prisons still played the service provider 
role.   
 
A later development in the SPS’s internal contracts was the modification of PCs 
which resulted in the creation of Service Agreements.  According to SPS Service 
Agreements, A Management Framework for Service Improvement (2008), the SPS is 
now in the process of developing and improving its Service Agreements.  To achieve 
this, a Service Framework was set up as the ‘culmination of work agreed between the 
Director of Partnerships and Commissioning and the Director of Prisons’.  Effective 





agreed between Directorates, including the Director of Health and Care for the SPS, 
that defines the services and service levels required of Scottish Prison Service 
establishments’. As the new set of SAs is still at an early stage, some significant 
elements, such as the requirements of young offenders and female offenders, are not 
fully addressed in the 2008 version.  
 
Overall, the internal contracts of SPS have undergone many significant changes since 
their establishment, especially in terms of the roles played by each Director, the 
responsibilities of the parties involved, service specification and measurement 
procedures.  As far as roles and responsibilities are concerned, the current SA 
framework not only sets out the key responsibilities of each director but also 
specifies the cooperation between directors.  For instance, ‘Directors of Prisons are 
responsible for the direct management of SPS establishments, the implementation of 
SPS policies within those establishments, for securing primary assurance of delivery 
and the maintenance of security and order of prisons.  Working together with 
Director of Partnership and Commissioning to agree service and performance level 
across SPS Establishments.’  In addition, the Director of Prisons collates 
performance data on a monthly basis and supplies reports to the Director of 
Partnerships and Commissioning.  The latter then works with the Director of 
Corporate Services to agree an Audit and Assurance plan. 
 
At an operational level, the SPS announced on its website (www.sps.gov.uk) in 
September 2008 that it needed ‘modern prison officers’ to work in prisons.  The 
expected roles of these officers were clearly marked.  It said ‘prison officers are 
highly skilled professionals.  The role is wide ranging but always people centred.  
There are two levels of prison officer roles in the SPS.  All Officers are recruited as 
Operations Officers; Residential Officer being a promotional position after 
successful completion of probationary period.’  The responsibilities of these officers 
include ‘working as an integral part of a team, Operations Officers are responsible 
for gate duties, reception of visitors, control and supervision of prisoners, supervision 
of visits, prisoner escort, providing prisoner information, monitoring security 






As of 18 April 2008, the requirements of the Service Framework cover five areas: 
Prisoner Places, Service Specification, Corporate Service Levels, Establishment 
Service Levels and Key Performance Indicators and Service Level Definitions.  The 
first two sections are the most important as they specify what the contract requires 
from public prisons.  Section 1, Prisoner Places, categorises prisoners places into 
three groups − Available Prisoner Places; Additional Prisoner Places; and 
Contingency Places.    
 
Section 2, Service Specification, is the most significant part as it specifies what a 
prison has to deliver.  This section is divided into six sub-sections.  The first sub-
section deals with General Principles and Expectation.  The second to fifth deal with 
the requirements that each SPS Establishment has to deliver, which are ‘Providing 
Secure Custody Service’; ‘Providing a Safe and Ordered Prison Service’; ‘Operating 
a Humane, Fair and Caring Prison Service’; ‘Providing Opportunities and Services 
to Reduce the Risk of Prisoners Re-offending on Release’; while the sixth deals with 
‘Resources: Effective, Efficient and Sustainable Management’.   
 
Figure 5.1 shows examples of content written in the SAs under the heading of 
Providing Secure Custody Service.  It specifies what secure custody service is and 
also addresses the following key requirements in order to achieve secure custody 
service:  lawful custody, prisoner supervision system arrangements and management 
of different groups of prisoners.  I wish to highlight that the content of SAs, 
especially these requirements, reflect the commitment to decentralisation in the SPS 
discussed in previous section.  Prison establishments are delegated a considerable 
amount of decision-making power in delivering the service.  The contract only 
specifies the ‘end’ of ‘secure custody’, for instance, each prison will ‘ensure that 
appropriate arrangements are in place for those likely to attempt to escape’.  As it 
does not specify what the ‘appropriate arrangements’ are, each establishment can opt 
for any ‘means’  as long as they help to achieve the target as measured by the key 
performance indicators (KPIs) set by management.  As shown in Table 5.1, KPIs for 





‘Absconds and incidences of failure to return’, ‘Liberations in error’ and ‘Detentions 
in error’.  According to the current Director of SPS, these KPIs were positively 
accepted by prison establishments.  He explained that ‘prisons responded quite well 
to it.  In some respects, KPIs reflected the prisons’ culture of ‘tell me what you want, 
and I will do it’.  That is why prisons responded well to this kind of performance 
measurement’ (Interview, Current SPS Director, 12 June 2007). 
 
 
1. PROVIDING SECURE CUSTODIAL SERVICE  
Each prison will ensure that all prisoners are subject to such security restrictions as 
are necessary to keep them in lawful custody and to protect the public. Each prison 
will establish and operate an integrated multi-functional approach to the management 
of physical, procedural and dynamic aspects of security to prevent escapes, maintain 
good order, and to ensure the safety of staff, prisoners and the public. 
1.1 Lawful Custody  
Each prison will:  
• ensure that Prisoners are held in lawful custody and ensure, prior to the 
liberation of any Prisoner, that the correct custodial period has been served;  
• ensure accurate calculation of the sentence length for all Prisoners held within 
the Prison and shall also provide this information, with appropriate 
explanations, to the Prisoner within 24 hours of his admission;   
• ensure Prisoners who have reason to doubt the legality of their custody have 
the opportunity to contact a legal adviser by telephone or letter free of charge;  
• ensure Prisoners who are foreign nationals or stateless can contact a 
diplomatic representative free of charge;   
• not refuse to admit to the Prison any Prisoner who has been sent to the Prison 
unless it would be unlawful to hold him/her in custody; and  
• not release from the Prison any Prisoner on the basis of incomplete or 
inaccurate information unless details have been verified with the issuing 
authority and it would be unlawful to continue to hold him/her in custody.  
 
1.2 Prisoner Supervision System Arrangements  
Each prison will:  
• ensure that through risk assessment, security and allocation procedures, 
Prisoners are placed in conditions of security commensurate with the risk of 
harm they pose to the public and the likelihood of their trying to escape. In all 
cases the primary risk indicator will be the risk of harm to the public;  
• ensure that appropriate arrangements are in place for those likely to attempt 
to escape; and 
• ensure that suitable and sufficient arrangements are in place for the 
supervision and monitoring of activities of prisoners on placements, leave and 
temporary release within the community. Such arrangements shall be in 
accordance with Prison Rules and in line with the Integrated Practice 







1.3 Management of Different Groups of Prisoners  
Each prison will:  
• manage all groups of Prisoners appropriately (as detailed in Section 1, table 
2) and shall also ensure that, as far as reasonably practicable, there is 
appropriate and lawful separation where necessary; and   
• ensure that all Prisoners have appropriate access to activities and services.  
 
 
Figure 5.1: Excerpt from SPS Service Agreement 
 
SECURE CUSTODIAL SERVICE 
KPI1a Extreme Risk Escapes 
KPI1b Escapes at other Supervision Level 
SI1 Absconds and incidences of failure to return 
SI2 Liberations in error 
SI3 Detentions in error 
FAIR AND ORDERED PRISON 
SI4 % prisoners completing the appropriate element of the Nationally 
Approved Induction Programme 
SI5 Incidents of concerted indiscipline 
HUMANE, SAFE AND CARING PRISON 
SI6 Cells out of use 
SI7a Prisoner Perception: Food 
SI7b Prisoner Perception: Cleanliness 
SI7c Prisoner Perception: Personal Hygiene 
SI7d Prisoner Perception: Family Contact 
KPI2a Prisoner on staff assaults - serious 
KPI2b Prisoner on staff assaults - minor or no injury 
KPI2c Prisoner on prisoner assaults - serious 
KPI2d Prisoner on prisoner assaults - minor or no injury 
PROVIDING OPPORTUNITIES AND SERVICES TO REDUCE THE RISK 
OF PRISONERS REOFFENDING ON RELEASE 
KPI3 Numbers of hours of completed programmes and approved activities 
KPI4 Offender development hours 
SI8 Purposeful activity hours 
SI9 Average % capacity of all activity areas in use in each half day 
KPI5a % of education classes spent delivering literacy skills 
KPI5b % of education classes spent delivering numeracy skills 
KPI6 Increase in employability 
KPI7 Vocational and employment related qualifications 
KPI7b Vocational and employment related qualifications at SCQF level 5 or 
above 
KPI8 Reduced or stabilised drug misuse 
SI10 Number of prisoners (serving over 31 days) identified as having an 
addictions misuse problem and undertaking an ICM addictions assessment 






Table 5.1: Key performance and service indicators: Public Sector Prisons 
 
II. External contracts: Contracts with private providers   
As described above, external contracts are the contracts that SPS signed with its 
private partners for the delivery of prison service.  External contracts are also 
managed by the Partnership and Commissioning Directorate.  It should be noted here 
that the change of this Directorate from Rehabilitation and Care in a way reflected 
the influence of NPM, the move towards Public Private Partnerships (PPP) and the 
contractual model of governance.  In fact, it is clearly stated in the Directorate’s 
vision statement that ‘the core role of the Directorate will be as Commissioning 
Client for custodial, correctional and inclusion services for all prisoners. This role 
involves moving its’ focus from ‘public sector prison policy making’ to ‘all sector 
requirement setting’ and the new arrangements were expected to ‘result in changes in 
activity, relationships with partners, behaviour and structures’ (SPS 2008d). 
 
After examining the SPS external contracts that are available to the public, I 
clustered them into four main groups: (a) private prison contracts; (b) prisoner escort 
and court custody service contracts; (c) prisoner programme contracts (i.e. for 
addiction programmes and medical services); and (d) contracts for support services 
(i.e. maintenance and office supplies).  The discussion in this section focuses on the 
first two groups as they are the contracts that deal with the core functions of the 
Integration Case Conference with the TAS representative in attendance 
SI12 % prisoners leaving having secured accommodation or been referred to the 
relevant housing provider 
INTEGRATION OF OFFENDER MANAGEMENT SERVICES 
SI13 % of appropriate convicted prisoners completing the Core Screen 
assessment 
SI14a % of ICM case conferences held within relevant timescales 
SI14b % of ICM case conferences for which a minimum of 4 weeks notice is 
given to CJSW 
KPI9 % of ICM case conferences held with Criminal Justice Social Work 
representative/s in attendance 
SI15 % of ICM case conferences held with family members in attendance 
SI16 Compliance with parole timescales 
SI17 % of appropriate short term prisoners completing reviews of the 





prison service.  In addition, they cost the SPS and tax payers a considerable amount 
of money and, more importantly, they are relevant to the concerns of this research.    
 
a. Private prison contracts (Kilmarnock and Addiewell)  
HMP Kilmarnock, the first private prison in Scotland was established in the middle 
of 1990s (the development of private prisons is discussed in detail in Chapter 6).  On 
10 November 1997, the first private prison contract was signed by the SPS and 
Premier Custodial Group (now wholly owned by Serco
48
).  The site of Kilmarnock 
was a former ordinance factory southeast of the town which had previously been 
selected and purchased by the SPS in June 1996.  This prison was the first prison in 
Scotland to be designed, constructed, managed and financed (DCMF) by the private 
sector under the Private Finance Initiative (PFI).  It was officially opened on 25 
March 1999 and is operated under a 25-year contract.  The prison comprises 500 
single cells, with a contractual maximum capacity of 692 prisoner places.  It is a 
closed, mainstream, high security prison and operates a regime similar to HMP 
Shotts, Edinburgh and Perth. 
   
HMP Addiewell is the second privately-run prison in Scotland.  The Addiewell 
contract is similar to that of Kilmarnock.  The 25-year contract was signed by the 
SPS and a consortium led by Kalyx
49
 on 20 June 2006.  The prison was designed and 
built by Interserve Project Service, financed by the Royal Bank of Scotland, and is 
now operated by Kalyx.  Addiewell prison is situated in Addiewell near West Calder 
in West Lothian.  It comprises 700 prisoner places with a maximum capacity of 792 
prisoner places.  This maximum security prison became operational in December 
2008. 
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 Serco is an international company which runs a wide range of business including scientific 
establishments, critical traffic management systems, railways, border security, detention centre, health 
care, military supports and facility maintenance.  See Serco (2008a) for more details on the company’s 
profile. 
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 Kalyx was originally known as UK Detention Services (UKDS).  The name of the company was 






The tendering process for both contracts followed the guidelines provided by the 
government
50
.  However, the Kilmarnock and Addiewell contracts are far more 
complicated than those of public prisons.  The Kilmarnock contract comprises of 
eight parts − General (definitions and background), Provision, Maintenance, 
Operation, Finance, Termination, and Miscellaneous, and covers 65 contract items 
(SPS 2007a).  For Addiewell Prison, the contract is even more complex, covering 79 
items (see Chapter 6).  From the SPS’s point of view, the content of contracts 
between SPS and its private partners might seem complicated but this is intended to 
make it easier for the two parties to manage the contracts.  ‘The SPS needs to 
understand clearly how the private prison contract is operated.  This is because a 
contract is used to create a relationship between the prison service and the private 
sector.  [Even though they might be complex], such contracts usually allow 
flexibility of the outputs and outcomes without costing the SPS or the service 
provider’ (Interview, Current SPS Director, 3 July 2007).  
 
b. Prisoner Escort and Court Custody Service (PECCS) Contract  
According to the Prisoner Escort and Court Custody Services Contract: Post 
Implement Review (SPS 2006c), there were 140,000 prisoner escorts per year across 
Scotland, two-thirds of which were carried out by eight Scottish police forces and the 
rest by the SPS.  The uncoordinated process created a series of problems, not least an 
inefficient use of resources.  Accordingly, a multi agency review (SPS, Scottish 
Court Service, District Courts/Local Authorities, the eight Scottish police forces; and 
the State Hospital and other NHS secure Units) was undertaken with the aim of 
improving the quality of the existing arrangements.  Key concerns from the 
participating parties included deployment of police officers in the front line service 
and an inconsistent regime in prisons which affected escort demands (2006c: 3): 
 
• A growing and shared sense that arrangements were not working 
as well or as efficiently as they might; 
• A belief that the existing arrangements could be significantly 
improved; 
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• Growing demands to maximise deployment of police officers to 
front line services;  
• Inconsistent regime delivery in prisons due to increased and 
variable escort demands diverting prison officers from delivering 
constructive activities for prisoners; 
• Increased awareness around the inefficiencies of deploying police 
officers and prison officers to roles that did not require their full 
range of skills or powers;  
• Increased dissatisfaction with the duplication of effort, nugatory 
work and inefficiency of the extant arrangements, aggravated by a 
lack of coordination between the agencies involved;  
• Frustration at arrangements and systems that did not allow for the 
recording of accurate data on either performance or incidents, 
making performance improvement difficult; and  
• Alternative service provision in England and Wales had shown 
potential benefits in terms of performance, new working practice 
and technology. This suggested a mature and experienced market 
existed to provide a new service.  
 
The review resulted in an agreement to engage a single operator for court custody 
and prisoner escort services.  A procurement process began in January 2002 and by 
November 2003 the first contract for the provision of prisoner escort and custody 
services was signed by the SPS and Reliance Secure Task Management Ltd 
(Reliance)
51
.  The contract implementation began in April 2004 and became fully 
operational on 21 February 2005.  It will run until December 2011 with the option of 
a three year extension (ibid. 4).     
 
The rationale behinds PECCS, I argue, reflects the influence of NPM in the 
management of prison business.  According to the Project Initiation Document (PID), 
PECCS aims to ‘free up police and prison officers to secure better value for money 
through a phased implementation of a contracted-out prisoner escort and court 
custody service throughout Scotland’.  Moreover, when looking at its strategy for 
service delivery, PECCS employs a business-like approach in solving the 
                                                 
51
 Reliance Security Group was established in 1973.  The growth of its business was significant as a 
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transportation and safe custody of detainees in the 1990s created new markets for the companies 
which specialised in the field, including Reliance.  Currently, its business includes secure 
transportation, staff resourcing, care support services, medical services, custodial services, tagging and 
monitoring services, private finance initiatives, evidential property management and offender services 






aforementioned concerns and developing the efficiency and effectiveness of service, 
for instance, by maximising the effective use of resources, providing better value for 
money and promoting information management
52
.    
 
The PECCS contract was divided into ten parts: (1) General Principles; (2) Prisoner 
escorting and court custody management; (3) The prisoner; (4) Staff Matters and 
Certification of PCOs; (5) Prisoner escort and court custody task; (6) Admission, 
induction and release; (7) Care and services for staff and prisoners; (8) Security; (9) 
Vehicles; and (10) Transitional arrangements (SPS 2008c).  In addition, PECCS also 
specifies the roles and responsibilities of the parties involved.  The content of the 
items in the PECCS contract is shown in Appendix Five. 
 
The Post Implementation Review, which was conducted 18 months after PECCS was 
launched, revealed that PECCS had achieved the identified business benefits, 
especially in terms of an efficient use of human resource, by releasing 300 police and 
200 prison officers to undertake their core duties.  The review covered the key 
agenda items of PECCS (Value for Money and Effective Use of Resources, Process 
Improvement and Reducing Inefficiency, Better Management Information, Multi 
Agency Working and Best Value) and provided suggestions for improvement.  For 
instance, in terms of process improvement and reducing inefficiency, the review 
indicated that ‘the 33 performance measures in the contract set out a minimum 
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 In response to the concerns expressed by the parties involved, the strategies used to improve the 
quality of PECCS were:  
• ‘Realising and maximising the effective use of resources across the range of 
activities associated with prisoner escorting and court custody requirements 
within the Scottish Criminal Justice System; 
• Providing better value for money by using appropriate staff to conduct court 
custody and escort work activity. Such staff did not require to be police officers 
or prison staff;  
• Removing the duplication and consequent inefficiency from existing 
arrangements;  
• Providing uniformity and consistencies of service delivery throughout Scotland;  
• Obtaining better management information about the delivery of service with a 
focus on continual improvement;  
• ‘Joining up’ agencies in a way that delivered a complex project and improved 
multi agency working between key partners; and  
• Delivering ‘Best Value’ and making use of the best practice learned from 






standard to be achieved against each one’ and ‘the delivery of prisoner escort 
services by a single contractor has improved accountability and removed duplication 
of effort between agencies. Feedback from partners has confirmed that the 
introduction of the contract has rationalised the service at a national level’ (see 
Appendix Six).   In terms of multi agency working, the review found that ‘the 
PECCS contract has shown that complex multi-agency contracts can be delivered 
and has promoted consultation and information sharing between all partners, in 
setting up and in the subsequent management of the contract’ (SPS 2006c:7).  
 
5.3.2 Contract monitoring issues 
In Scotland, contract monitoring and performance inspection were key procedures 
that were specified in all contracts and agreements.  Basically, the SPS’s 
measurement mechanisms follow the principles set out by the Government in 
Modernising Government which outline ‘four principles for performance 
management and inspection,’
53
 namely (1) encourage a whole systems approach; (2) 
move from counting what goes in, to assessing what is being delivered; (3) intervene 
in inverse proportion to success; and (4) use the right information at the right level.   
Nevertheless, critics argue that monitoring contracts can be very costly.  There are 
some factors that should be taken into consideration when drafting contracts to 
prevent unnecessary expense at the performance monitoring stage.  Walsh (1995:49) 
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 Four principles for performance management indicated in Modernising Government were as 
follows: 
‘Encourage a whole systems approach. We will put the focus on assessing improvements in the 
effectiveness and value for money of a whole system, such as the criminal justice system, not just in its 
constituent parts.  
 
Move from counting what goes in, to assessing what is being delivered. We will keep a tight rein on 
the management of resources. But we also need to know what is being achieved with the money spent. 
The targets for government Departments, as far as possible, are expressed either in terms of the end 
results or service standards, and we are working to develop measures for all levels of government 
which support this approach.  
 
Intervene in inverse proportion to success. The Government is no afraid to take action where standards 
slip. But we do not want to run local services from the centre. Where services deliver results we will 
give them greater freedom to innovate.  
 
Use the right information at the right level. We want managers to use performance measures to 
monitor and improve their organisations. We do not want them to feel swamped by information 
overload or bureaucratic requests for irrelevant data. We will use new technology to take a more 






suggests that the contract monitoring process can be extremely expensive if the 
service is delivered in ‘widely spread locations’, takes a long period of time, and 
requires a great number of inspectors for effective monitoring.  He also points out 
that if the service requires technical or professional inspectors, this can lead to high 
costs.  In addition, although performance monitoring can be contracted out, ‘the costs 
of monitoring services may be greater than any savings that are made as a result of 
the introduction of market processes.  The more effective is the structure of positive 
incentives for the contractor to perform, the less need there will be for monitoring 
and maintenance’ (p.49).  For the public sector, monitoring the contract is as difficult 
as entering the contract.   
 
Comments from the SPS Director whose job was relevant to contract management 
revealed that   
 
‘A lot of work went into the process.  This is to ensure that we get the 
best of what the private sector does along with all the benefits of 
having the private sector in the prison system’. (Interview, Current 
SPS Director, 3 July 2007).  
 
However, given its limited experience in contract competition, the public sector tends 
to put a great deal of effort into the contract process to ensure that the contract 
specifies all aspects required and that it is clear enough for the monitoring team to 
inspect.  If the contract drafting process is comprehensible and clear, it should help to 
alleviate the work loads during the monitoring stage.  Table 5.2 shows the criteria for 
performance measurement of the prisoner escort contract (PECCS).  These key KPIs 
reflected the SPS’s attempts to employ business-like mechanisms approach to ensure 
the effectiveness of the service.  These indicators, in addition, demonstrated that SPS 
still put ‘secure custody’ and ‘order’ at top priorities. 
 
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
1) Service Delivery 
1a) Incident of late or non-collection of a prisoner from any of the 
Premises.  
1b) Incident of late delivery of a prisoner to any of the Premises  
1c) Incident of late return of a prisoner to any of the Premises.  





2) Prisoner Care  
2a) Incident of death or suicide in custody.  
2b) Incident of self-harm by a Prisoner.  
2c) Incident of substantiated complaint by a Prisoner (including loss 
or damage of Prisoners property).  
2d) Incident of failure to provide food or water to a prisoner.  
2e) Incident of failure to provide a prisoner with medical services or 
access to a medical officer  
3) Secure Custody  
3a) Incident of Prisoner Unlawfully at Large including release of a 
Prisoner in error.  
3b) Incident of loss of key or key/lock compromise  
3c) Incident of failure to follow defined security procedures  
3d) Incident of failure to carry out an effective security risk 
assessment.  
3e) Incident of failure to gather and/or disseminate intelligence 
received.  
4) Maintain Good Order:  
4a) Incident of concerted Prisoner disorder  
4b) Incident of failure to discharge responsibilities in relation to the 
safe custody of Prisoners.  
4c) Incident of assault against Service Provider staff or others 
(Serious)  
4d) Incident of assault against Service Provider staff or others 
(Minor)  
4e) Incident of assault against a Prisoner (Serious)  
4f) Incident of assault against a Prisoner (Minor)  
4g) Incident of Prisoner found in possession of an Unauthorised 
Article.  
4h) Incident of damage to any Premises.  
5) Contribute Effectively  
5a) Incident of an official complaint substantiated by the Escort 
Monitor  
5b) Incident of non-certificated staff undertaking PCO duties.  
5c) Incident of inaccurate, incorrect, late or failure to report any 
Performance Measure to the Authority.  
5d) Incident of Service Provider failure to ensure that a PCO is 
cleared by Disclosure Scotland and the Authority.  
5e) Incident of a member of Service Provider’s staff found to be in 
breach of duty.  
5f) Incident of failure to ensure accurate recording of transfer of 
responsibilities 
 






In addition to the ‘official’ monitoring against the aforementioned KPIs in the 
contract, private prison contracts are also subject to public and political scrutiny.  
Since private prisons are relatively new in Scotland, everything about them can 
attract attention from society.  In another words, its activities are regularly monitored 
by a ‘third party’ other than the SPS and the monitoring team.  The senior manager 
of Kilmarnock pointed out some difficulties in managing private prisons in the light 
of scrutiny, as follows: 
 
‘So, you have media as a national scrutiny, SPS as an internal 
scrutiny, Parliament as a political scrutiny, and the local community 
as a local scrutiny.  There are so many parliamentary questions asked 
by left wing MPs.  So it’s been very adverse since this prison was 
opened.  The prison is very high profile. That’s evident.  Whenever 
anything happens, it hits the newspaper.  It’s non stop.  I do a lot of 
PR.  I do a weekly column in the local newspaper.  And I am running 
out of things to say’. (Interview, Kilmarnock Senior Manager, 1 May 
2007)   
 
5.3.3 The influence of private contracts 
Has contracting out affected the management of public prisons?  Although the 
answer to this question is still inconclusive, I argue that the existence of Kilmarnock 
has created changes in how public sector prisons in Scotland are managed, at least at 
the policy level.  As discussed above, the introduction of Service Agreements (SAs) 
into the public prisons demonstrates the impact of private prison contracts.   In other 
words, private prisons have created a competitive atmosphere in the prison system.  
They have been used as a benchmark for quality improvement in the public system.  
This development was reflected by the senior manager of Kilmarnock, who said that  
 
‘What has been interesting is how we have been used.  So within the 
prison service we are used as a beating stick; they can do it half the 
price, why haven’t you?  So, that has been interesting’. (Interview, 
Kilmarnock Senior Manager, 1 May 2007) 
 
This is similar to the comment of former SPS Chief Executive who was known to be 
a supporter for private prisons, who pointed out that 
 
‘They also set an example to the public sector of what’s possible.  We 





perform better.  If prisons in the public sector were performing 
perfectly, there would be no room for private prisons’. (Interview, 
Former SPS Chief Executive, 13 December 2007) 
 
Since the Director of Partnership and Commissioning is responsible for both private 
prison contracts and SAs for public prisons, it is inevitable that the two contracts will 
influence each other.  However, I argue that the influence of the private prison 
contract on the SAs was greater than vice versa.  It is really a one way transfer.  What 
was found inefficient and ineffective in the private prison contracts was a lesson for 
the development of SAs.  The key director of SPS explained that his public contract 
team interacts with his private contract team on a regular basis and that this promoted 
experience sharing between the two.  His strategy for the management of SPS 
contracts was to create a ‘culture of thinking’. 
 
‘What I have done is to bring the contract manager for the private 
sector team and the public sector contract manager together at the 
same desk and in the same group so that they can discuss things and 
make sure that they are achieving best value and sharing of strategy 
about how things should be done. … The point of the contract is to 
make those business decisions to place in contracts and to make sure 
that service delivery, the KPIs has been delivered, the co-worker has 
been delivered’. (Interview, Current SPS Director, 3 July 2007) 
 
Last but not least, the impact of private prison contracts can also be observed in the 
report of the Chief Inspector of Prisons for Scotland (2000).  This noted the use of 
contracts for private prisons that clearly specified what is required from a prison and 
also established an investigation officer and a compliance officer as key 
accountability mechanisms for monitoring the contract.  It even recommended that 
this approach be applied to public prisons.  The report stated that ‘as well as 
providing clear focus and direction, there were obvious frustrations about operating 
within the rigid framework of a detailed contract that set higher standards for 
Kilmarnock than other SPS prisons and which required sometimes lengthy discussion 
and agreement before some changes could be implemented. However, the roles of 
Investigations Officer and Compliance Officer in particular were of obvious added 





given as to how such roles could be developed elsewhere in the SPS’ (SPS 
2007c:para. 9.15). 
 
5.4 Customer-oriented organisation 
The shift towards a customer-oriented service was among the most significant 
developments in the Scottish prison system in the NPM era.  A ‘customer orientated’ 
approach borrowed from the private sector gradually became a characteristic of 
public organisations (Hood, 1991).  DiIulio (1991) points out that prison 
management in the new era or what he terms the ‘new penology’, has focused mainly 
on prisoners.  He claims that ‘whereas the old penology focused sympathetically on 
prison administrators, the new penology focused sympathetically on prison inmates’ 
(1991:72).  For the SPS, although there are a range of stakeholders who are affected 
by the SPS’s service, it is undeniable that prisoners are the principal customers.  As 
explained in Chapter 4, prison discourse during the last twenty years has paid closer 
attention to the management aspect of prisons.  In particular, there has been 
continuous development in prison policies to improve its organisational structure and 
the treatment of prisoners in terms of their living condition, regimes, health and basic 
human rights.   
 
My focus in this section is on the SPS’s attempt to serve and satisfy prisoners who 
are its core customers.  In Chapter 4, I discussed the development of prison discourse 
over the last twenty years.  Evidence showed that one of the key aims of 
organisational development was to improve the service so that it responds to the 
needs and risks of prisoners.  The published policy papers had a lot to do with 
attempts to serve the needs of prisoners as customers of the prison service, for 
instance, those concerned with Inclusion Policy (IP), Suicide Risk Management 
Strategy (ACT2Care) and Health Care Standards (HCS).  As demonstrated in 
previous chapter, IP was an extended version of OR.  Its main focus, however, was 
on short-term prisoners while OR focused on long-term prisoners.  In addition, 
ACT2Care dealt specifically with prisoners who were suicidal or at risk of self harm.  
HCS focused on the improvement of healthcare standard for all prisoners in Scottish 






To develop policies or programmes that are responsive to prisoners, the SPS 
developed its Prisoner Survey as a key mechanism for identifying its customers’ 
needs.  The Prison Survey was used as an additional and effective communication 
channel between prisoners and prison authorities.  Launched in 1990, the Prison 
Survey originally focused on the basic elements of prison life, such as living 
conditions, family contact, healthcare, relationships, atmosphere and perceived 
safety.  Over the years, however, this has been modified to concentrate on prisoners’ 
views on variety of issues i.e. drug use, programme involvement, sentence 
management, mental health, safety, change and bullying.   
 
The process of the survey started with the questionnaire developed by the research 
team at Headquarters.  The research team handed out these questionnaires to every 
prisoner in every prison.  Prisoners were encouraged to score each and every 
questionnaire item.  In case they needed assistance in filling out these questionnaires, 
the research team would provide appropriate help.  Questionnaires were then 
collected and taken back to Headquarters for analysis.  Results from the survey, 
together with data from prisoners’ complaints, were reported to the SPS Board of 
prison managers and policy makers who would use this information to develop 
appropriate policies.  One of the SPS Board members commented that 
 
‘The Prisoner Survey makes us rethink our management side: the 
philosophy of imprisonment; how we deal with prisoners; how we 
train staff; and the style of organisation and then we began to think 
that we were far too militaristic’. (Interview, Current SPS Director, 3 
July 2007) 
 
This brought SPS into the era of change as one of the former senior governors of the 
SPS commented 
 
‘We moved away from industries where prisoners where occupied 
with work.  After those incidents in the late 1980s, the SPS decided it 
would think about things like responsibility for prisoners.  We started 
out the prison survey which was quite interesting if you think of 
customers and a customer-focused service.  The survey did tell us 





contact.  I was the governor of Dundee at the time and was very much 
involved in family visits, visiting centre and family contact.  I did 
respond to customers’ needs.  And my prison happened to get the 
award from the UK government which recognised organisations 
trying to focus on customers’. (Interview, Former SPS Governor and 
Director, 12 December 2007)   
 
The content of the questionnaires covered such key areas such as atmosphere of 
prison, smoking habits, prison foods, cleanliness, prison hygiene, visits, drugs and 
miscellaneous.  Table 5.3 demonstrates the results of Prisoner Surveys over the 
period from 2004 to 2007.  Prisoners’ perceptions on each agenda item changed up 
and down over time.  There did not appear to be any patterns of how prisoners 
responded to questionnaire items.  Having said that, I wish to point out that the SPS 
seemed to be successful with the policy to stop ‘slopping out’.  Many of the items in 
the ‘cleanliness’ and ‘hygiene’ categories received a higher score over time, for 
instance, ‘the cleanliness of your hall/dormitory’, ‘the cleanliness of the toilet area’, 
‘the cleanliness of the showers’, ‘the cleanliness of your cell when you first moved 
in’, ‘the condition of your mattress’, ‘I have access to hand washing facilities after I 
use the toilet’ and ‘I can wash my hands before every meal’.  Overall, prisoners 
seemed to be pleased with access to the sanitary facilities provided by prisons.  On 
the other hand, prisoners’ perception in ‘visits’ category fluctuated.  Only the ‘access 
to family and friends’ item received a higher satisfaction over time.  Last but not 
least, despite a much lower score on ‘safety’ and ‘bullying’ compared to other items 
in other categories, prisons appeared to perform well in keeping order which resulted 
in the increase of prisoners’ satisfaction.    
 
 


















ATMOSPHERE     
The reception area 81 80 74 75 
Your hall or dormitory 88 90 86 86 
Your workshop/work party 90 91 89 90 
The visit area 68 68 69 69 
The gym 95 94 95 94 























SMOKING     
Do you share your cell with a 
smoker? 
50 47 48 54 
Are you a smoker? 80 79 78 79 
If YES do you want to give up 
smoking? 
58 66 62 60 
FOOD     
How would you describe the following in THIS prison? 
The choice of menu 54 53 55 56 
The size of portions 50 51 54 52 
The temperature of the food 56 58 60 59 
The way in which food is served 62 66 69 72 
The timing of meals 74 82 79 81 
CLEANLINESS     
How would you describe each of the following? 
The cleanliness of your 
hall/dormitory 
77 80 83 85 
The cleanliness of the toilet area 69 73 79 80 
The cleanliness of the showers 66 67 73 73 
The cleanliness of the visits area 93 92 91 94 
The cleanliness of your cell when 
you first moved in 
45 50 50 54 
The condition of your mattress 31 35 40 46 
HYGIENE     
If I want, I can have a shower 
every day 
90 90 86 86 
If I want, I can change my 
underwear every day 
89 91 87 89 
If I want, I can take daily exercise 92 92 94 95 
I receive a clean towel every week 85 85 84 84 
I have access to hand washing 
facilities during the day 
92 94 96 97 
I have access to hand washing 
facilities after I use the toilet 
92 93 96 96 
I can wash my hands before every 
meal 
93 97 98 98 
I have access to cell cleaning 
materials 
83 83 88 88 
VISITS     
How would you describe each of the following? 
Access to family and friends 78 78 78 79 
The length of the visits 62 63 61 66 























Facilities for children at visits 66 67 68 67 
The level of privacy at visits 38 41 41 44 
Access to pay phones in this 
prison 
75 79 77 78 
Facilities for disabled visitors 63 69 66 71 
The timing of visits 72 71 68 71 
DRUGS     
Have you EVER used ILLEGAL 
drugs in prison? 
55 50 50 51 
MISCELLANEOUS     
Safety (I have feared for my safety 
in the last month.) 
17 15 17 16 
Bullying (I have been bullied in 
the last month.) 
9 9 11 11 
Note: The ratings shown here were obtained by aggregating all the positive responses to 
each question.  They reflected prisoners’ perceptions on a variety of areas of prison life.  
See Prison Survey 2008 (SPS 2008b) for more details on the nature of the questions and 
the responses from prisoners. 
 
Table 5.3: Results from Prisoner Survey between 2003-2006 
Source: Scottish Prison Service (2008b) 
 
 
I wish to conclude this chapter by highlighting the fact that the SPS’s attempts to 
embrace market mechanisms or business-like approaches, i.e. decentralisation, 
contractual management and customer-oriented service reflected a progressive prison 
management that was no longer bounded by a bureaucratic approach.  This allowed 
more flexible ‘means’ for deciding how prisons should be run.  Having private 
prisons in the prison system, for example, indicated that the SPS was ready for 
competition.  The private prison companies can be viewed as both ‘partners’ and 
‘competitors’ in the current prison ‘business’.  Despite the claim from a private 
prison antagonist that prison privatisation did not bring about improvements in 
quality in the service (Interview, Academic, 9 May 2007), my analysis of the SPS’s 
experience presented above revealed that private prisons can be considered as the 





examination of the two private prisons in Scotland are presented in light of the 






PRIVATE PRISONS IN SCOTLAND 
 
Private prisons are important for thinking about punishment generally 
because they exemplify the salient features of any prison in late 
modernity, a bureaucratic institution lacking a clear normative basis; 
they are not departures from contemporary penal practice, but the 
embodiment of its most characteristic features.  If punishment mainly 
means imprisonment, and imprisonment mainly works by containing, 
then private prisons are well-placed to perfect the modern punishment 
of carceral containment (Armstrong 2003:294) 
 
Armstrong’s (2003) argument accurately reflects the comments by SPS senior 
management who were advocates of private prisons as presented in Chapter 5.  These 
supporters (including one of the former Chief Executives) implied that if the key 
function of prison services is to ‘contain’ an offender sentenced by the court, the 
status of a prison should not be an issue.  The senior manager of SPS implied the 
principle for the improvement of prison management in Scotland, saying that 
 
‘What we did not want was more concrete, high walls and a bigger 
steps approach.  What we were looking for was to re-establish 
legitimacy.  We had to do two things: fight the fire [prison incidents 
and challenges at the end of 1980s] and, at the same time, find a 
different approach to prison management’. (Interview, Current SPS 
Director, 12 June 2007) 
 
SPS policy on private prisons from the late 1990s to the present (before the new 
policy launched by the SNP Government came out) did not really create the climate 
of ‘it is us or them’.  At a policy level, Kilmarnock was treated as another prison in 
the prison system and was also granted a certain degree of flexibility as the first 
private prison.    
 
Not many people know how private prisons are operated while some people do not 
even recognise their existence.  This chapter aims to fill this gap by revealing the 
management of private prisons with reference to Scotland’s experience.  In fact, this 
chapter wishes to add the argument raised in Chapter 2 with regards to the 





management that was discussed in Chapter 5.  Special attention is given to the classic 
study by Mick Ryan and Tony Ward (1989) and a more recent study of policy 
transfer by Tim Newburn (2002).  There were two principal questions established as 
a departure point of this chapter which are: (1) how did the use of private prisons 
become a managerial alternative for the incarceration of prisoners in Scotland? and 
(2) how do the two private prisons in Scotland operate?   
 
The two questions build on what I have already presented in previous chapters 
regarding to the influence of NPM on prison policy and operations.  In Chapter 4, I 
argued that, since the late 1980s, prison discourse has gradually become dominated 
by managerial values, i.e. efficiency, effectiveness and value for money.  SPS policy 
papers were presented as key evidence of this development.  For the operational 
dimension, I demonstrated, in Chapter 5, the extent to which the SPS employed 
business-like mechanisms to run its prisons.  Three key mechanisms namely 
devolved control (decentralisation), contractual management and customer service 
were examined.  In this chapter, I wish to focus on the emergence of private prisons 
in Scotland.  With reference to the books by Ryan and Ward (1989) and Newburn 
(2002), I examine the factors that drove the SPS towards private prisons and explain 
why this occurred when it did.  These two books are discussed at length and 
contrasted with empirical evidence from the SPS.  In addition, building on the 
analysis of private prison contracts in Chapter 5, I examine and discuss the origins of 
Kilmarnock and Addiewell, their organisational structures, their regimes and their 
staffing.    
 
This chapter is presented in a descriptive format and comprises three main parts.  The 
first discusses the development of private prisons in Scotland; the second deals with 
HMP Kilmarnock; and the third deals with HMP Addiewell.   
 
6.1 The development of private prisons  
Private prisons became a controversial issue in Scotland in the middle of the 1990s 
when there was a proposal to establish HMP Kilmarnock as the first privately run 





unexpected policy intervention from the UK government.  I wish to support this 
observation and argue that the establishment of private prisons was not a new idea 
thought up by the management in Scotland.  It was, rather, a managerial choice that 
the SPS opted for in order to deal with the situation in Scottish prisons in the mid- 
1990s.  In other words, private prisons were a foreseeable, delayed implementation 
of UK government policy that aimed to achieve cost reduction, efficiency and 
effectiveness.  So I asked, ‘why did it happen when it did?  
 
Prison management of Scotland, like that of other jurisdictions, has been gradually 
influenced by the international community and by globalisation.  For instance, the 
European Convention of Human Rights has affected the way the SPS has treated its 
prisoners during these past ten years (Interview, Current SPS Director, 12 June 
2007).  In response to this development, more and more efforts have been made to 
prevent ‘slopping out’ and complaints from prisoners have been taken more seriously 
(SPS, 1993, 2000b, 2006b).  The SPS has also invested a great deal in prisoner 
programmes and positive ‘prisoner outcomes’ have been formulated (Interview, 
Current SPS Governor, 25 April 2008) and they have become one of the main targets 
of the organisation.  Moreover, its ‘vision for correctional excellence’ and its aim to 
be recognised as ‘the leader in prisons’ led to SPS becoming more proactive in the 
correctional community at the international level
54
.  The exchange in knowledge and 
‘best practice’ between the SPS and its’ ‘partners’ has become commonplace in 
prison management today.  When looking at the SPS’s prisoner programmes, 
especially the programmes for sex offenders, it becomes clear that the SPS has been 
working closely with the Canadian Correctional Service.  For example, the most 
recent programme ‘transferred’ from Canada is the Violence Prevention Programme 
(VPP)
55
 which is an intervention programme for high risk violent offenders.  
                                                 
54
 The SPS is the main organising body for the International Corrections and Prisons Association 
(ICPA).  Founded in the 1998 as a non-profit association, ICPA provides a forum for professionals in 
correctional and criminal justice field to exchange idea and practice.  At present, ICPA represent more 
than 80 nations worldwide and gains Special Consultative Status with the Economic and Social 
Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC).  The association is governed by a multinational board of 
Directors and president of ICPA is Tony Cameron, the former Chief Executive of the Scottish Prison 
Service.  More details can be found at the ICPA’s website (http://www.icpa.ca/). 
 
55 The VPP addresses the need to deal with inmates who have a history of violence and have difficulty 





Meanwhile, for daily management and practices, the SPS tends to use Scandinavian 
countries, Benelux countries, Ireland, Canada, and New Zealand as benchmarks 
because of their similarities in size and policy approach (SPS 2005b).   
 
The emergence of private prisons is one of many forms of practical knowledge that 
Scotland has imported from England to deal with its problems during the NPM era.  
To understand the birth of private prisons in Scotland, the bigger context needs to be 
taken in to account.  Accordingly, this section attempts to reveal how prison 
privatisation took hold in the UK in the first place.  To achieve that, I wish to refer to 
Tim Newburn’s (2002) book Atlantic Crossings: ‘Policy Transfer’ and Crime 
Control in the USA and Britain.  Newburn points out that prison privatisation, like 
many other crime control policies such as zero tolerance, curfews, ‘three strikes and 
out’, electronic monitoring and the war on drugs, are the product of a policy transfer 
process from the USA to the UK.  The extent to which these policies have been 
transferred to the UK can be explained by looking at the following factors: the 
‘ideological proximity’ between the UK and USA; the ‘electoral success’ of Bill 
Clinton which led to the use of similar language by the governments of the UK (New 
Labour) and the USA (New Democrat) e.g. the ‘tough on crime’ policy; the 
expansion of the ‘penal-industrial complex’; and the growth of a neo-liberal penal-
policy complex that emphasises bureaucratic, political and moral entrepreneurial 
interests (Newburn 2002).  Consistent with Newburn’s argument, Parry (2005:1) 
points out that 
 
‘Interest in privatisation stemmed from inflexible industrial relations 
practices of the Prison Officers’ Association and from American 
experience.  The Adam Smith Institute report 1984 was followed in 
1987 by a House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee report 
(Contract Provision of Prisons HC 291, 1987) which set policy on its 
way by calling for an experimental tendering of custodial services, to 
concentrate on the remand system.  In 1991, the first contracts were 
let − Group 4 was chosen from eight bidders to run the newly-opening 
Wolds Remand Centre on Humberside, with a Home Office controller 
(and deputy) in the centre monitoring standards alongside the 
Director.  Staff were licensed by the Home Office to have, in effect, 
                                                                                                                                          
Changes; Violence Awareness; Anger Control; Solving Problems; Social Attitudes; Positive 






the powers of prison officers.  In late 1991 the government proposed 
to contract-out Blakenhurst, a prison in Hereford and Worcester with 
both convicted and remand prisoners’. 
 
While Newburn explains the emergence of private prisons as a policy transfer at the 
macro level, Mick Ryan and Tony Ward (1989) look in detail at how prison 
privatisation was adopted in the UK.  I wish to demonstrate the journey that private 
prisons made from the US to the UK and to Scotland by referring to Ryan and 
Ward’s (1989) book Privatisation and the Penal System: the American experience 
and the debate in Britain.  The book is relevant to this study because it helps to 
clarify how prison privatisation became a managerial choice in dealing with the 
prison situation in the UK over the past twenty years, and it helps to understand the 
future of private prisons in Scotland.  By observing the American experience in 
prison privatisation through the reports of politicians, pressure groups, and the media 
and combining them with the history and practices of the British penal system, Ryan 
and Ward are ultimately against the idea of prison privatisation.  Like others who 
oppose the idea of privatisation, their arguments concern ‘productive efficiency’, ‘the 
ethics of making money out of punishment,’ and ‘the genuinely difficult political 
issue of accountability’.  However, it should be noted that Ryan and Ward are not 
against the participation in the prison service of some private agencies, such as 
private volunteer agencies or non-profit organisations, because these agencies do not 
have a vested interest in the prison system that would weaken the integrity of the 
system.   
 
Ryan and Ward start their book by accounting for the American experience of prison 
privatisation.  In the US, a significant movement towards privatisation began in the 
1970s when the prison population increased dramatically, especially in New York.  
In response to the huge demand for more resources, a great number of prison spaces 
were added by converting buildings previously used for other purposes and 
constructing new prisons by raising prison bonds.  This was when the private sector 
officially got involved in the penal system in the US.   From converting, building and 
then running prisons, the private sector moved onto jails (which hold prisoners on 





services like medical service, catering, and rehabilitation, and even the ‘shallow end’ 
of the system like halfway houses. 
 
Controversial issues that arose in America are something that should be carefully 
assessed before importing privatisation to Britain.  Among the most crucial problems 
were issues of civil rights.  Ryan and Ward refer to the report of the National Prison 
Project under the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) which expressed concerns 
over the fact that the power to deprive a person’s freedom cannot be delegated to 
private entities. 
 
Ryan and Ward also reveal that, among the major pressure groups whose members 
felt threatened by privatisation were the National Sheriffs’ Association and the 
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME).  Their 
arguments were rather similar and concerned the accountability of the private sector.  
Ryan and Ward note that the AFSCME vigorously opposed privatisation by pointing 
out that ‘in the early years of the present century many American cities and towns 
contracted out a whole range of public services; but problems were frequent. 
Contractors often over-charged, gave poor service and in some service areas and in 
some cities, corruption was endemic’ (1989:32-33). 
 
To understand more about the American experience, the report of the House of 
Commons Home Affairs Committee, which was dispatched to visit the American 
private prison and came back with the recommendation to promote privatisation in 
Britain, was analysed.  Ryan and Ward point out that since the objective of the 
Committee’s visit to the US was not primarily to observe private prisons, they visited 
only a limited number of privately-run institutions.  This led to the argument that the 
Committee’s recommendations were quite premature.  The report of Prison Officers 
Association (POA), which also travelled to the US to visit private prisons, supports 
this argument.  After visiting four private institutions in the US, the POA reported 
unconvincing levels of performance in private prisons.  Ryan and Ward also assess 
the influence of the media on importing the idea of prison privatisation from the 





easily attract policy makers, especially MPs, for whom they may constitute the main 
source of information.  However, given the fact that press reports tend to ignore or 
play down those features of the American political system that were most likely to 
appear odd to a British audience, some of them could be trustworthy while others are 
just propaganda.  
 
Ryan and Ward claim, in later chapters, that these American experiences are not new 
to British criminal justice.  They reveal that the involvement of the private sector 
began in the eighteenth century with profit-making prisons.  At this early stage, they 
explain that ‘the avaricious turnkey’ portrayed by Hogarth was not a contractor 
selling services to the state, but a publicly appointed official who maximised his 
income by collecting fees from his prisoners.  The situation in this period was that 
prisoners who had money could live far better than those who had none.  Soon after 
that, the private sector expanded its role in the development of prison industry, 
starting from a ‘state-use’ system to the current contracting-out system.  Moreover, 
as in the US, some institutions for young offenders and the running of immigration 
detention centres in England have been under the control of the private sector for a 
long time.  However, this scenario, I argue, is too extreme to apply to the current 
situation in Scotland given that contracts between the SPS and private providers are 
now extremely detailed and specific.  In addition, HM Inspectorate for Prisons in 
Scotland and the contract monitoring team can ensure that the treatment of prisoners 
in private prisons conforms to the contract and to the law and can provide 
recommendations to prevent and resolve any misconduct of the private provider.  
This issue lays the foundation for the discussion of ethics and accountability in 
Chapter 7. 
 
After investigating the American experience as well as British precedents, Ryan and 
Ward indentify a number of ethical and political flaws of prison privatisation.  Such 
significant issues include: ‘the delegation of the power to punish’ from the state to 
the private sector which might lead to the abuse of power by the private sector; 
‘profit and ethics’; ‘political pressures’ to support longer sentences and put more 





which can potentially affect prisoners’ date of release; and ‘accountability’.  Their 
arguments are similar to those of many others who were against private prisons on 
the ground of legitimacy, ethics and accountability (DiIulio 1986, 1988; Lawrence 
1986; Logan 1990). 
 
In light of the above, Ryan and Ward argue that prison privatisation is not an 
appropriate solution for the challenges faced by British penal systems.  Rather, they 
suggest that radical alternatives to prison be introduced to engage the community in 
helping offenders to reintegrate into society and reconstruct their lives.  They also 
suggest that cooperation between the public sector, the private sector and the society 
be enhanced to improve the prison service rather than privatising prisons.   
 
They conclude their study by summarising the case against privatisation.  In their 
view, the greater ‘productive efficiency’ of the private sector is still not convincing.  
They caution that what seems to ‘work’ in the US might not be promising in Britain 
given the differences between the penal systems and in the political and legal 
frameworks and in light of the cultural legacy of history which has a powerful impact 
on the way policy makers respond to demands for change.  Both the threat posed by 
the profit-making private sector and the potential of the voluntary or non-profit 
sector as a site for radical intervention, are likely to vary from country to country. 
 
As mentioned earlier, Ryan and Ward’s arguments in Privatisation and the penal 
system: the American experience and the debate in Britain are clearly against prison 
privatisation.  Despite the fact that my view differs somewhat from theirs, it is not 
the intention of this research to debate the legitimacy of private prisons.  Rather, I 
wish to make an argument based on the SPS’s experience that private prisons are an 
integral part of NPM.  In Chapter 5 I demonstrate that having private providers in the 
prison service can have a positive impact on the overall prison system as it creates a 
sense of competition between public prisons and private ones.  Public prisons need to 
deliver a ‘value-for-money’ service and to serve their customers’ needs or they may 
lose their contracts to their private competitors.  In addition, with reference to the 





performed satisfactorily as specified in the contract.  The Chief Inspector even 
recommended that public prisons in Scotland could learn from Kilmarnock and adapt 
some practices from Kilmarnock in their establishments.   
 
What drove Scotland to establish a private prison?  Prison management in Scotland 
in the 1990s was influenced by managerialist ideology and, as I have argued, this 
was initially during a ‘trial and error’ period when a number of new policy papers 
were produced and a number of prisoner programmes were implemented (see 
Chapter 4 and 5).  Private prisons were among the new practices that the SPS 
adopted to deal with the problems of overcrowding and to achieve the UK 
government’s aim of improving the quality of its public services.  Price and Riccucci 
(2005) argue in their study of prison privatisation in the USA that the primary 
reasons that most states chose to privatise their prisons were not fiscal ones.  Rather, 
they suggest, ‘political and ideological factors such as the overall political and 
ideological culture of the state’ seem to provide a more plausible explanation of why 
states decided to privatise their prisons.  This fact is consistent with what I found in 
Scotland.  In addition, Harding (1997:21) points out that: 
 
Precursors to the push for privatisation were: a burgeoning prison 
population; consequential overcrowding and deteriorating conditions; 
an urgent need for large and continuing capital outlays on new plant; 
legal inability or political reluctance to commit such funds; low 
management and staff morale, linked with input-based penal 
strategies; ideological distaste for public sector enterprises, coupled 
with a general commitment to privatisation; anti-union feeling, both 
for its own sake and because of the increases in recurrent funding 
needs that flowed from strong unionism; and a sense, if not an 
articulate expression, of the fact that penal policy benefits might flow 
from an alternative form of service industry. 
 
In summary, based on Ryan and Mick’s (1989) and Newburn’s (2002) arguments 
and supported by others who have written on private prisons (for example, Ascher 
1987; Scottish Consortium on Crime and Criminal Justice 2006; Shaw 1990) and 
NPM scholars (such as Aucoin 1990; Flynn 2001; Hood 1991; Pollitt and Harrison 
1992), what I wish to emphasise is that the emergence of private prisons in Scotland 





of the policies transferred from south of the border.  This development can also be 
viewed as part of the NPM movement.  Under the Modernising Government scheme 
discussed in previous chapters, the SPS as a public agency did not have much choice 
but adopted what the UK Government required. 
 
As at the end of 2008, there were 12 private prisons across the UK, two of which 
were in Scotland.  Table 6.1 shows that private prisons in the UK were used to 
incarcerate a wide range of prisoners from young prisoners to medium-security adult 
prisoners.  The management of contracts was subject to the government’s Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI) and the Design Construct Manage Finance (DCMF) model, 
which was developed under the umbrella of a neo-liberal ideology aimed at 
efficiency and value for money.  At the time, only three companies had managed to 
win a private prison contract in the UK.  Serco Group plc had won five contracts 
while Kalyx (formerly know as UKDS) had won four.  The rest were under the 
management of G4S Justice Service.  In Scotland, Kilmarnock was managed by 
Serco and Addiewell, the newest private prison in the UK and the second private 
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Table 6.1: Private Prisons in Britain  









6.2 HMP Kilmarnock: the first private prison in Scotland 
What I wish to achieve in this section and the next is to show how private prisons in 
Scotland operate.  Private prisons are usually thought of as institutions managed by a 
private company where prisoners enjoy lenient conditions; prison regimes are not 
taken seriously; money can buy comforts; and the private company only cares about 
profits.  In this section and the next, these myths are contrasted with empirical 
evidence from the two private prisons in Scotland.   
 
6.2.1 The opening 
The opening of Kilmarnock in 1999 was a challenge for the SPS as it was the first 
prison in Scotland to be designed, constructed, managed and financed (DCMF) under 
the private finance initiative (PFI).  Kilmarnock started to take prisoners on 25 
March 1999 and operated according to what the contract specified.  During the 
opening stage of Kilmarnock, the two key issues that were mentioned in the report of 
HM Chief Inspector of Prisons for Scotland (2000b) were the transfer of prisoners 
from the public sector to Kilmarnock and the inexperience of its new staff.  The 
report stated that ‘a process had been agreed with the SPS for the screening of 
prisoners and a gradual build up to full capacity, to avoid any repetition of the 
mistakes made when HMP Shotts Phase 2 opened in 1987.  Initially, long-term 
prisoners who volunteered and were considered suitable for transfer to Kilmarnock 
arrived at the rate of 50 per week.  There were planned periods of consolidation 
before prisoners were accepted directly from the courts, either on remand or as short-
term convicted prisoners, until the establishment reached its normal operating 
capacity of 500 in June 1999. The Director of Kilmarnock considered this gradual 
approach to be particularly helpful for the staff, 91% of whom had no previous 
experience of working with prisoners’. 
 
In terms prison staff, the recruitment of inexperienced staff ran counter to the logic of 
traditional public management which valued its employees’ experience.  If 
Kilmarnock had been managed by the public sector, there is no doubt that it would 
have employed seasoned prison officers.  In this case, Serco took a risk that difficult 





which could be a threat to order and security in the prison.  According to the Chief 
Inspector’s report (2000b), this risk ‘had been anticipated and support teams of 
experienced prison staff from other Premier Prison Services [now Serco] 
establishments, principally HMP Doncaster, were deployed during the start-up phase. 
Premier Prison Services also employed some experienced former SPS Governors, 
who provided very helpful advice and useful insights into Scottish prisoner culture 
during that phase.’  Since its opening in 1999, the cooperative relationship between 
experienced staff and newcomers at this newly established prison has been 
consistently good.  There was no significant conflict between the two groups.  When 
I visited Kilmarnock in 2006 for a preliminary interview and asked the Deputy 
Director how the prison managed the differences in working experience of its staff, I 
was told that  
 
‘for staff who have experience in public sector prisons, we re-
programme them.  For newcomers, mentors are assigned for everyone 
for a year.  It is easier to train newcomers than those who have had 
some experience with government because the latter tend to bring 
with them the old bureaucratic culture’ (My pilot project’s research 
note). 
 
The opening of Kilmarnock illustrates the SPS’s new approach to the management of 
its prisons in the late 1990s.  Prior to the establishment of its first private prison, the 
SPS tended to follow the precepts of traditional public administration by emphasising 
adherence to rules, hierarchy, experience and working routines.  When using a 
private company, in this case Serco, to manage one of its prisons, the SPS became 
more flexible and took a risk.  It experimented with new ideas and the techniques 
that the private sector brought in.  As argued in Chapter 5, the establishment of a 
private prison ultimately led to changes in the management of public sector prisons.  
The most significant development was the use of contractual management in running 
the public prisons in Scotland. 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Kilmarnock contract was far more 
complicated than the Service Agreements (SAs) of the public prisons.  The content 
of the Kilmarnock contract comprised eight parts covering General (definitions), 





Miscellaneous (Appendix Seven).  I wish to highlight some of the key points of the 
contract which relevant for this study.  In general, from the client’s point of view, the 
complexity of the contract implied intense scrutiny.  On the other hand, from the 
service provider’s point of view, the Kilmarnock contract was perceived as a 
‘punitive’ contract.  During the pilot project, the senior manager of Kilmarnock 
pointed out that 
 
‘when you look at the current contract, it is more like a punitive 
contract, not a reward contract.  If we do things wrong, we get 
punished.  But when we go beyond the requirements, what do we get?  
Nothing’. (My pilot project’s research note) 
 
When the interview for the present research was conducted, I received the same 
comment from the Kilmarnock’s senior management who stated that 
 
‘there is no incentivisation whatsoever.  And I question whether it is 
perceived as a partnership.  It is more perceived as a contract.  Now 
we operate partnership but it is not perceived as a partnership.  The 
fundamental difference [between Scotland and England] for me is the 
belief in a win-win situation that you are looking for. The belief in 
Scotland is that ‘you do what I say’ − it is like a parent and child 
relationship’. (Interview, Kilmarnock’s Senior Manager, 1 May 2007) 
 
6.2.2 The Houseblock 
Since Kilmarnock is a closed high security prison of the same category as HMP 
Shotts, HMP Edinburgh and HMP Perth (keeping in custody long-term prisoners, 
mostly in Categories A and B), the balance between its managerial aims which were 
efficient and effective management and the security of its physical environments 
needed to be maintained.  Kilmarnock has two houseblocks.  Houseblock 1 (Afton 
House) holds long-term prisoners and Houseblock 2 (Doon House) holds short-term, 
remand prisoners and those on protective custody.  Each houseblock has four wings, 
and each wing is self contained and has two floors.  Access to each wing is through 
electronic gates controlled by residential staff.  Residential Officers (ROs) are 
appointed for the wings.  They are trained Prison Custody Officers (PCOs) who have 





any given day, ROs can be assigned to work as Personal Officers (POs) who are 
allocated a number of prisoners from the Wing for individual care.  
 
6.2.3 The management and staff 
The Director of Kilmarnock Prison is the Head of the Senior Management Team.  
Since its opening, Kilmarnock has had four Directors.  The first and the second 
Director had previously been Governors in the SPS.  The third, the only female, had 
a background in teaching before becoming the experienced governor of various 
prisons in England.  The current Director had previously been the Deputy Director at 
Kilmarnock for 3 years and had a background in custodial services of 15 yeas.  There 
are four Assistant Directors (ADs) responsible for custodial services (AD1), 
residential (AD2), programmes (AD3), and resource and administration services 
(AD4).  The AD1 also acts as the Deputy Director.  All ADs and three other 
managers, the Clinical Manager, the Investigations Officer and the Contract 
Compliance Officer, report directly to the Director.   
 
At an operational level, although Kilmarnock’s custody officers (COs) and SPS 
Prison officers are both regulated by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 
(1994)
56
, the nature of their employment makes them different from each other.  
While COs are private sector employees, POs are civil servants employed within the 
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 The duties and responsibility of COs according to this Act are as follows:  
‘Powers and duties of prisoner custody officers employed at contracted out prisons  
(1) A prisoner custody officer performing custodial duties at a contracted out prison 
shall have power to search—  
(a) any prisoner who is confined in the prison or for whose custody he is 
responsible; and  
(b) any other person who is in or is seeking to enter the prison and any 
article in the possession of such a person.  
(2) The power conferred by subsection (1)(b) above to search a person shall not be 
construed as authorising a prisoner custody officer to require a person to remove any 
of his clothing other than an outer coat, jacket, headgear and gloves.  
(3) A prisoner custody officer performing custodial duties at a contracted out prison 
shall, as respects the prisoners for whose custody he is responsible, have the duty—  
(a) to prevent their escape from legal custody;  
(b) to prevent, or detect and report on, the commission or attempted 
commission by them of other unlawful acts;  
(c) to ensure good order and discipline on their part; and  
(d) to attend to their wellbeing.  
(4) The powers conferred by subsection (1) above and the powers arising by virtue of 






public sector.  In addition, COs work for the benefit of their company.  SPS prison 
officers, on the other hand, are responsible for delivering a public service on behalf 
of taxpayers. The difference between COs and SPS prison officers was also 
highlighted by the senior manager of Kilmarnock, who said that:    
 
‘As a private sector organisation, [Kilmarnock] tended to deal with staff more 
robustly and tell them what to do.  If they don’t do it, they can sack them, get rid of 
them.  The public sector has a political problem in getting rid of civil servants.  Quite 
rightly!  However, what it means is that your efficiency is eroded. And what the 
private sector is saying is that if you really want to be efficient you have got to have 
control over these people.’ (Interview, Kilmarnock’s Senior Manager, 1 May 2007) 
The report of the first full inspection of Kilmarnock which was carried out in 2000, 
stated that human resource management at Kilmarnock was of ‘a high standard’. 
 
All staff in the establishment were provided with a detailed contract 
explaining their conditions of employment, which they were required 
to sign.  They were also provided with written information on Premier 
Prison Service’s grievance, disciplinary and appeals procedure and a 
comprehensive Staff Handbook. 
 
All PCO staff underwent a six month probationary period and those 
who satisfied the standard of the initial training programme were 
certificated at the end of a six week course and were contracted at that 
stage.  Ongoing assessment and reports were then compiled 
throughout the remainder of their probationary period.  Non-prisoner 
contact staff had a three-month probationary period. (2000b:para. 
9.16) 
 
For the staff who had experience of working in public prisons, there were measures 
to ‘re-programme’ them.  Normally, two mentors were assigned to newcomers for a 
year and the mentoring process for new staff was easier than for those who have had 
some experience of working in public prisons (comments of Kilmarnock’s senior 
manager given during the pilot project).  Nevertheless, as far as Trade Unions are 
concerned, Kilmarnock currently does not recognise the Prison Officers Association 







6.2.4 Prison regimes 
Kilmarnock provides basic, standard and advanced regimes for its prisoners.  Prison 
regimes are similar to those in public sector prisons.  For instance, at reception, 
prisoners are searched in the admissions area.  An officer on duty and a nurse are 
responsible for interviewing prisoners.  Information is then recorded on the Prisoners' 
Record System (PRS).  Prisoners are then provided with an information pack 
including 'Reception Information for New Prisoners' and a copy of the Prisoners' 
Handbook.  Necessary clothing is also provided at this stage.   
 
Different induction programmes are designed to suit different types of prisoners − 
remand, long-term, short-term and protective.  The goal of these programmes is to 
acquaint prisoners with all the main elements of prison life.  Risk and needs 
assessments are conducted with every prisoner in order to produce an individual 
sentence plan.  Basically, this sentence plan contains targets that prisoners should 
achieve and activities that they need to carry out in order to reach those targets while 
incarcerated in Kilmarnock. 
 
A wide variety of prisoner programmes are available in Kilmarnock including 
Problem Solving, Skills Training, Advanced and Basic Drug Awareness, Anger 
Management, education and social work.  The Chaplaincy Team is also established 
to provide activities which suit prisoners’ religion and faith.  The present chaplaincy 
comprises four groups: Church of Scotland, Roman Catholic, Episcopalian and Free 
Church.  Kilmarnock’s vocational training and industries are designed for prisoners 
so that they can acquire the skills needed in the labour market outside prison.  The 
prison provides a variety of workshops, including metalwork, welding, carpentry and 
laundry.  Prisoners earn a wage ranging from £6.00 to £20.00 per week, depending 
on what they do.   
 
Kilmarnock also provides a full range of healthcare services.  Its in-house services 
include dentistry, psychiatry, podiatry and physiotherapy.  It employs a full time 
doctor and nurses in different areas.  The prison has also set up an Addiction Team 





Resettlement Team provides services and supports prisoners to prepare prisoners for 
returning to the community.     
 
6.2.5 The report of HM Inspectorate of Prisons for Scotland (HMIP) 
 
‘The Chief Inspector’s report indicates that we are in the top three, if 
not the best, prison in Scotland.  If we were here only to make a 
profit and ran the prison badly, we would not have come this far’ 
(Interview, Kilmarnock’s Senior Manager, 26 January 2006). 
 
Since its opening until 2007, Kilmarnock has been fully inspected three times by the 
HM Inspector of Prisons for Scotland.  The first full inspection was in 2000, one year 
after the opening of Kilmarnock, the second was in 2004 and the most recent was in 
2007.  No serious warning was issued by the Chief Inspector and the results of the 
three inspections results are shown in Table 6.2.   
 
First Full Inspection  
(March 2000) 
Second Full Inspection 
(October 2004) 
Third Full Inspection 
(September and  
December 2007) 
For SPS HQ/Area 
Director 
1. The SPS should 
consider introducing 
more widely the satellite 
tracking system for 
prison vehicles that is in 
use at Kilmarnock. 
(para. 3.23) 
2. The SPS should 
consider how the 
performance 
management of its other 
prisons can be improved 
in the light of the 
experience at 
Kilmarnock. (para. 4.6) 
3. The issue about 
prisoners' progression 
from Kilmarnock to 
other mainstream SPS 
prisons requires to be 
addressed at the earliest 
opportunity. (para. 6.23)  
4. Consideration should 
 
 
1. There should be more 
activities available to 
prisoners when they are 
out of their cells in the 
evening and at 
weekends. 
2. Prisoners should be 
escorted to where they 
need to be within the 
prison more efficiently.  
3. Induction should be 
carried out consistently 
and with all prisoners. 
4. The overall Sentence 
Management System 
should be changed in 
order to integrate the 
elements more closely. 
5. All visiting staff who 
work alone, such as the 
optician, should hold 
their consultations in an 
area that can be 
 
 
1. Ways should be 
found to allow 
prisoners, particularly 
short-term prisoners, 
young adults and 
prisoners on protection, 
more time out of their 
cells;   
2. Prisoners should be 
present when their 
property is opened and 
cash checked in 
reception  
3. Risk assessments 
should be carried out in 
private in reception  
4. Prisoners, particularly 
prisoners at risk of 
suicide or self-harm, 
should be passed 
through reception more 
efficiently and quickly  





First Full Inspection  
(March 2000) 
Second Full Inspection 
(October 2004) 
Third Full Inspection 
(September and  
December 2007) 
be given as to how the 
roles of Investigations 
Officer and Contract 
Compliance Officer 
could be developed 
elsewhere in the SPS. 
(para 9.15) 
For PPS/Director 
5. Working conditions 
in the Communications 
Room should be 
significantly improved 
as a matter of urgency. 
(para. 3.25) 
6. The establishment's 
drug strategy requires 
co-ordination, with the 
various elements 
integrated to a greater 
degree than has yet been 
the case. (para 4.36) 
7. There should be a 
review of the entire 
work of the social work 
unit, including staffing 
resources, in order to 
ensure their effective 
input. (para. 6.44) 
8. As a matter of 
priority, management 
should seek the advice 
of HM Fire Service 
Inspectorate regarding 
the fire escape route 
from the upper floor of 
the Gate complex. (para. 
7.27) 
9. There should be a 
radical upgrading of 
staff facilities through-
out the establishment. 
(para. 9.44) 
observed by other staff.   
 
 
to matters of equality 
and diversity should be 
adopted   
6. Greater emphasis 
should be placed on 
linking individual 
aspects of the Integrated 
Case Management 
process and on 
monitoring outcomes. 
 
Table 6.2: Key recommendations of the Chief Inspector for Kilmarnock  






Given the recommendations from the full inspections of Kilmarnock in Table 6.2, I 
wish to highlight that the challenges faced by the private prison were rather different 
from those faced by its public counterparts.  One obvious example was that slopping-
out was not a problem presented in Kilmarnock
57
.  No recommendation directly 
requested Kilmarnock to improve the hygienic and sanitary conditions of the prison 
(HMIP 2007c) whereas HMP Edinburgh, which was inspected in the same year, was 
recommended to draw up an action plan to ‘address the problem of the lack of proper 
toilet facilities in Forth Hall’ (HMIP 2007b:para.2.17) and HMP Shotts was 
recommended in 2003 that the toilets in cells be screened off (HMIP 2007d:para.2.4).  
The news release on the Scottish Government’s website on 26 April 2005 quotes 
comments of Dr. McLellan, the Chief Inspector of Prisons, on the performance of 
Kilmarnock in recent years, saying that Kilmarnock ‘does not face the 
accommodation problems old buildings have. There is a separate toilet cubicle in 
every cell (with the exception of two cells in the Segregation Unit), the prison is 
clean, and prisoners keep their cells clean and tidy. The advantages of good living 
conditions are clear to see’ (Scottish Government 2006). More importantly, HMIP 
even recommended that the SPS adopt Kilmarnock’s practice to improve the 
performance management and to consider how the roles of Investigations Officer and 
Contract Compliance Officer could be developed in the public prisons.  Moreover, 
the senior officer of HMIP commented during an interview that ‘the fact that it runs 
more cheaply than other prisons is a significant driver for the Scottish Prison Service 
in the way it manages its prisons (Interview, HMIP Senior Officer, 10 May 2007).  
This confirmed my argument in the previous chapter that private prisons can act as 
catalysts for improvements in the prison system. 
 
Although the reports addressed some of the problems that Kilmarnock presented, for 
example, the provision of basic education and vocational training, food conditions 
and staff turnover, these reports came as quite a surprise because the overall 
evaluation was relatively positive in spite of the fact that Kilmarnock was the first 
private prison, the staff had little prior experience of working in prisons.  Although, 
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before the establishment of Kilmarnock, the SPS had no experience of managing 
private prison contracts, it managed to ensure that its first private prison had no 
record of escapes and no serious security incident.  Serco, as the first private prison 
provider in Scotland, not only carried out what was required of it by the contract but 
actually had an impact on the SPS as a competitor in the ‘prison business’, and 
ultimately raised the standards of prison management in Scotland as a whole.  The 
senior management of Kilmarnock claimed that 
 
‘in terms of performance, I think we are one of the top two or three 
prisons in Scotland at half the cost. I think we should have laid a way 
for innovation.  We haven’t done so because we had to concentrate so 
heavily on meeting the contract requirements.  There are areas where 
we have provided the innovation and that have been adopted by the 
SPS.  I think there is a real issue with measuring our performance 
against theirs’. (Interview, Kilmarnock’s Senior Management, 1 May 
2007) 
 
The success of Kilmarnock led to the use of contractual management in public sector 





A few years after Kilmarnock was established, the Scottish Executive produced its 
Prison Estates Review which aimed at making efficient use of prison establishments.  
The Review suggested that 2,200 prison spaces would be needed by the 2000s and 
this led to the proposal to establish two new prisons, one of which was to be built and 
operated by private sector.  One of the senior directors of SPS had this to say about 
the building of Addiewell. 
 
‘It isn’t about sector.  It’s about services for offenders.  It’s something 
about the benefits of good standards, good governance, and good 
institutions.  How can we share the best practice between each other?  
How can we think prison design and learn from that?  These are all 
opportunities for doing things differently, to create innovations for the 
future’. (Interview, Current SPS Director, 3 July 2007) 
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HMP Addiewell, the second privately-run prison in Scotland, was to function with 
more requirements than Kilmarnock.  In fact, despite the fact that Kilmarnock 
contract included a great deal of detail at the micro level, the areas covered by 
Addiewell Prison Contract were even more detailed than those in the Kilmarnock 
contract.  In the Addiewell contract, there are 79 items that the prison has to follow 
compared to Kilmarnock, which is subject to 65 items.  These increasing items 
reflected not only the quantity of works but also implied the substance and quality of 
services needed to provide (as discussed in Chapter 5 and demonstrated in Appendix 
Seven and Eight).  The SPS thought it was necessary to make the Addiewell contract 
as comprehensive as possible as in order to prevent some foreseen problems which 
occurred in Kilmarnock and other public prisons in particular access to programmes 
and prisoners’ living conditions (my research note from the interviews with SPS 
staff).  Additionally, with reference to its experience with the management of 
Kilmarnock in terms of public and political scrutiny, SPS gained a better knowledge 
of what should be put in the contract and what could be negotiated with the private 
provider in order to enhance effective management and at the same time to enhance 
value for money which might help ease pressures from key stakeholders including 
policy makers, the public and the media for private prisons (my research note). 
 
Recently, however, the image of Addiewell was portrayed in the free newspaper, 
Metro Scotland (2
nd
 December 2008) as ‘a cutting edge prison of the 21
st
 century’ 
where prisoners can enjoy en-suite cells, multi-channel Freeview TV from flat screen 
televisions, a ‘state-of-the-art’ computer room, large gym hall, fitness suite and 
electronic kiosks which can be used to order meals in advance, to check their money 
in their account, to order foods from the canteen and even to top up their phone 
accounts.  The Daily Record (10
th
 February 2009) called it a ‘luxurious’ prison and 
reported that prisoners named it ‘the Addison’ after the Radisson hotel chain.   
 
During the test-run period, the management of Addiewell was more problematic than 
that of Kilmarnock, given that the SNP Government had expressed its strong 
opposition to private prisons.  Prison privatisation in Scotland seems to have come to 





election in 2007.  As mentioned earlier, the plan to have Bishopbriggs Prison run by 
private sector was reversed.  And the two existing private prisons, Kilmarnock and 
Addiewell, will have to undergo a relatively strict scrutiny.   
 
Continuous criticism of private prisons has made it difficult for Addiewell to find 
constructive methods to defend its performance in Parliament and to deal with the 
media and the public as well.  Intense scrutiny (see Chapter 7) has also been a 
challenge to the newly-opened Addiewell Prison.  Learning from Kilmarnock’s 
experience could help Addiewell to defend itself.  The former Governor of 
Kilmarnock expressed the view that 
 
‘The other part that absolutely fascinated me is the close involvement 
of The Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Executive with prisons at 
the local level.  When working in English prisons, I can’t remember 
when the local MP visited the prisons.  I have never experienced the 
Home Secretary visiting prisons.  Whereas in Scotland, local MPs 
visit prisons regularly. 
 
In Scotland, the Minister of Justice is closely involved in which 
prisoners go where.  The direct involvement of the Scottish Executive 
with my prison and the scrutiny and spotlight that they have, are 
unknown in England.  I recognise that the senior management of the 
English Prison Service will be talking and meeting with the Minister 
for Prisons.  Here, my middle managers know the Minister of Justice 
and local MPs by their first names.  So, that is different.  It’s a kind of 
cultural and political split’. (Interview, Kilmarnock’s Senior Manager, 
1 May 2007) 
 
I wish to add here that the performance of Addiewell is crucial for the future of 
private prisons in Scotland.  It has to prove that it is an efficient service provider 
which can compete with other public prisons and with its private counterparts.  
Addiewell cannot afford to lose because its future is crucial to the future of private 
prisons in Scotland.  Obviously, if the SNP Government retains the support of the 
Scottish public, it is unlikely that Scotland will have new private prisons in the near 
future.  According to the a statement from the Justice Secretary, reported in a news 
release on the Scottish Government’s website on 23 August 2007, ‘rather than filling 
up prisons with minor offenders and building private prisons that cost the taxpayer 





dangerous criminals and punish serious offences. These investments are part of our 
wider strategy for managing offenders in an appropriate and responsible way that 







ETHICS AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
This chapter explores issues of accountability in the Scottish Prison Service over the 
last two decades.  Influenced by NPM, the SPS has undergone many changes in 
terms of policy and practice.  For instance, as discussed in Chapter 5, market 
mechanisms have gradually been imported and have come to dominate formerly 
bureaucratic management techniques.  In addition to the contracting-out of its 
support services, the SPS now employs private companies to deliver some of its core 
functions which include keeping offenders in custody as described in Chapter 6.  The 
shift towards privatisation and the adoption of business-like approaches has led to a 
number of major criticisms and a great deal of controversy about ethics and 
accountability.  Unfortunately, research on these issues, especially on the relation 
between NPM and ethics and accountability (e.g. Berman 1998; Frederickson 1997; 
Harding 1997; Kolthoff 2007), has been limited.  The most common critique had to 
do with the claim that the attempt to run public organisations like the private sector 
usually leads to corruption and unethical behaviour (Frederickson 1997). 
 
It is not my intention in this chapter to investigate the general issues of ethics and 
accountability in the prison service.  What I attempt to do here is to examine the 
ethics and accountability mechanisms in the Scottish prison system in the NPM era.  
To guide the discussion in this chapter, three key questions were raised: How does 
NPM affect ethics and accountability? What are the accountability mechanisms in 
the Scottish prison system?  How does the SPS respond to these mechanisms in terms 
of policy and practice?  A normative approach was used to tackle these questions.  
Theories and comments from the academic literature were examined and contrasted 
with quotations from SPS policy papers and interviews.  Special attention was given 
to the two most relevant publications.  The first is a book by Emile Kolthoff (2007), 
entitled Ethics and New Public Management: Empirical Research into the Effects of 
Business-like Government on Ethics and Integrity, which explores the relationship 
between NPM and ethics and integrity issues using The Netherlands’s police force as 





Harding (1997) which examines the accountability mechanisms of private prisons in 
three different jurisdictions: the USA, the UK and Australia.  In addition, to 
demonstrating the influence of NPM on prison management in terms of increased 
public accountability, this chapter focuses on three accountability mechanisms: (1) 
Her Majesty Inspectorate of Prisons for Scotland  (HMIP) which has direct 
responsibility for ‘inspecting’ prisons in Scotland, (2) the Scottish Prisons 
Complaints Commission (SPCC) which was established in 1994 to deal with 
complaints from prisoners, and (3) the Scottish Public Services Ombudsman (SPSO), 
which was established in 2002 and is responsible for investigating complaints about 
organisations providing public services in Scotland. 
 
The justification for examining these three mechanisms (HMIP, SPCC and SPSO) 
was based on their direct impact on the SPS’s core functions.  I wished to examine 
the mechanisms of performance accountability, i.e. accountability for the custody 
and rehabilitation of prisoners, which is the principal mission of the SPS.  These 
three mechanisms, I argue, help enhance best practice in the prison service, improve 
inefficient and ineffective policies and operations, and promote moral standards.  
They enable the SPS to achieve its principal goals, which are public safety, reduction 
in reoffending and correctional excellence (as discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5) 
with legitimate ‘means’ and ‘ends’.  The significance of these three mechanisms is 
that their outputs can have a considerable impact on the prison system and on 
prisoners who are now seen as the key ‘customers’ of the prison service.  Last but not 
least, HMIP, SPCC and SPSO are employed by the government as managerial tools 
to monitor the delivery of prison services against established targets.  The focus on 
these mechanisms, therefore, fits the aims of this research to investigate the 
development of managerialist ideology in the prison service.  I demonstrate below 
the roles and outputs of each agency that have recently come to reflect the 
significance of managerialism and the use of a business-like approach.    
 
By focusing on mechanisms of performance accountability, I do not wish to suggest 
that other forms of accountability e.g. legal accountability and political 





functions are not directly relevant to the scope of the present study.  It goes without 
saying that mechanisms such as prison statutes and regulations are among the key 
‘inputs’ to the delivery of prison services and were once regarded as the centre of the 
public service system.  In the NPM era, however, they are supporting tools which act 
as vehicles for the effectiveness and efficiency of the prison service.  They are, I 
argue, no longer at the heart of the service.  In the dynamic circumstances of NPM, 
outdated legislation could be, and should be, reformed as implied by the modernising 
government agenda.  In excluding these mechanisms from this study, I am aware that 
the validity of the account of accountability might be threatened.   This was 
compensated, however, by a thorough examination and discussion of these three 
mechanisms.  Also, the discussion of ‘legality’ as ‘means discourse’ (see Table 4.2  
and the discussion in Chapter 4 where I demonstrated that ‘legality’ row remained 
empty as there was no significant policy which address this ‘means discourse’) and 
the argument about the roles of ministers in Chapter 5 were intended to compensate 
for the exclusion of accountability in this chapter.   
 
7.1 The influence of NPM on public ethics and accountability  
This section attempts to tackle the first question: how does NPM affect ethics and 
accountability?  I refer to the work of Emile Kolthoff whose book focuses on the 
integrity of the police, and then move on to discuss the accountability issues that 
arise in the prison system with reference to Richard Harding’s Work.  The main aim 
is to present empirical evidence of the impact of NPM on the management of the 
prison services.  
  
7.1.1 Emile Kolthoff’s study 
Emile Kolthoff’s book Ethics and New Public Management: Empirical research into 
the effects of business-like government on ethics and integrity considers the 
relationship between NPM and ethical issues.  The strength of his account is that his 
arguments are based not only on his academic knowledge but also on his professional 
experience as Director of the Dutch Office of Local Government Ethics.  In his book 
he explores theories of previous thinkers and contrasts them with the evidence from 





academic and as a practitioner.  This approach definitely strengthens the validity and 
reliability of his work.    
 
Kolthoff (2007) starts his book by pointing out that a number of thinkers (i.e. Bovens 
and Hemerijck 1996; Frederickson 1997, 1999; Osborne and Gaebler 1992) have 
expressed concern over the use of business-like approaches by government.  He also 
notes that, among them, Frederickson is ‘one of the most outspoken opponents of the 
NPM movement’ who has argued that the rise of NPM caused corruption and 
unethical behaviour in government.  He points out that most of the scandals 
concerning the management of public services in recent years involved the use of 
business-like techniques and activities which were new to the public sector (for 
instance privatisation, market techniques and the outsourcing of tasks and services).  
As concrete research on this issue is still limited, Kolthoff’s aim was to fill this gap 
by analysing the influence of NPM on integrity (Kolthoff 2007:1). 
 
Kolthoff’s main research question is what is the relation between a business-like 
approach to government and integrity? A business-like approach to government and 
ethics and integrity are the two central concepts in his study.  Kolthoff explains that 
‘a business-like government is defined as a government moving in the direction of 
the business sector by taking over ideas, instruments, methods, institutions, and 
products that traditionally characterise this sector’ (ibid. 2).  He also adds that 
‘because the manifestations of business-like government are highly diverse, the most 
appropriate means for clarifying the framework of reference is to break down the 
paradigm by characteristics’ (ibid. 25).  His discussion of the business-like 
government concept is mainly based on the approach associated with Pollitt and 
Bouckaert (2004) and Hays and Kearney (1997).  Pollitt and Boeckeart (2004:6) 
describe public management reform as a potential means of achieving multiple ends, 
including savings (economies) in public expenditure, improved quality of public 
services, more efficient governmental operations, and greater likelihood that the 
policies chosen and implemented will be effective (Kolthoff 2007:24).  Pollitt and 
Boeckeart (2004:64) suggest that four main components are key to reform: (1) 





security of employment, etc.; (3) organisation: specialisation, coordination, scale, 
(de)centralisation; and (4) performance measurement systems: content, organisation, 
use.  On the other hand, Hays and Kearney (1997) had earlier identified five core 
principles of NPM as: (1) ‘downsizing − reducing the size of government’; (2) 
‘managerialism-using business protocols in government’; (3) ‘decentralisation − 
moving decision making closer to service recipients’; (4) business-like processes; 
and 5) ‘privatisation − directing the allocation of government goods and services to 
outside firms’ (Kolthoff 2007:24).  Combining Pollitt and Boeckeart’s (2004) 
approach with the five core principles proposed by Hays and Kearney’s (1997), 
Kolthoff then focuses on four characteristics of a business-like approach which are 
downsizing and entrepreneurship, decentralisation, performance measurement and 
the use of a planning and control cycle.  
 
As for ethics and integrity, Kolthoff explains that ‘the term “public ethics” refers to 
the collection of values and norms, moral standards and principles, that form the 
foundation of integrity’ (2007:3).  In general, ethics are a set of principles frequently 
defined as a code of conduct; that is, a framework for action (Lawton 1998:6).  
Whereas the moral nature of these principles refers to what is judged to be right, just, 
or good (conduct), integrity or ethical behaviour means much more than not being 
corrupt or fraudulent.’
59
  Accordingly, Kolthoff defines integrity as ‘a quality or 
characteristic of individual or organisational behaviour that denotes the quality of 
acting in accordance with moral values, standards, and rules accepted by the 
organisation’s members and society’ (2007:3).  He also adds that violations of 
integrity can be defined as the violations of these moral values and norms.  In his 
study, Kolthoff clusters integrity violations into 10 different categories: 
 
1. corruption, including bribing, kickbacks, nepotism, cronyism, and 
patronage (actions that benefit the individual, family, friends, or 
party); 
2. fraud and theft of resources, including the manipulation of 
information to cover up fraud; 
3. conflict of (public and private) interest through promises, gifts, or 
discounts; 
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4. conflict of interest through jobs and activities outside the organization 
(e.g. moonlighting); 
5. improper use of violence towards citizens and suspects; 
6. improper (investigative) methods of policing (including improper 
means for noble causes); 
7. Abuse and manipulation of information (unauthorized and improper 
use of police files; leaking confidential information); 
8. Discrimination and (sexual) harassment; indecent treatment of 
colleagues or citizens; 
9. Waste and abuse of organizational resources, including time; and 
10. Misconduct at leisure (such as domestic violence, drunken driving, 
use of drugs). 
  
To tackle the main research question, Kolthoff then operationalises the level of 
business-like approach and the frequency of integrity violations.  The former is 
measured by individuals’ perception of this phenomenon.  The latter is also measured 
by individuals’ perception of the occurrence of integrity violations.  Kolthoff 
explains that ‘this focus assumes that it is not necessarily the actual situation that 
influences people’s behaviour but rather their situational perceptions and evaluation.  
This research looked in an explorative way for relations between the two phenomena, 
thus testing the “Frederickson assumption”’ (ibid. 5). 
 
Four hypotheses were set for the relations between a business-like approach and 
integrity based on previous literature: (1) a negative effect of downsizing and 
entrepreneurship on integrity (more integrity violations); (2) a negative effect of 
decentralisation on integrity (more integrity violations); (3) a negative effect of 
performance measurement on integrity (more integrity violations); (4) a positive 
effect of the proper use of a planning and control cycle on integrity (fewer integrity 
violations) (ibid. 69). 
 
The Dutch police force was then selected as representative of government.
60
  The 
nature of police organisation is appropriate for the topic, especially its organisational 
missions which are vulnerable to unethical and corrupted conduct in light of the past 
history of Dutch police and public beliefs.  A total of 2,700 questionnaires were 
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given out to employees of the Regional Police Force in Midden West Brabant which 
is one of the larger police force in the south of the country.   
 
The statistical analysis reveals that ‘downsizing and entrepreneurship’ had a negative 
influence on integrity, while ‘performance measurement,’ ‘decentralisation,’ ‘ethical 
management,’ and ‘business-like management’ contributed to integrity in positive 
ways (p.115).  Unfortunately, the impact of the ‘planning and control cycle’ could 
not be studied due to Kolthoff’s inability to develop measurable indicators for it 
(p.114).  
 
Findings from Kolthoff’s study provide the most recent evidence of the connection 
between NPM and ethical and accountability issues.  My discussion later in this 
chapter draws upon these findings.  The difference between Kolthoff’s study and the 
present research is that the former focuses on the influence of a business-like 
approach on integrity at an individual level.  Respondents were asked to reflect on 
their individual perceptions of the survey items.  The latter, however, focuses on how 
NPM or the use of business-like approach has affected prison organisation in terms 
of its policy discourses on ethics and accountability.  Data were collected from 
published policy papers and the interviews. 
 
7.1.2 Harding’s (1997) study on private prison and public accountability 
Kolthoff’s work demonstrates that the use of business-like approaches in government 
does not necessarily have a negative effect on the integrity of public employees and 
on the public sector as a whole.  In fact, some features of NPM, specifically 
‘performance measurement,’ ‘decentralisation,’ ‘ethical management,’ and ‘business-
like management’, contribute to the improvement of integrity in government.  
Kolthoff’s findings confirm what Harding (1997) had suggested a decade before.  
The two studies share a common interest of the connection between NPM and ethics 
and accountability.  While Kolthoff’s work focuses on the general relation between 
the two concepts, Harding’s book is more specific in terms of examining only one 
feature of the NPM − privatisation.  Harding regards accountability as a necessary 






Discussion in this section is based on Harding’s (1997) book, Private Prisons and 
Public Accountability.  Special attention was paid to the models of public 
accountability of private prisons suggested by Harding.  These models were 
examined and contrasted with what I found in the SPS.  In addition his discussion of 
accountability mechanisms was used as a guideline to explore accountability 
mechanisms in the SPS (see section 7.2.1).   
 
Harding’s (1997) study explores private prisons in terms of their public 
accountability in three jurisdictions − USA, UK and Australia.  The expansion of 
private prisons in these countries is far greater than anywhere else in the world.  His 
book examines the accountability concept from a different angle to Kolthoff (2007).  
According to Harding: 
 
accountability is not a unitary idea; its crucial components will vary 
from activity to activity, from structure to structure.  The closed 
nature of total institutions such as prisons means that there are special 
difficulties in achieving effective accountability, even within public-
sector prisons, and obviously these factors will be no less applicable 
to accountability within private prisons.  However, a further question 
arises: are there additional factors that make accountability in private 
prisons even more difficult and illusory? (1997:17). 
 
There are two points from Harding’s view of accountability that the present research 
employed in the analysis of the SPS (discussed in section 7.2.1 below).  First, 
accountability is not a unitary idea.  I argue that the accountability mechanisms used 
in one jurisdiction do not necessarily match those in other jurisdictions.  When 
examining the accountability mechanisms in the Scottish prison system, there are 
some features (i.e. the Community Justice Authority and the Scottish Prisons 
Commission) that are applied in the Scottish jurisdiction only.  Further, Harding’s 
question of whether there are any factors that make accountability of private prisons 
more difficult is also one of the interests of the present research.  As discussed in 
Chapter 6, I hypothesise that the management of private prisons is more difficult than 
that of the public ones on account of the greater accountability and scrutiny they 





event, after exploring the management of private prisons in the three jurisdictions, 
Harding (ibid. 27-31) suggests that the ten key tenets of public accountability 
covered the following areas:  
• ‘The distinction between the allocation and the administration 
of punishment must be strictly maintained, with the private 
sector’s role being confined to its administration. 
• Penal policy must not be driven by those who stand to make a 
profit out of it. 
• The activities of the private sector and their relations with 
government must be open and publicly accessible. 
• What is expected of the private sector must be clearly 
specified.   
• A dual system must not be allowed to evolve in which there is 
a run-down and demoralized public sector arrangement. 
• Independent research and evaluation, with untrammelled 
publication rights, must be built into private sector 
arrangements. 
• Custodial regimes, programmes and personnel must be 
culturally appropriate. 
• There must be control over the probity of private contractors. 
• There must be financial accountability. 
• The state must in the last resort be able to reclaim private 
prisons.’ 
 
The book also outlines a basic model of public accountability and describes the 
models that have been used in the USA, UK and Australia.  Harding explains how 
each model works along with its pros and cons.  And when considering changes in 
the management of prisons in these past two decades, he proposes a new model of 







Figure 7.1: Harding’s new model for public accountability 
 
Harding concludes that 
accountability is often presented as a rather negative idea − a system 
to ensure that standards are not breached.  In the context of prison 
privatisation, that aspect of accountability is crucial.  But 
accountability also has more positive connotations − to make a system 
work better than it previously has done.  The system in question is the 
prison system as a whole, not just the private sector component.  The 
model of accountability developed in this book rests on the premise 
that the public component of the prison system is no less in need of 
effective regulation than the new private sector (1977:165). 
 
In addition, ‘the evidence is clear that private prisons could act as a catalyst for 
improvement across the whole prison system, but only if they are effectively 
regulated and properly accountable’ (p.165).   The proposals from Harding’s book 
that are related to the present study are that ‘a loose contract will tend to lose 
accountability’; that discipline for misconduct in private prisons should be similar to 
that in public prisons; that financial accountability for private prisons is strong; and 
that ‘termination of the contract is an extreme sanction for a breach’.    
 
Public prison sector Private sector 
Prison Authority 
Calls for tenders 
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Prisons                              Prisons 
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7.2 Ethics and accountability mechanisms for the SPS 
This section aims to answer the second question: what are the accountability 
mechanisms for the Scottish prison system?  Key accountability mechanisms for the 
Scottish prison system are identified and its involvement in the management of 
Scottish prisons is also discussed.  A significant point that I attempt to make here is 
that, although the SPS in the NPM era enjoys a certain degree of independence as an 
Executive Agency, it is still subject to inspection and monitoring by other agencies 
as specified in legislation.  
 
Ethics and accountability mechanisms in the Scottish prison system can be sub-
divided, based on Walsh’s (1995) suggestion, into parliamentary accountability, 
judicial accountability and administrative accountability.  In terms of parliamentary 
accountability, prisoners who are dissatisfied with their treatment in prison may write 
to their MPs.  Normally, the letter will be forwarded to the Minister with the MP’s 
observations and/or recommendations. The letter will then be treated as a normal 
complaint, except that it might be given priority as it has already been seen by the 
Minister.  For judicial accountability, there are a range of statutes, rules, regulations 
and legal requirements (e.g. Prison Act 1952, Prison (Scotland) Act 1989 and Prisons 
and Young Offenders Institutions (Scotland) Rules 2006).  They include international 
rules and regulations such as the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners and the European Convention on Human Rights.  For 
administrative accountability, the SPS is subject to a number of mechanisms 
including HM Inspectorate of Prisons for Scotland, Scottish Prisons Complaints 
Commission and Scottish Public Services Ombudsman.  This chapter, however, 
focuses on three formal mechanisms of accountability, namely HM Inspectorate of 
Prisons for Scotland, Scottish Prisons Complaints Commission, and Scottish Public 
Services Ombudsman and also briefly touches on the significance of informal 
mechanisms.  It should be noted that most of these mechanisms were created during 








7.2.1 HM Inspectorate of Prisons for Scotland 
In Scotland, prisons are subject to regular inspection. The Prisons (Scotland) Act 
1989 (S7) lays down the statutory basis for the Chief Inspector of Prison for 
Scotland
61
.  The Chief Inspector is appointed by Her Majesty ‘to inspect or arrange 
for the inspection of prisons in Scotland and to report to the Secretary of State on 
them’ and ‘to inspect the conditions in which prisoners are transported or held in 
pursuance of prisoner escort arrangements (within the meaning of section 102 of the 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994) and to report to the Secretary of State 
on them’.  The key areas which the Chief Inspector needs to assess in the report are 
the treatment of prisoners and the conditions in prisons.  
 
The ‘core’ inspection team comprises Chief Inspector, a Deputy Chief Inspector, an 
Assistant Chief Inspector, an Inspector, and a Personal Secretary.  There is also a 
support body composed of experts from HM Inspectorate of Education and the 
Social Work Inspection Agency and other experts and lay inspectors for specific 
inspections (see Adler and Longhurst (1994) for more details regarding the history 
and development of the Inspectorate).  Each establishment is subject to an inspection 
every three to four years.  In between, there may be follow up inspections carried out 
by the HMIP.  The 1997 report by the Inspectorate on Aberdeen Prison suggests that 
‘the Chief Inspector has no executive powers but is able to draw the Secretary of 
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 Prison (Scotland) Act 1989 provides that 
“7.  (1) Her Majesty may appoint a person to be Chief Inspector of Prisons for 
Scotland. 
 (2) It shall be the duty of the Chief Inspector. 
(a) to inspect or arrange for the inspection of prisons in Scotland and to 
report to the Secretary of State on them [; and 
(b) to inspect the conditions in which prisoners are transported or held in 
pursuance of prisoner escort arrangements (within the meaning of section 102 of 
the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994) and to report to the Secretary of 
State on them.] 
 (3) The Chief Inspector shall in particular report to the Secretary of State on 
the treatment of prisoners and conditions in prisons. 
 (4) The Secretary of State may refer specific matters connected with prisons in 
Scotland and prisoners in them to the Chief Inspector and direct him to report on 
them. 
 (5) The Chief Inspector shall in each year submit to the Secretary of State a 
report in such form as the Secretary of State may direct, and the Secretary of State 
shall lay a copy of that report before Parliament. 
 (6) The Chief Inspector shall be paid such salary and allowances as the 






State's attention to any aspects of a penal establishment which call for comment.  The 
publicity which the Chief Inspector's reports attract is in itself a powerful instrument 
for change and improvement’ (HMIP 2007a:Role of the Prison Inspectorate Section). 
 
In 2006, the Inspectorate published Standards Used in the Inspection of Prisons in 
Scotland to ‘enable prisoners and prison staff to understand the main areas to be 
examined in the course of an inspection and what would be expected in each area; 
and to provide assurance to Ministers and the public that inspection is being carried 
out within a consistent framework and that measurements are being made against 
appropriate standards’ (HMIP 2006b:1).  The Standards are set out under three 
headings: safety (security, good order, protection of prisoners from harm); decency, 
humanity and respect for legal rights; and opportunities for self-improvement and 
access to services and activities.  In addition, based on the domestic, regional and 
international laws and regulations, nine prisoner outcomes
62
 were established 
covering prisoner protection; prisoner dignity; appropriate prison conditions; 
treatment of prisoners with respect; contact with family and friends; prisoners’ rights; 
prisoner programmes; healthcare standards for prisoners; and prisoner reintegration.  
The publication of the Standards reflects the principle of independence of the 
Inspectorate in setting requirements for the inspection of prisons and also, I argue, has 
led to improvements in the public sector organisation in the NPM era.   
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 Nine outcomes are specified as follows: 
(1) Appropriate steps are taken to ensure that individual prisoners are protected 
from harm by themselves and others; 
(2) Prisoners are treated with respect for their dignity while being escorted to and 
from prison, in prison and while under escort in any location; 
(3) Prisoners are held in conditions that provide the basic necessities of life and 
health, including adequate air, light, water, exercise in the fresh air, food, 
bedding and clothing; 
(4) Prisoners are treated with respect by prison staff;  
(5) Good contact with family and friends is maintained; 
(6) Prisoners’ entitlements are accorded them in all circumstances without their 
facing difficulty;  
(7) Prisoners take part in activities that educate, develop skills and personal qualities 
and prepare them for life outside prison;  
(8) Healthcare is provided to the same standard as in the community outside prison, 
available in response to need, with a full range of preventive services, promoting 
continuity with health services outside prison; and  
(9) Appropriate steps are taken to ensure that prisoners are reintegrated safely into 








Overall, according to Chief Inspector’s report, the response of the SPS to the HMIP’s 
recommendations in general was satisfied by the Chief Inspector.  It was reflected by 
the senior officer of HMIP that  
 
‘I think they are very keen and take it very seriously.  I think on those 
things where they can change, they have significantly changed in line 
with our recommendations.  However, there are things that haven’t 
changed, e.g. overcrowding and ‘slopping out’.  But their response to 
my recommendation is at a satisfactory level’. (Interview, HMIP 
Senior Officer, 10 May 2007) 
 
In his latest Annual Report for 2007-2008, the Chief Inspector also stated that  
 
Scotland’s prisons are much, much better than they used to be.  It is 
the task of the Chief Inspector to inspect and to report on the 
conditions in which prisoners live and the treatment they receive.  In 
both of these aspects our prisons have changed beyond recognition in 




7.2.2 The Scottish Prison's Complaints Commission (SPCC)  
Most prisoners’ requests and complaints in the Scottish prison system are normally 
dealt with locally, e.g. within the establishment by prison officers, governor-grade 
staff or the governor in charge of the establishment (Adler and Longhurst 1994).  
However, on 1 December 1994, SPCC was established as an independent body that 
formally deals with complaints from prisoners in Scotland.  The principal role of 
SPCC is to resolve complaints that cannot be solved through the internal complaints 
system of the SPS.  It is one of the developments in the Scottish prison system in the 
NPM era or the period which I term ‘trial and error’ period (see Chapter 4).  The 
Prison Complaints Commissioner, Vaughan Barrett has said that ‘the peaceful 
resolution of prisoner grievances will help to reduce hostility and make prisons safer 
places.  This is not only conducive to prison staff and prisoners' well being but it is 
likely to have a positive influence on a prisoner's disposition when he is released and 






In Scotland, the complaint system is known as the ‘CP’ system because prisoners 
have to fill in a ‘CP’ form appropriate to the nature of their complaint and send their 
complaint to the SPCC.  There are four types of CP forms: CP1 for ‘ordinary’ 
complaints; CP2 for ‘confidential’ or ‘sensitive’ complaints; CP3 for medical 
complaints; and CP4 for complaints against Orderly Room Decisions.  The 
procedures of the CP system are shown in Figure 7.2-7.5.  Prisoners can directly 
contact SPCC by letter and telephone, and can also ask anyone to contact SPCC on 
their behalf.  The Commission will only investigate complaints that cannot be 
resolved through the normal grievance system of the SPS.  It will not consider 
complaints regarding court sentences, decisions concerning parole or life license, 
medical matters that involve clinical judgement, the subject of legal proceedings or 
the opinions of professionals regarding a prisoner, and complaints that are considered 
‘trivial, vexatious or completely without merit’ (SPCC, 2008).   
 
 





completes a CP1 Form 
Residential Officer 
responds to prisoner within 24 hours 
Unit Manager 
responds to prisoner within 24 hours 
Internal Complaints Committee 
convenes within 7 days 
Governor in Charge 
responds to prisoner within 7 days 
















Figure 7.4: The CP3 System Medical Complaints 
 
Prisoner 
completes a CP 2 Form 
Governor in Charge 
response time – 7 days 
Scottish Prisons complaints Commission 
Prisoner 
completes a CP3 Form 
Medical Officer 
response time -  7 days 
Scottish Ministers 
response time – 28 days 
(if complaint does not involve clinical judgement) 






Figure 7.5: The CP4 System Complaints against Orderly Room Decisions 
 
When looking at the complaints received from 1995 to 2008, the number of 
complaints went up and down over time (see Chapter 8 for the discussion of 
prisoners’ complaints and SPS’s performance).  The trend in recent years, however, 
was downwards (Table 7.1).  The latest statistics show that during the year 2007-8, 
the number of cases received went down to 324 of which 228 were within the 
jurisdiction of the SPCC.  These numbers were the lowest in 13 years, only just 
above the first year after the SPCC was established.  Table 7.2 reveals the number of 
complaints classified by subjects.  The top five subjects of complaints received were 
location, OR proceedings, property, medical treatment and visits respectively.     
 
 
Year Cases Received 
Cases within 
jurisdiction 
1995 (1 Jan – 31 
Dec) 217 120 
1996 440 349 
1997 450 361 
1998 397 319 
1999 433 343 
Prisoner 
completes a CP4 Form 




Governor in Charge 
Response time 7 days 






Year Cases Received 
Cases within 
jurisdiction 
2000(1 Jan 2000 – 
31 Mar 2001)* 392 245 
2001/02 (1 Apr – 31 
Mar) 405 231 
2002/03 442 236 
2003/04 441 264 
2004/05 388 259 
2005/06 460 363 
2006/07 403 298 
2007/08 324 228 
*From 1995-1999 the Commission reported on a calendar year 
basis. In 2001 the Commission began its reporting year from 
01 April. To allow for this change, statistics in 2000/2001 were 
recorded from 1 January 2000 for a 15 month period to 31 
March 2001. Since 2001/2002 the reporting year has run from 
1 April to 31 March. 
 
Table 7.1: Total number of complaints received between 1995-2008 





by Subject Matter 
Within Jurisdiction 
Access to Rules 1 1 
Amenities 3 3 
Bullying 3 2 
Canteen 4 4 
Clothing 2 2 
Compassionate Leave 3 2 
Complaints System (CP) 7 6 
Computers 9 9 
Downgrading 16 11 
Drug Testing 2 2 
Education 3 3 
Exercise 1 1 
FOI Requests 2 2 
Food 2 1 
Home Detention Curfew 4 3 
Health & Safety 2 1 
Home Leave 1 1 
Legal Correspondence 2 2 
Liberation Date 2 2 
Location 42 30 
Mail 4 3 







by Subject Matter 
Within Jurisdiction 
Medical Treatment 23 7 
Operations 7 2 
OR Proceedings 31 20 
Outside Placements 1 0 
Parole Matters 2 1 
Phone Calls 8 5 
Physical Environment 2 2 
PPC 7 6 
Prisoner Records 2 1 
Privileges 6 6 
Programmes 4 4 
Property 31 25 
Regime 15 10 
Religion 2 0 
Removal from Association 3 3 
Security Category 1 0 
Sentence Planning 2 0 
Social Work Matters 1 0 
Staff 13 11 
Staff Treatment 2 1 
STOP Programme 3 3 
Strict Escapee Status 1 1 
Strip Searching 3 3 
Supervision Level 1 1 
Transfers 1 0 
Visits 21 11 
Wages 10 9 
Work 4 3 
TOTAL 324 228 
 
Table 7.2: Complaints received by subject matters between 2007-08 
Source: Scottish Prisons Complaint Commission (2008) 
 
There are three possible outcomes after the SPCC investigates a prisoner’s 
complaints.  Firstly, SPCC does not find in the prisoner’s favour.  In these cases, 
SPCC will write to the prisoners explaining why the decision was made.  Secondly, 
for complaints that can be resolved at local level, SPCC will contact governors, 
managers and staff of the prison.  Lastly, SPCC will make a formal recommendation 
to the Chief Executive of the SPS who must respond to that recommendation within 
28 days.  SPCC will also contact the prisoners and inform them of recommendations 





management in the most recent years.  Out of 228 cases within jurisdiction, 29.82% 
(68 cases) were closed with conciliation results while 39.03% (89 cases) were 
resolved at establishments with no further recommendations.  For the year 2007-
2008 no case received formal recommendation from SPCC and 17.98% (41 cases) 
were still under investigation.  These recent statistics implied SPCC’s problem-
solving approach which attempted to find resolutions at the establishment level and 
included all the parties involved. 
 
 
Results of cases management Number of cases 
Conciliated 68 
No recommendation 89 
Formal recommendation 0 
Withdrawn by prisoner 30 
Outwith jurisdiction 96 
Files awaiting outcome 41 
Total 324 
 
Table 7.3: Results of case management 2007-08 
Source: Scottish Prisons Complaint Commission (2008) 
 
7.2.3 Scottish Public Services Ombudsman  
Another accountability mechanism that was developed during the NPM era is the 
creation of the Scottish Public Services Ombudsman (SPSO hereafter).  It was 
established by Scottish Public Services Ombudsman Act 2002 to replace the Scottish 
Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, the Local Government Ombudsman 
for Scotland and the Housing Association Ombudsman for Scotland
63
.  The main 
responsibility of SPSO is to investigate complaints about organisations providing 
public services in Scotland.  The process of SPSO is similar to that of SPCC.  The 
SPSO deals only with complaints that have exhausted the internal complaint 
procedures of the organisations concerned.  The investigation is conducted by 
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collecting and examining evidence through ‘seeking written answers to questions’, 
‘interviews’, ‘getting copies of documents’, ‘site visits’ and ‘taking expert advice 
(for example on clinical issues)’. 
 
The Scottish Public Services Ombudsman Act (S12 & S13) requires that the SPSO’s 
investigations be conducted in private, and that SPSO should give an opportunity for 
the organisation to comment on the allegations that led to the complaint.  If the 
complaint is within jurisdiction, the aggrieved persons and the organisations that the 
complaint is related to, will be informed about the complaint and the outcome.  As a 
public organisation, SPS is subject to an investigation by the SPSO when there is a 
complaint against it.  An important case relating to the custody of prisoners is the 
complaint against Reliance Custodial Services (RCS), the provider of prison escort 
and transfer for the SPS (Case Number 200503484).  The complaint alleged that 
Reliance used ‘excessive security in an already secure environment and failed to 
carry out a full risk assessment on premises that a prisoner was escorted to’.  In this 
case, SPSO recommended that 
 
‘The Ombudsman recommends that the Service ask RCS to apologise 
to Mr A for not conducting a risk assessment for the visit on 31 
January 2006 which led to an inconvenient visit and caused Mr A to 
complain.  
 
The Service and RCS have accepted the recommendation and will act 
on it accordingly.’ 
 
The recommendation of the Ombudsman implied that accountability of the prison 
services was not limited to only the ‘principle’ (SPS) but also to be borne by the 
‘agent’ (private contractor).  Even though the services were contracted out, the 
accountability of such services was still borne by SPS as the contract owner.  Also, its 
private agent need to be accountable for a certain degree as specified in the contract.  
Anyway, this case was the lesson learnt for the Headquarters and prison 
establishments in terms of accountability, service agreements and service 







7.2.4 Informal accountability 
What I wish to raise here for future discussion are informal accountability 
mechanisms for the prison service.  While discussions on formal accountability 
mechanisms are available in the published literature, discussions of informal 
mechanisms are not.  In this NPM era, the SPS not only faces formal mechanisms but 
it also encounters informal scrutiny.  Recent years witnessed the increasing 
importance of the media in ‘inspecting’ , ‘assessing’ and ‘reporting’ the SPS’s 
performance.  News about prisons, especially the private prisons, is generally not 
good news.  ‘Slopping out’, for example, is among the issues that attracted the 
media’s attention most often.   
 
Electrical spotlight is on you!  When I first came here, sadly there was 
a newspaper article every week, about the ‘Killy Hilton’ [Kilmarnock 
is known colloquially as ‘Killy’] and also something else.  There was 
also a political spotlight.  We were the only private prison [at the 
time] although there’s another private contractor now, Alliance, and 
that eases the pressure.  A second private prison coming on board 
should ease the pressure further.  (Interview, Kilmarnock’s Senior 
Manager, 1 May 2007) 
 
7.3 The prison service and accountability: the SPS’s response  
 
The aim of this section is to tackle the third question: how does the SPS respond to 
accountability mechanisms in terms of its policy and practice?  Results from 
documentary analysis and from interview materials confirm that the SPS has initiated 
new policies and operations in response to feedback, comments and 
recommendations from the external accountability mechanisms discussed above.  My 
discussion in this section covers three key developments: the response to HMIP’s 
recommendations; the launch of Prisoner Supervision System; and the establishment 
of internal mechanisms to enhance accountability. 
  
First of all, the examination of the SPS’s response to the recommendations of the 
HMIP demonstrates that during the last twenty years, the SPS has positively 
responded to the recommendations of the inspection agencies by launching necessary 
policies (such as the policy to deal with ‘slopping out’) to improve the quality of its 





SPS’s response in four key areas: overcrowding; children in prison; prison food; and 
drugs.  In relation to prison food, for example, HMIP reported that ‘the main thrust 
of improvement in recent years has been in relation to quantity and quality, 
especially at the point of delivery as prisoners have highlighted these as more of a 
concern than nutrition.  The most recent prisoner survey results will be used by 
Catering Managers to improve diets and the ‘Good Food Group’ consisting of 
representatives from both within and outwith the SPS continues to consider how best 
to improve prisoner food and diet’.  This implies that the use of such business-like 
approaches as decentralisation and customer orientation has the potential to improve 
the quality of service.  As for drugs prevention and suppression, the report revealed 
that ‘while there is an equal determination in the Service to prevent drugs entering, 
there is also a commitment to offer appropriate treatment services for those prisoners 
wishing to engage positively.  The introduction of the Enhanced Addictions 
Casework Service (EACS) in August 2005 offers individual interventions tailored to 
specific population groups’.  These quick responses resulted in a compliment from 
the HMIP as presented earlier. 
 
Inspectorate Issues 
in HMIP Annual 
Report 2005-2006 
SPS’s Responses 
Overcrowding The SPS signed a contract earlier this year for the 
construction of a new prison in Addiewell, West Lothian. 
SPS are also seeking to build a new prison on the existing 
site of HMP Low Moss and await the outcome of a planning 
inquiry.  New ‘fit for purpose’ accommodation has been built 
on time and within budget at HMP Edinburgh, HMP 
Glenochil, HMP Castle Huntly and HMP Cornton Vale. 
Children in Prison The vast majority of those under 16 who enter prison, do so 
for a very short period until suitable local authority 
accommodation can be found. There are however, 
exceptional circumstances whereby it is deemed that prison 
is the most appropriate location in which to locate a child. 
When such circumstances arise, the child will normally be 
located in HMYOI Polmont where there is a dedicated 
facility committed to meeting the needs of these very 





Prison Food The issue of prison food is one which SPS takes very 
seriously. The main thrust of improvement in recent years 
has been in relation to quantity and quality, especially at 
point of delivery as prisoners have highlighted these as more 
of a concern than nutrition. The SPS considers that gradual 
improvements from nutritional and other perspectives are the 
most sensible approach. This approach also avoids wasting 
resources. The most recent prisoner survey results will be 
used by Catering Managers to improve diets and the ‘Good 
Food Group’ consisting of representatives from both within 
and outwith the SPS continues to consider how best to 
improve prisoner food and diet. The figure of £1.57 no 
longer applies corporately and establishments now have 




Drugs are recognised as a problem within prisons as they are 
a problem in society. The majority of those admitted to 
prison have an addiction problem. SPS are committed to 
preventing the introduction of drugs, however where there 
are a minority of prisoners with a will and determination to 
take illicit drugs, they inevitably find ways of securing a 
supply even while in prison. A balance must be struck in 
ensuring that prisoners have the right opportunities to 
challenge their offending behaviour and to prepare for 
release. While there is an equal determination in the Service 
to prevent drugs entering, there is also a commitment to offer 
appropriate treatment services for those prisoners wishing to 
engage positively.  The introduction of the Enhanced 
Addictions Casework Service (EACS) in August 2005 offers 
individual interventions tailored to specific population 
groups. 
 
Table 7.4: SPS’s Responses to HMIP’s Recommendations  
Source:  HM Inspectorate of Prisons for Scotland (2006a) 
 
The relatively positive reports by the HM Inspectorate for Prison (as shown in 
Chapter 6) on Kilmarnock in recent years are evidence that reflects the SPS’s success 
in working with the private sector to deliver prison services.  This contrasts with the 
views of Frederickson (2005:178), who has said that ‘it is my prediction that in 2008 
this ancient saying will have come to pass: Today’s problems were caused by 
yesterday’s solutions.  The managerialism recipe-deregulation, privatising, 
downsizing, and market competition – will make a dish that will spoil and become 





has now passed, and it should be noted that there has been little controversy over 
effects of the new managerialism in Scotland.  The only negative impact on the SPS 
in recent years came from politicians when the SNP Government declared that it was 
opposed to private prisons.  In any event, one preventive strategy of SPS to deal with 
potential criticisms was to educate the public and promote a better understanding of 
prison management in particular in the areas where the public have relatively limited 
knowledge for example the management of private prison, prison contracts and key 
administrative processes.  Below is an example of SPS’s policy on public 
procurement which was available on its website: 
 
Procurement Ethics 
The Civil Service Code and SPS internal policies establish clear 
guidelines regarding the values and standards of behaviour expected 
from civil servants.  For example, individuals within SPS should act 
with ‘integrity’, ‘honesty’, ‘objectivity’ and ‘impartiality’.  These 
overarching values and standards apply to all SPS staff including 
those engaged in procurement projects and managing any resulting 
contractual relationships with suppliers.  
 
SPS expects suppliers to maintain and conduct its activities with SPS 
to similar ethical standards. (SPS 2007b) 
 
In 2002 the SPS introduced the Prisoners Supervision System (PSS) to ensure that 
the management of prisoners in every Scottish prison is operated with efficiency and 
effectiveness.  Available for public access, the SPS announced on its website that the 
PSS would help to enhance the effectiveness of sentence management of each 
prisoner
64
.  It is also expected that the system would promote the acceptable 
behaviour of prisoners.  Moreover, ‘these changes will help redress the balance 
towards Lord Mountbatten’s recommendation that individuals be held in the least 
restrictive conditions which are appropriate.  Another outcome will be a high 
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 The SPS announces that “the integration of the Prisoner Supervision System into the Sentence 
Management process provides a single cohesive system by which the SPS may manage prisoners 
through their sentence. PSS is designed to motivate the individual to demonstrate acceptable 
behaviour patterns and address identified needs. The Management Rules will enable consideration of 
prisoners serving a sentence of 18 months and over for access to ‘top-ends’ and open prisons at the 
earliest stage of their sentence at which preparation for release is appropriate. In the interim the 
separation of internal supervision level from external escort security considerations permits 
recognition of an individual prisoner’s achievements by the granting of enhanced autonomy within a 






proportion of the prisoners being subject to Low Supervision arrangements while 
they are in closed establishments’.  In a way, this new mechanism acts as another 
mechanism that encourages transparency of prison management and treatment of 
prisoners.  It allows the public to have better understanding of what exactly the SPS 
does with prisoners and helps to monitor the SPS’s operations which previously were 
hidden behind high walls.   
 
I wish to argue that the aims of PSS reflect the influence of managerialist ideology 
(Appendix Nine).  Such key discourses as ‘effective management’, ‘fair and 
transparent’ management and ‘resource allocation’ can be found throughout the 
document.  The key elements which comprise (1) the Assessment Rule, (2) the 
Management Rule and (3) Integration with Sentence Management mirror the 
‘systematic’ arrangement of prisoner treatment from admission to release.  The 
Assessment Rule requires each prison to classify a prisoner to one of three levels: 
High Supervision; Medium Supervision; and Low Supervision.  Each prisoner is 
assessed against ten criteria.
65
  The Management Rule, on the other hand, focuses on 
the management of prisoners based on the length of their sentence: long-term and 
short term prisoners.   In addition, SPS recognises the need to take the results of Risk 
and Needs Assessment for Sentence Management into account when assessing the 
supervision level for each prisoner.    
 
Last but not least, in order to enhance external accountability; the SPS has developed 
its own internal accountability mechanisms, including its strict policy on contract 
inspection and monitoring and the development of the Prisoner Survey (as discussed 
in Chapter 5).  For the former, what I wish to argue is that the use of Key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs) in the inspection and monitoring process of contract 
management contributes to the improvement of the services provided.  According to 
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 Ten criteria are: (1) Within 12 months of commencing a sentence of 4 years or over for serious 
violence (including murder and sexual offences) or drug related offences?; (2)Previous history of 
serious violent offending within past 3 years?; (3) Means and willingness to escape now or on 
admission have a history of such behaviour?; (4) Means and willingness to organise serious 
indiscipline, (including drug dealing)?; (5) Previous involvement in violence or fear-inducing 
behaviour (in prison) within the last year?; (6) Current substance abuse?; (7) Significant psychiatric / 
psychological history within the past year?; (8) Serious outstanding charges?; (9) Impulsive behaviour 






Genders (2002:296), ‘contractual arrangements enable the specification of standards 
of service against which performance can be measured and action taken in the event 
of non-compliance’.  Each year the SPS will reassess and readjust its KPIs so that 
they reflect the SPS’s vision, mission and responsibility.  Obviously, current KPIs 
from the year 2005-2008 (as shown in Table 7.3) reveal the focus of the SPS on 
public safety (measured by escape and reoffending), prison orders (measured by 
assaults), the problem of ‘slopping out’ (measured by access to night sanitation), and 
rehabilitation (measured by prisoner outcomes).  Prisoner Outcome, for instance, 
gradually becomes recognised as key policy goal as the SPS moves towards a 
customer-oriented business.  The current SPS Director stated that ‘prisoner outcomes 
are not just offending ones but they relate housing, physical health, mental health, 
drugs use, family relationship, employment and qualifications’ (Interview, Current 
SPS Director, 25 July 2007). 
 







Average number of prisoners 
provided for (not KPI) 
6,800 7,000 7,200 
Escapes: extreme risk  0 0 0 
Escapes: others <=6 (pa) ≤ 6 
(p.a.) 
<= 6 
Serious assaults: prisoner on staff <= 12 ≤ 12 <= 12 
Serious assaults: between 
prisoners   
<= 74 ≤ 74 <= 74 
% of prison places with access to 
night sanitation  
93% 94% 95% 
Average annual cost per prison 
place  
£35,000 £35,000 £36,000 
% of Integrated Case 
Management case conferences 
with social work contributions 
where needed 
- 85% 85% 
Offender Development 
Hours of completed programmes 
and approved activities 
Offender development hours 






















*Improved literacy skills  
*Employability prospects 
increased  














*Return to custody (not KPI) 
(2002 cohort) 
overall figure 
48%; of which 
males 49%, 
females 39% 
- (2003 cohort 
next to be 
measured) 
* denotes new measure  
 
Table 7.5: Key Ministerial Targets 
Source: Scottish Prison Service (2009c) 
 
For the management of contracts, both public and private, I argue that contract 
inspection and monitoring mechanisms are vital to not only the success of SPS in 
meeting the established targets as specified in the contract but also to achieving the 
goals of correctional excellence and value for money.  Harding (1997) calls this a 
‘contract-based accountability’ which is managed by the supervising agency with no 
formal statutory support.  The use of the inspection and monitoring process as 
accountability mechanisms is two fold: to ensure that the contract is not breached and 
to improve standards (as discussed earlier in Section 7.2).  In order for these 
mechanisms to function properly, the contract itself needs to be clarified and 
understood by the parties involved (Interview, SPS’s Senior Manager at the 
Headquarters, 17 May 2007).   
 
What inspection and monitoring mechanisms expect is contract compliance.  Eric 
Murch, the Director of Partnership and Commissioning, acting as controller, 
described how he cooperated with the Director of Prisons, who acts as a service 
provider, that 
 
‘The point of the contract is to give those business decisions a place in 
contracts and to make sure that the service is delivered, the KPI is 
delivered and the co-worker is delivered.  Things needed to be put 
into the contract and then we measured them up as we had a monthly 
meeting namely a contract liaison meeting.  There was a robust 
process.  We did the same to both public prisons and private sector 






The one thing, however, that does not appear in the public contract is the penalty for 
breaching the contract (Interview, Former SPS’s Governor and Director, 11 May 
2007).  This demonstrates the different accountability level borne by the public and 
prison prisons. 
 
‘If you were going to have the purity of the model, you would have to 
have penalties for the public sector.  But the difficulty with that is you 
penalising yourself!’ (Interview, Current SPS’s Senior Manager, 17 
May 2007) 
  
The other internal mechanism developed was the Prisoner Survey.  As indicated in 
Chapter 5, the survey not only reflects the SPS’s efforts to serve its customers, but it 
also can be viewed, I argue, as a mechanism to reduce prisoners’ complaints to 
HMIP and SPCC.  The Prisoner Survey is a proactive measure for identifying 
prisoners’ needs, obtaining feedback and dealing with issues in advance through 
policy and operational developments before problems occur.     
 
In summary, most of the common criticisms of the prison system in the NPM era 
revolve around prison privatisation issues especially in terms of the ethics and 
accountability of private prisons.  However, in Scotland, this issue is not as serious 
as in other jurisdictions (see Frederickson 1999, 2005; Genders 2002) as indicated 
by the positive reports from a range of inspection agencies.  One of the contributing 
factors that protects the SPS from ethical issues is the fact that it has developed a 
number of internal accountability mechanisms (such as transparency policy and 
Prisoner Survey) and also utilised its resources, especially staff and technology 
(website), to communicate with prisoners who are its primary clients.  Based on my 
findings from Scotland’s experience, therefore, I wish to argue that the NPM itself 








8.1 Summary of the research 
This research builds on the pilot project that was carried out in late 2005 and early 
2006.  The main aims of the pilot project were to explore prison management and 
prison privatisation issues in England and Scotland, and to help identify the research 
that was needed in this area.  I was particularly interested in the relation between 
prison management and the reform of public sector in the UK. However, when 
looking at the published literature, previous studies in this area were very limited.  
My primary question at the start of this study was how much the prison service, as an 
agency in the public sector, has been affected by managerialism since the late 1980s.  
The main goal of this research is to demonstrate how prison management in the last 
two decades has been influenced by the so-called new public management (NPM). 
 
As presented in Chapter I, my journey began with the exploration of the current 
condition of prison service organisation.  The Scottish Prison Service (SPS) was used 
as a case study for this research.  Its penal policy, vision and mission, organisational 
structure and relevant management issues were examined.  This was aimed at 
describing the anatomy of the 21
st
 century prison service before exploring the history 
of Scottish prison management.   
 
In Chapter 2, the literature on NPM and prison management were reviewed.  
Available evidence suggests that prisons have unfortunately been left out of the 
discussion of NPM until very recently
66
.  Most of the NPM literature focuses on the 
reform of education and health care.  In this chapter, I discussed and quoted at length 
from Christopher Hood’s (1991) work, A Public Management for All Seasons? This 
is because his work gave rise to the term new public management and informed 
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 Subsequent to the present research, Alison Liebling, Ben Crewe, Susie Hulley and Clare Mclean’s 
current research on Values, practices and outcomes in public and private sector corrections, funded 
by Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and started from 2007 to 2009, deals substantially 
with prison development in terms of values and practices in relations to the evaluation of prison 





debate in this area.  Hood’s (1991) article was used in this research as a framework 
for exploring the significance of NPM and its influence on the management of public 
services in the UK. 
 
After contextualising the relation between NPM and prison management and with the 
intention of filling this gap in knowledge, Chapter 3 outlines three principal research 
questions: (1) to what extent has managerialism had an influence on prison 
management?; (2) what does managerialism in the SPS look like?; and (3) how has 
the SPS approached ‘New Public Management’ (NPM)?  These questions aim to 
describe and understand the influence of NPM on prison management in Scotland 
and also to examine the response of SPS to this new approach.    
 
The methodology used in the present study was explained in Chapter 3.  Given the 
nature of the research questions and objectives, a deductive approach was employed 
as the principal means of finding answers to those questions.  Previous proposals and 
arguments (i.e. Harding 1997; Hood 1991; Liebling 2004; Walsh, 1995) were tested 
against the empirical evidence from the SPS case.  The rationale behind the selection 
of the SPS as a case study was mainly the ease of access and its manageable scale.  
As a staff member of the Department of Corrections of Thailand, I had known some 
SPS staff personally for some time prior to the commencement of this study research.  
This connection helped during the data collection process.  Moreover, during the past 
two decades, the SPS has changed dramatically in terms of the management of its 
prisons.  For instance, between the end of 1980s and the early 1990s, many 
significant prison policies were launched to reform its prison management.  In the 
late 1990s, the first private prison in Scotland was established to create some 
competition in the management of prisons in Scotland.  Scottish devolution also 
affected the SPS in terms of its political and public accountability.  All these 
significant changes made the SPS an interesting choice for study. 
 
Documentary research and individual semi-structured interviews were the key 
methods for data collection.  In addition to academic literature, secondary data were 





primary data for this research were collected from the semi-structured interviews.  
The interview questions were drafted as a guide but were used very flexibly.  At the 
pre-test stage, I asked Dr. Jim Carnie, Research Manager of the SPS, to look at each 
item and comment on its validity.  The interviewees were selected from three 
professional groups − (1) policy makers, (2) civil servants, and (3) academics and 
outsiders, all of whom needed to have knowledge of the SPS.  Out of 38 invitations, 
21 persons agreed to be interviewed.  Each interview lasted approximately one hour.  
Data analysis in this research was similar to other qualitative research, such as 
Gulland (2007), which was based on identifying themes and categorising patterns of 
data collected from interviews and literature reviews.  The interview data were 
transcribed selectively.  Only relevant data were used in the analysis. 
 
In general, this research attempts to explore the relationship between prison 
management and NPM (or managerialism).  Throughout the study I demonstrate how 
the former has been influenced by the latter.  At the macro level, prison policies and 
discourses were examined.  At the same time, at the micro level I examined the 
market mechanisms and the ‘business-like approach’ used in the delivery of prison 
services.  The findings are summarised below.     
 
8.2 The influence of managerialism on prison management 
Based on the analysis of relevant documents and the interview material, I have come 
to the point of being able to address the answers to my research questions.  As for the 
extent which NPM has influenced prison management in Scotland which is the first 
question for this research, I conclude that the NPM scheme has had an impact on the 
SPS in two significant dimensions: prison policy discourses and operational 
management.  The influence of NPM on the former is demonstrated in Chapter 4 
where I argue that the focus of prison management has moved beyond the traditional 
purposes of prison to embrace specifically managerial aims.  The influence of NPM 
on the latter is shown in Chapter 5 and 6 where I reveal the use of a ‘business-like 
approach’ to running Scottish prisons, in particular decentralisation, contractual 
management and a focus on customers.  These market mechanisms are not a 





have developed gradually from the early 1990s to the present.   Nevertheless, they 
arose and were applied in the specific circumstances then prevailing in the Scottish 
prisons, to which they were seen at the time by the key actors as a valid response. 
Like all instances of policy transfer, they have ‘naturalized’ with the local conditions 
(Newburn and Jones 2004), producing a Scottish outcome with some distinctive 
features. These developments must also be interpreted in light of particular political 
circumstances, such as the advent of devolution. 
 
For the second and third question, ‘what does the development of managerialism in 
the SPS looks like?’ and ‘how has the SPS approached NPM?, the evidence suggests 
that the SPS, like other public services, has adopted NPM without incurring any 
significant resistance from management or staff.  Despite the rough start in the late 
1980s and 1990s, when the SPS faced a number of serious hostage-taking incidents 
and struggled to find a new set of prison policies, the development of managerialism 
in the SPS has been relatively peaceful and continuous, resulting in the extensive use 
of managerial mechanisms in prison management, in particular the adoption of 
contracting to establish Service Agreements (SAs) for public prisons.   
 
8.2.1 Discourse dimension 
The ‘discourse matrix’ presented in Chapter 4 confirms my argument that prison 
policy in Scotland has moved in the direction of managerialism.  The growing 
influence of NPM can be seen in SPS policy papers and annual reports.  The ‘end 
discourse’, which asks what prisons are for, has expanded from emphasising control, 
normalisation, and rehabilitation, which were presented in Custody and Care, 
Assessment and Control and Opportunity and Responsibility, to embrace managerial 
ends like excellence, efficiency and value for money, as shown in Vision for 
Correctional Excellence, Estate Review and SPS Service Agreements.  On the other 
hand, the ‘means discourse’, which asks how prisons should be managed, has shifted 
from a traditional bureaucratic approach to the use of ‘business-like’ approaches, e.g. 
contracting out and customer orientation, for managing Scottish prisons.  This 





pressures including prison order problems, overcrowding, ‘slopping out’, political 
pressures and public scrutiny.   
 
The development of prison discourses, however, is not a linear one.  Although 
managerialist ideology dominates both ‘ends discourses’ and ‘means discourses’, I 
argue that the original, traditional ends and means have not totally disappeared.  The 
publication of Health Care Standards, Suicide Risk Management and Inclusion 
Policy maintain the focus on control and normalisation by using a combination of 
bureaucratic and managerialist approaches.  This demonstrates that the use of a 
‘business-like’ approach does not entirely replace traditional concerns.  This might 
be simply because the SPS is still a public organisation with a long history of public 
sector management.  Its bureaucratic values and culture are deeply rooted not only in 
the organisation but also in the staff who manage the system.   
 
Another point that I wish to highlight is the fact that the lines between ‘end 
discourses’ and ‘means discourses’ have become blurred during the NPM era.  This 
is because both focus on managerialism.  The ‘end discourse’ language in Vision for 
Correctional Excellence, as presented in Chapter 4, emphasises the significance of 
excellence in prison business as a goal of the SPS.  The means to achieve this goal, 
as the Vision suggests, resemble the private sector’s approach.  This is an example of 
how managerialism has influenced ‘end discourse’ as well as ‘means discourse’ and 
blends the two together.   
 
8.2.2 Operational dimension 
The change in prison discourses as a result of NPM led to experiments with 
‘business-like approaches to the management of prisons.  A significant milestone 
was the establishment of Kilmarnock, the first private prison in Scotland, in the late 
1990s.  The rationale behind this development was, I argue, that the means for 
achieving what prison is for are no longer restricted to a bureaucratic way of doing 
things.  Rather, with the impact of NPM, the prison service has been exposed to a 







The market mechanisms discussed in this research − devolved control, contractual 
management and the focus on customers − are evidence to support my argument that 
the SPS has been keen to use a business-like approach in the management of prisons 
during the last twenty years.  I also wish to argue that this development does not stop 
here.  Although the SNP Government is clearly opposed to private prisons, its policy 
on the management of the Scottish prison system is still likely to employ one of those 
‘business-like’ techniques as suggested in the SPS’s recent framework document.   
 
8.3 The importance of ethics and accountability 
In Chapter 7, I argue that, when the SPS decided to embrace business-like 
mechanisms for the management of its prisons, this inevitably led to closer scrutiny 
and more accountability measures in addition to those which had been developed 
when it was a traditional public service organisation.  These accountability 
mechanisms are intended to promote good governance of the SPS.  In this research I 
focused on three key administrative mechanisms − Her Majesty Inspectorate of 
Prisons for Scotland, Scottish Prisons Complaints Commission and Scottish Public 
Services Ombudsman.   
 
These mechanisms, I argue, are vital aspects of prison management in the NPM era 
as their common goal is to ensure that the SPS delivers its services in an optimal 
manner.  The SPS can benefit from these mechanisms in that their guidance and 
feedback can help improve quality of service.  Accountability mechanisms assure the 
public that the service provides ‘value for money’ and safeguards them from 
malpractice by the SPS that, at the end of the day, promotes public safety.  The 
implication of my argument is that NPM has contributed to the improvement of the 
public services not only from an economic perspective but also through its ethical 
stance.  The accountability measures that have been put in place reflect the attempt to 







The claim that private prisons are less accountable than public prisons is not borne 
out in this research.  I argue that private prisons in Scotland are equally accountable, 
and definitely not less accountable, than their public counterparts.  When the SNP 
won the general election in 2007 and formed a minority Government, penal policy 
towards private prisons shifted dramatically and put private prisons under much 
closer scrutiny.  Private prisons are also informally monitored by the media and the 
public.  Once there is an escape, suicide or misconduct in private prisons, it 
invariably catches the attention of the media.  A news report of this type often 
emphasises the location of the incident by highlighting the term ‘private’ instead of 
simply mentioning the prison.  These formal and informal accountability 
mechanisms are evidence to support my argument which is detailed in Chapter 7.     
 
8.4 Overall performance  
In general, it is fair to conclude that the ‘quality’ of prison services in Scotland 
during the past twenty years has improved.  Such problems as ‘slopping-out’, safety 
and order, limited access to rehabilitative programmes and healthcare service and 
overcrowding have been professionally dealt with.  As presented in Chapter 6 and 
Chapter 7, the reports of HMIP during the past twenty years recognise the 
development of prison estates, prisoners’ living conditions, prisoner treatment and 
even the use of business-like approach for management of public prisons.  Although 
the reports of the Chief Inspectorate suggest that the SPS’s response to his 
recommendations was at ‘satisfactory’ level, the standard of service is still a concern 
for HMIP.   The classic issues of SPS such as accommodation spaces, access to some 
programmes and drug problems are still under scrutiny. 
 
Beside the use of prisoner survey as a tool to evaluate the ‘quality’ of the services (as 
presented in Chapter 5), prison complaints can also reflect the SPS’s performance.  
At the face value, the higher the number of prisoners’ complaints, the more likely 
that the services provided are unsatisfied.  With reference to the latest statistics on 
prisoners’ complaints presented in Chapter 7, Chart 8.1 was drawn to highlight 
changes in the number of prison complaints over time.  From 1995 to 2008 witnessed 





When the number of prisoners reached its peak in 2006, the number of complaints 
also went up to the highest point ever.  The good sign, however, is the reduction of 
prison complaints since 2006.  From a peak of 460 complaints in 2006, the number 
of complaints fell to 403 in 2007 and 324 in 2008.  As for the complaints within 
jurisdiction, the number of complaints likewise3 went down significantly from 363 
in 2006 to 298 in 2007 and 228 in 2008.  Based on the aforementioned assumption, 
and in the absence of any evidence to suppose that complaining has become more 
difficult, this chart implies that the reduction in prisoners’ complaints tends to 




















































Figure 8.1: The Number of Prison Complaints from 1995-2008 
Source: HM Inspectorate of Prisons for Scotland (2006, 2008) 
 
The SPS’s performance in managing prison safety and order as well as prisoner 
treatment can also be viewed through the number of prison suicides over time.  Bird 
(2008) studied the change in male prisoners’ suicides from 1994 to 2003 and the 
findings indicate that the total number of suicides decreased over time.  Despite the 
decline in the overall number of suicides, Table 8.1 shows that the number of 
suicides in the 15-24 age group increased at a higher rate than in other groups.  Bird 
(ibid.) suggests that ‘their vulnerability was addressed by the Scottish Prison 
Service’s changes in how addictions and the identifying of suicide risk are dealt with 





induction and their lack of activities or occupation on remand’ (2008: 448).  I wish to 
point out that the data for this study were collected before the review of ACT&Care 
in 2005 which changed the way in which suicide risks were identified in prison (as 
mentioned in Chapter 4).  Future studies might need to investigate how the new 
policy, ACT2Care which replaced ACT&Care, has affected prison suicides and 













15–24 15 19 17 21 





35–44 4 9 2 6 
45+ 2 6 6 7 
Total for all 
ages 
33 57 33 51 
a. Status undetermined for one prisoner, eight known to be convicted 
 
Table 8.1: The Number of Prison Suicides from 1994-2003 
Source: Bird (2008) 
 
Last but not least, the quality of prison safety and order, which are the key thrusts of 
the prison service, are reflected by the number escapes, serious assaults on staff and 
serious assaults on prisoners.  Again, as a rule of thumb, we might take a higher the 
number of escapes and serious assaults to signify lower effectiveness in respect of 
prison custody and order.  The analysis of the data from the Annual Reports and 
Accounts of the SPS for 2007-2008 reveals the relatively positive outputs of the 
prison service (Figure 8.2).  In terms of escapes, the number reached its peak in the 
year 1999-2000 when there were a total of 23 escapes across the jurisdiction.  After 
that, the number was relatively stable over time with no escape in the most recent 
years.  For serious assaults on staff, the number has gone up and down.  The worst 
situations were in 1999-2000 and 2002-2003 when the number of assaults went up to 
25 and 29 respectively.  On the other hand, serious assaults on prisoners seem to 
have decreased over time.  The highest number was in 1999-2000 when there were 





The number of cases dropped to 68 in 2007-2008.  In conclusion, the general trend of 
these safety and order indicators is to decrease-that is to say, an improvement-over 
time.  Although there are issues that needed to be dealt with individually, the 
statistics imply that the SPS’s attempts to enhance security and safety while 
promoting prisoners’ access to treatment and programmes have met with some 














































Serious Assaults on Staff
Serious Assaults on Prisoners  
 
Figure 8.2: The Number of Escapes, Serious Assaults on Staff and  
Serious Assaults on Prisoners from 1997-1998 to 2007-2008 
Source: Scottish Prison Service (2002b, 2006a, 2008a) 
 
8.5 Contribution made by this research 
What the present research adds to existing knowledge in the field is that it provides 
empirical evidence of the influence of NPM on prison management over the past 
twenty years.  As mentioned in Chapter 2, there have been a relatively limited 
number of studies on how prison management has been changed as a result of the 
introduction of NPM.  Most of previous studies have tended to discuss the 
experience of health and education.  The present research partly shares the same 
interest with Liebling’s (2004) book Prison and their Moral Performance: A Study of 
Values, Quality, and Prison Life in that both touch on the significance of 





changing values of prison staff and prisoners during a period of rapid modernisation, 
this study set out to examine changing policy discourses and management 
mechanisms.   
 
In Chapter 4, I argue that prison policy discourses in the last two decades have 
changed and have adopted a managerialist ideology rather than the traditional penal 
ideologies.  A ‘discourse matrix’ was developed from the original model proposed by 
Adler and Longhurst (1994).  It can be used as a framework to examine prison policy 
in other jurisdictions or indeed across the public services more broadly.  In this 
research it demonstrates the influence of managerialist ideology on prison policy in 
Scotland especially after devolution.  Drawing on the language used in policy papers, 
annual reports and the interviews with policy makers, terms such as efficiency, 
effectiveness, and value for money tend to have been put in the spotlight while 
rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation seem to have faded away.  This finding 
confirms Liebling’s (2004:23) view that: 
 
Critics argued throughout the 1990s that managerialism was 
displacing older normative concerns and ideals in criminal justice and 
in prisons in particular.  It represented a departure from an ‘old way of 
life’: the welfare state compromise between capitalism (the free 
market) and socialism (public provision through the state), the 
ameliorative aspirations of many public institutions, including the 
prison and an ethos of ‘public service’.   
 
The use of market mechanisms in prison management in Chapter 5 is the main 
contribution of this research.  It builds on Kieron Walsh’s (1995) exploration of the 
use of business-like tools in the public sector during the 1980s and early 1990s.  
Previous literature has never really looked at the use of market mechanisms in prison 
practice.  Most of the literature has overstated the privatisation of prisons which, I 
argue, is only one piece in a large jigsaw puzzle.  I have demonstrated and discussed 
at length the ways in which competition, contracting, decentralisation, and customer-
oriented policy were introduced into the management of Scottish prisons without any 
significant resistance from management and staff.  This, I argue, implies a positive 
response on the part of SPS towards the managerialist route which has dominated the 





8.6 Future study 
My main focus has been on the influence of managerialism at the organisational 
level.  Data were collected from the interviews with the Chief Executive, senior 
directors and prison governors who were directly involved in the policy making 
process.  Unfortunately, feedback from prison staff in local establishments was not 
included in this study.  It is likely, I assume, that these staff have been affected by the 
whole managerialist reform as much as the organisation as such.  Prison officers as 
service operators are now being monitored closely and their performances are being 
measured.  Moreover, their daily regimes have to conform to the contract which their 
governor signs with Headquarters.  It would therefore be interesting for a future 
study to investigate the influence of managerialism on operational prison staff.  
 
The present research focuses on how prison management in Scotland developed from 
the late 1980s to 2007.  However, since my data collection process finished, there 
have been significant developments in prison policy in Scotland.  These policies 
were either introduced after I finished data-collection or fell beyond the immediate 
scope of this research in terms of topic.  Among the most significant were the 
creation of Community Justice Authorities (CJAs) under the National Strategy for 
the Management of Offenders (NSMO) which came into force in March 2006
67
 and 
the establishment of Scottish Prisons Commission (PC) which was established in 
September 2007 and produced its report − Scotland’s Choice − on July 1, 2008 
containing 23 recommendations
 68
.  Given time limitations, it was not possible for the 
present research to include the influence of these developments on the SPS.  Future 
research may wish to explore the effects that they have had on the SPS, especially in 
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 The NSMO is reviewed every 3 years.  The first strategy covered 2006-2008 and the present three-
year strategy covers 2008-2011. 
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 See Scotland’s Choice, Report of the Scottish Prison Commission, July 2008.  The 
recommendations cover variety of areas concerning the use of imprisonment in Scotland.  For 
instance, imprisonment should be reserved for ‘serious’ offenders; ‘paying back in the community’ 
should be used with ‘less serious’ offenders; the government should extend ‘the types and availability 
of effective alternatives to prosecution’; the government should establish National Sentencing Council 
(NSC) to develop clear sentencing guidelines; the National Community Justice Council (NCJC) 
should be established to lead a new Community Supervision Sentence; the Community Supervision 
Sentence should be used instead of 6 month or less imprisonment sentence; the Open Prison Estate 
should be used to prepare and train prisoners before release-not to ease prison overcrowding; and the 
government should pursue a target of reducing the prison population to an average daily population of 





terms of prison policy, as the SPS is now facing a new challenge of prison 
management as a result of Scotland’s Choice report which clearly recommends what 
prison is for and how it should be run in the 21
st
 century.  According to Armstrong 
and McNeill (2009)’s work, it examinees and takes into account a connection 
between penal policy, prison populations and national well-being considers, a 
separation between questions about the purpose of punishment and questions of the 
capabilities of prisons and the role of the criminal justice system and the number of 
prison populations. It also encourages informed debates about a complicated topic 
which would result in a plan of action for the key parties involved.  This 
development implies that the interaction between the influence of NPM and the 
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I am writing to ask whether you would agree to be interviewed for a study I am 
conducting as part of my PhD degree in the School of Law at the University of 
Edinburgh under the supervision of Professor Richard Sparks and Professor Michael 
Adler.  I would like to provide you with more information about this research and 
what your involvement would entail if you decide to take part. 
 
In the course of experience working as a civil servant in the Department of 
Corrections of Thailand, I was keen to further my knowledge of prisons.  Therefore, 
when granted a scholarship by the Royal Thai Government to study in the UK, I 
decided to focus my study on its prison systems.  Scotland was selected as the site of 
this research because I am a student at the University of Edinburgh.  Apart from 
reasons of convenience, I chose to study the Scottish Prison Service (SPS) because of 
its reputation in prison management, its size that fits with the time constraints of this 
research, and its positive connection with the Department of Corrections of Thailand.   
 
Over the past twenty years, the SPS has undergone many significant events and 
changes.  It is my aim to describe and explain how those events have affected SPS 
and how SPS has adapted itself in terms of management style.  I believe that because 
you have been actively involved in the management and operation of SPS, you are 
well placed to speak with respect to various issues, such as prison policy, key actors 
in the management of SPS during the past twenty years, and the driving and 





Should you agree to take part, I would like to conduct an interview of approximately 
one hour in length to take place in a mutually agreed location.  With your permission, 
the interview will be audio recorded to facilitate the collection of information, and 
later transcribed for analysis.  A copy of the transcription will be sent to you upon 
request.  All information you provide is considered completely confidential.  Your 
name will appear in my thesis and/or publications to come as a result of this research 
only with your expressed consent.  Data collected during this study will be retained 
for approximately a year in a locked office at my residence. Only persons directly 
involved with this research will have access.  I would like to assure you that this 
research has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the Research 
Office, School of Law at University of Edinburgh.  There are no known or 
anticipated risks to you as a participant in this study. 
 
I am hoping to conduct approximately 20 interviews and would like to have them 
completed by summer 2007.  Therefore, I was wondering if you could let me 
know the date, time, and location that would be convenient for you. 
 
If you have any questions regarding this study, or would like additional information 
to assist you in reaching a decision about participation, please contact me at: 
 
My contact address: Mr. Assanee  Sangkhanate 
35/14  Leith Street 
Edinburgh  EH1 3AT 
Tel. 07876595977 
Email: s0460232@sms.ed.ac.uk / assanee45@yahoo.com 
 
You can also contact my supervisors, Professor Richard Sparks at (0)131-650-2059 
or by email at r.sparks@ed.ac.uk and Professor Michael Adler at (0)131-650-3931 or 
by email at michael.adler@ed.ac.uk.   
 
I hope that the results of my study will be of benefit to prison administrators and staff 
of SPS and of other jurisdictions who will be able to learn from Scotland’s 
experience, administrators from other public agencies who are managing change in 
their organizations, and a broader research community.  
 
I very much look forward to speaking with you and thank you in advance for your 



















Over the past 20 years, Scottish Prison Service has encountered several 
challenges (i.e. riots in late 1980s, emergence of private prison, and the 
devolution).  How do these factors affect the prison service?  
2 What impacts these challenges have in term of management style? 
3 
Has prison management/policy changed as of or prior to these 
challenges? 
4 
As a policy maker/board member/civil servant, how do you proactively 
deal with these challenges?  What are the consequences? 
5 
As a policy maker/board member/civil servant, how do you manage to 
work with policy maker/board member/civil servant in order to help 
develop the service under these challenges? 
6 
Who are/were key actors in helping develop the prison service in 
Scotland?  What are/were their inputs? 
7 
What are significant pressures for change in prison service in Scotland?  
Why? 
8 What are restraining factors for the change?  
9 Have you witnessed any resistance or support for change? 
10 
Has the prison privatization scheme affected the prison service in 
Scotland? Why/Why not?  How?  
11 Can private prison be viewed as a pressure for change? 
12 
Is there any lesson learned from the private company in term of prison 
management? 
13 
How do you perceive the role of politics/politicians in prison service in 
Scotland? 
14 
How politicians help develop prison service in Scotland? What are 
significant evidences? 
15 To the best of your knowledge, how the devolution affect prison service? 
16 
How prison service looks like before and after the devolution? Any 
significant changes i.e. penal policy, organization structure, and 
management style? Do these changes result from the devolution or 
something else?  
17 
As a policy maker/board member/civil servant, has your job changed as 
of the devolution?  
18 
To the best of your knowledge, what are the similarity and the difference 
between Scotland and other jurisdictions in term of challenges?   
19 Has SPS coped with challenges the same way as other jurisdictions did? 







Generally speaking, privatization is more famous in England than in 
Scotland.  However, for prison system, it seems that private prison in 
Scotland is more favoured than those in England.  Why is that? 
22 
To the best of your knowledge, what are the similarity and the difference 
between SPS and other public agencies in Scotland in term of 
challenges?   
23 Has SPS coped with challenges the same way as other agencies did? 
24 Is there any lesson learned from other public agencies? 
25 
Is the development of prison management from the 1980s to present a 
continual one?  How do you perceive it? 
26 How do you perceived the current performance-based practice in SPS?   
27 How does the performance-based practice affect you and your job? 
28 How do you deal with this performance-based practice? 
29 
How do you perceived the current prison service in term of management 
style? 
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14 Parry, Richard Academic, University of 
Edinburgh 
1983-present (date of 
interview) 
15 Russell, Peter Former Director of Human 
Resources, SPS 
1998-2002 
16 Spencer, Alec Director of Rehabilitation and 
Care, SPS  
 
Former Governor of Dungavel, 
Peterhead, Edinburgh and 
Glenochil 
2001-2006 
17 Sweeney, Rona Assistant Governor/Governor-in-
Charge (Peterhead unit, HMI 
Longriggend and HMP Shotts) 
1987-present (date of 
interview) 
18 Tombs, Jacqueline Professor of Criminology, 
University of Stirling 
At present (date of 
interview) 
19 Withers, Peter Governor Grade Career 
 












20 SPS Director* SPS Director - 
21 Senior Management of 
HMP Kilmarnock * 
Senior Management of HMP 
Kilmarnock 
- 











GENERAL PRINCIPLES 1.1 Introduction  
1.2 Enabling Legislation  
1.3 Other Legislation 1.4 Escort Monitor  
1.5 Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons for 
Scotland  
1.6 Government Policy  
1.7 Prisoner Escort Documentation  
2. PRISONER ESCORTING AND COURT 
CUSTODY MANAGEMENT 
2.1 Custody, Care and Effectiveness  
2.2 Routine Operational Communications  
2.3 Personal Responsibility of Staff  
2.4 Strategic Planning  
2.5 Health & Safety and Hygiene  
2.6 Fire Precautions  
2.7 Environmental Health Regulations 
3. THE PRISONER – GENERAL PRINCIPLES 3.1 Rights of Prisoners  
3.2 Range of Possible Classes of People in 
Custody 3.3 Confinement and Allocation of 
Prisoners  
3.4 Extreme Security Escorts (formerly Category 
‘A’ Prisoners) 
3.5 Prisoner Policies and Strategies  
3.6 Scottish Prisons Complaints Commission  
3.7 Prisoners’ Request and Grievance 
Procedures 
4. STAFF MATTERS AND CERTIFICATION 
OF PCOs 
4.1 Staff Identification and Uniform  
4.2 Staff Complement  
4.3 Staff Selection and Recruitment  
4.3.2 Personnel  
4.3.3 Sub-Contracted Staff  
4.3.4 Security Vetting and Approval of Staff 
4.5 Certification of PCOs  
4.6 Withdrawal of Certificate  
4.7 Control and Restraint (C & R) Techniques 
Training  
4.8 Other Areas of Operational Expertise  
4.9 Specialists and Support Staff 
4.10 Management Training 
4.11 Incident Command Training  
4.12 Health & Safety Training  
4.13 Fire Safety and Evacuation Training  
4.14 First Aid Training 16  
4.15 Changes to Staff Policy and Procedures 
5. PRISONER ESCORT AND COURT 
CUSTODY TASK 
5.1 General  
5.2 Court Escorts and Custody Tasks 5.3 Escort 
of Persons from Police Custody Units to Courts 
5.4 Escort of Prisoners from One Court to 5.5 






Custody 5.6 Escort of Prisoners to and from 
Prison, Young Offenders Institution (YOI), and / 
or Hospital 5.7 Managing Business in the 
Criminal Courts 5.8 Management of Court 
Custody  
5.9 Bail and Discharge Arrangements  
5.10 Police Transfer Escorts  
5.10.1 Scottish Inter Police Force Transfers  
5.10.2 Extract Warrants  
5.10.3 Inter-Police Force Transfers from Outwith 
Scotland 
5.11 Hospital Orders, Criminal Procedure 
(Scotland) Act 1995  
5.12 Non-Core Services  
5.13 Children’s’ Hearings  
5.14 Committal of Children Appearing in Court  
5.15 Funeral Escorts   
5.16 Police Enquires   
5.17 Immigration Appeals  
5.18 Deportation  
5.19 Inter-Jurisdictional Transfer 5.20 Inter-
Prison Transfers  
5.21 Inter-Prison Visits  
5.22 Marriage Escorts  
5.23 Transfer to and from Hospital (subject to 
Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 to be 
repealed and replaced by the Mental Health 
(Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003)  
5.24 Hospital and/or Other Medical 
Appointments  
5.25 Hospital Supervision and Confinement, 
Including Maternity and Mother with Baby 
Escorts  
5.26 Social Security Tribunal  
5.27 Special Escorted Leave and/or Escorted 
Exceptional Day Absence  
5.28 Community Placements Escorts  
5.29 Home Leave Escorts  
5.30 Transfer of Responsibilities  
5.31 System Reviews 
6. ADMISSION, INDUCTION AND RELEASE 6.1 Prisoner Admission and Court Custody  
6.2 Admission Process 
6.3 Suicide Risk Management  
6.4 Cell Allocation  
6.5 Prisoner Correspondence  
6.6 Challenge by Prisoner  
6.7 Prisoner Release 
7. CARE AND SERVICES FOR STAFF AND 
PRISONERS 
7.1 Management of Court Facilities  
7.2 Responsibilities for Court Facilities  
7.3 Access to Manuals, Records and Documents 
7.4 Vandalism  
7.5 Toilet and Sanitation Facilities  
7.6 Drinking Water  
7.7 Inspection and Security Risk Assessment  






Medication and Infection Control  
7.8.2 Qualifications of Health Care Staff  
7.8.3 Medical Records  
7.8.4 Access to Own Doctor  
7.8.5 Health Issues 35  
7.8.6 Medical Services Cost  
7.9 Compilation of Statistics and Annual Report 
7.10 Prisoner Clothing 
7.11 Food Services  
7.12 Court Based Social Work and Mental 
Health Services 
8. SECURITY: PASSIVE AND DYNAMIC 8.1 Security Reviews: Scotland  
8.2 Prisoner Accommodation  
8.3 Official Visits to Prisoners  
8.4 Discipline  
8.5 Searching  
8.6 Physical Restraint  
8.7 Incident Reporting & Management  
8.8 Contingency Planning  
8.9 Security Intelligence (General)  
8.10 Control of Drugs and Unauthorised Articles  
8.11 Control of Equipment, Tools and Stores 
9. VEHICLES 9.1 Vehicles 
10. TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 10.1 Phasing In Services  
10.2 Authority Support During Service 
Implementation  
10.3 Plans, Policies and Procedures  
10.4 Implementation Contact and Liaison  







RESULTS OF ‘PECCS’ REVIEW 
 
Review Agendas Comments 
Value for Money and 
Effective Use of 
Resources 
 
The major business benefit envisaged for the project was more efficient 
service delivery through more effective use of resources. 
In line with projections the implementation of the PECCS contract freed 
up at least200 police from court duties and an estimated further 100 from 
escorting duties. In all, around 300 police officers were redeployed to 
front line duties across Scotland’s eight forces. In addition stakeholders 
report some additional efficiency in their backroom co-ordinating 
functions. 
 
Within prisons the number of prison officers released from escort duties 
was around 200 many of which were given up as efficiency savings or to 
allow reinvestment for improvements to services. 
 
The main benefit to prisons was the increased stability and consistency of 
delivery of regimes. In local prisons escort variability had frequently 
resulted in the restriction of regime activity. The new contract allowed for 
improved delivery of constructive activity for prisoners. 
 
The Police and SPS further report that they have reduced the costs 
associated with maintaining the vehicle infrastructure necessary to deliver 





The 33 performance measures in the contract set out a minimum standard 
to be achieved against each one. This standard increases during the life of 
the contract. RCS have matched or exceeded the required standards in all 
but a few months. This despite a 15% increase in the volumes of escort 
transactions, with peaks at times when the volumes have been 40% more 
that the contract initially envisaged.  
 
Escort volumes have increased in line with the general increase in the 
prison population, which over the same period, has continued to rise 
dramatically.   Performance for the year to date stands at around 90% ‘on 
time deliveries’ with an average of 15,594 escort movements per month.  
 
So the contract is delivering improvements in performance despite 
significantly higher transaction volumes.  
 
In addition the delivery of prisoner escort services by a single contractor 
has improved accountability and removed duplication of effort between 
agencies. Feedback from partners has confirmed that the introduction of 
the contract has rationalised the service at a national level. Not only has 
this resulted in savings, attributable to former backroom personnel but it 
has clarified reporting lines and promoted an improvement culture. 
Better Management 
Information 
The Auditor General’s Report of September 2004 commented that there 
was no accurate pre-tender data available. This is now no longer the case 
with RCS maintaining databases covering a wide range of information 
previously unavailable. This means better strategic decision making is 
possible. The SPS also maintains records in relation to key contract 
performance data. Performance data is shared with partners at the Multi-





Review Agendas Comments 
contract is published on the SPS website for increased transparency.  
This includes statistics on RCS performance across 33 performance 
measures, which includes a Release in Error statistic which was not 
previously systematically recorded. 
Multi Agency Working The Multi-Agency Liaison Group (MALG) was formed in November 
2005 by the SPS. The MALG comprises of representatives of the key 
stakeholders and provides a multi-agency vehicle for: Monitoring 
performance; Joint problem solving; Review of incidents; and Advising 
the contractual authority on new requirements.  
 
The PECCS contract has shown that complex multi-agency contracts can 
be delivered and has promoted consultation and information sharing 
between all partners, in setting up and in the subsequent management of 
the contract.  
 
Joint working has been further developed by the development of a multi-
agency approach to contract monitoring. The police currently have a 
second opportunity as part of the Contract Monitoring Team. 
Best Value Since April 2002 there has been a duty of Best Value placed on 
Accountable Officers. The SPS believes that the PECCS contract reflects 
the principles of ‘best value’ both in development and subsequent 
deployment. 
  
Previous sections have outlined benefits around economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness and the benefits realised in the delivery of the contract The 
tendering process has assured VFM by ensuring that an experienced 
provider presenting the best service solution at the best price had been 
selected. 
  
The structure of the contract and the performance management process 
are also designed to secure continuous improvement on the life of the 
contract. Improved management information allows for better:  
 
Alignment of service to business strategy;  
 
Joint working to ensure continued service satisfaction; and  
 
More sustainable service with a contract that can adapt to changes in 
demands from partners.  
 
So the SPS are satisfied that feedback to date suggests that the PECCS 
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Aims • to assist the effective management of prisoners and; 
• to provide for public safety;  
• to provide for the operational needs of SPS;  
• to facilitate progression towards release;  
• to be fair and transparent; and 
• to allow the appropriate allocation of resources. 
Key Elements 1. THE ASSESSMENT RULE 
Each prisoner will be assigned to one of three Supervision Levels:  
High Supervision: an individual, for whom all activities and movements 
require to be authorised, supervised and monitored by prison staff.  
Medium Supervision: an individual for whom activities and movements are 
subject to locally specified limited supervision and restrictions.  
Low Supervision: an individual for whom activities and movements, 
specified locally, are subject to minimum supervision and restrictions [and 
could include licence conditions and unsupervised activities in the 
community].  
Assessment Criteria 
The Supervision Level allocated is determined by assessment of the 
individual’s circumstances against ten criteria
69
.  
                                                 
69
 Ten criteria are: (1) Within 12 months of commencing a sentence of 4 years or over for serious 
violence (including murder and sexual offences) or drug related offences?; (2)Previous history of 
serious violent offending within past 3 years?; (3) Means and willingness to escape now or on 
admission have a history of such behaviour?; (4) Means and willingness to organise serious 
indiscipline, (including drug dealing)?; (5) Previous involvement in violence or fear-inducing 
behaviour (in prison) within the last year?; (6) Current substance abuse?; (7) Significant psychiatric / 
psychological history within the past year?; (8) Serious outstanding charges?; (9) Impulsive behaviour 










 2.  THE MANAGEMENT RULE 
Long Term Prisoners 
Defines the minimum period of their sentence that each prisoner must serve 
in a secure establishment before having supervised or unsupervised access to 
the community or commencing a preparation for release programme. In the 
case of determinate sentence prisoners they will be eligible to be considered 
for national ‘top-end’ when they are within 2 years of their Parole 
Qualifying Date (PQD). Life sentence prisoners must have no more than 3 
years to serve before the expiry of the ‘punishment part’ of their sentence to 
be eligible to be considered for inclusion in the Special Escorted Leave 
Scheme (SEL) from ‘top-ends’.  
Short Term Prisoners 
The sentence management procedures do not, at present, apply to short-term 
prisoners. Their management, and access to opportunities, is dependant on 
the Assessment and Management Rules that comprise the Prisoner 
Supervision Level System. The principle purpose of open prisons is to 
prepare individuals for release, which leads to the conclusion those serving 
very short sentences would neither require nor benefit from open prison 
regimes. Hence only those serving a sentence of 18 months and over will be 
eligible for consideration to be transferred to these establishments.  
 3. INTEGRATION WITH SENTENCE MANAGEMENT 
The process for assessing a prisoner’s required level of supervision is risk 
assessment. The majority of risk factors to be considered for supervision 
levels already form part of the Needs and Risk Assessment process for 
Sentence Management It is therefore logical that the supervision and needs 
assessment should be part of the recognised structured Sentence 
Management process.  
 
Escort Arrangements  
Future escorting arrangements will be broadly similar to those that currently 
apply to individual prisoners. Allocation to a level of escort security will be 
dependent on the outcome of assessment of the risk presented by the 
prisoner when outwith the establishment. The individual prisoner’s escort 
security level will be independent of the supervision level appropriate within 
the establishment. It might sometimes be the case that the risk assessment 
prior to an escort of a Low Supervision Prisoner located in a closed 
establishment would result in allocation to High Risk Escort precautions.  
 
 
